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Anselm of Canterbury and the Development of Theological 
Thought, c. 1070-1141 
Judith R. Dunthorne 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the role of Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109) in the development of 
theological thought in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries. It aims to demonstrate 
that Anselm’s thought had a greater impact on the early development of scholastic theology 
than is often recognized, particularly in the areas of the doctrine of the incarnation and 
redemption, but also in his discussion of freedom and sin. Through his explanation of the 
economy of salvation in terms of making satisfaction for sin, and his rejection of modes of 
discussion that focussed on the rights and role of the devil, Anselm’s writing on the theology 
of the redemption provided a framework for the discussion of later authors such as Hugh of 
St Victor, Peter Abelard, Bernard of Clairvaux and authors associated with the School of 
Laon, among others. Such discussion often utilized Anselm as an explicator of difficult 
passages in patristic theology, notably Augustine, and his work was most controversial when 
he was thought to have contradicted earlier authority. Anselm was involved in contemporary 
polemics with both Jews and Christian theologians, as well as producing works that explored 
profound theological and metaphysical ideas. In his emphasis on the place and role of reason 
in divine questions, he crossed the boundaries between ‘monastic’ and ‘scholastic’ thought. 
Through an exploration of Anselmian elements in the thought of a variety of authors from the 
late eleventh and early twelfth centuries, this thesis aims to contribute to a broadening 
understanding of the legacy of this great thinker. 
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Preface 
 
This thesis sets out to explore in more detail than has hitherto been the case, the extent to 
which Anselm of Canterbury’s thought was influential upon the immediate generations 
following his death. Anselm (1033-1109) is regularly counted one of the most influential of 
medieval thinkers, the heir to the Fathers and the harbinger of new intellectual questions and 
explorations in the high medieval schools. While it makes no particular claim to being a 
completely comprehensive study, the present discussion is the first to explore the afterlife of 
Anselmian questions amongst the generations of scholars in north-western Christendom until 
the 1140s in a wide perspective. Anselm’s thought was influential in his immediate 
surroundings at his monasteries of Bec and at Canterbury, and within the ‘School’ of Laon 
responsible for the beginning of the Glossa Ordinaria and associated with early Sentence 
collections from Anselm of Laon and his brother Ralph. Anselm’s ideas can be traced in the 
thought of Peter Abelard and Hugh of St Victor in the Parisian schools, as well amongst early 
Cistercian writers, Bernard of Clairvaux and William of St Thierry prominent amongst them. 
A final group of authors considered are those connected with Christian-Jewish dialogue and 
polemical texts of the first half of the twelfth century. Later scholars did not always consider 
the questions by which Anselm was intrigued, and on which he spent his own intellectual and 
prayerful energies, with the same enthusiasm; his reputation and influence were not 
consistent. Nevertheless his questions play a more prominent role in the development of 
twelfth-century theological thinking, and amongst a wider range of contemporary figures, 
than has previously been allowed. 
Sir Richard Southern declared in his first monograph treatment of Anselm that: 
 
He touched the thought, the piety and the politics of the time at every point; and 
whatever he touched looked different afterwards. He founded no school, and in 
many ways the immediate future turned against his methods and ideas. Ironically, 
his influence was most conspicuous where it was least personal – in the sphere of 
politics. His own pupils, though stirred into activity by his large and perceptive 
spirit, went their various ways. They left no easily recognisable impress on the 
future. Yet they helped, by collecting his works, by recording his conversation, by 
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adding their own more commonplace, though not negligible appendices to the 
body of his writings, to keep his influence alive.
1
 
 
Southern was certainly not wrong to emphasize Anselm’s political influce, and it is equally 
true that he founded no school. Whether, and if so in what ways, the generations immediately 
after his death, did move away from his methods and ideas will be explored in more detail. 
Anselm’s influence was a large one, perhaps larger than those pupils closest to him, and it is 
by virtue of that fact to a great extent, that the question of his immediate legacy is complex 
and to be found in a wider range of locations.  
Anselm’s influence on the later twelfth century schools, and certainly the thirteenth-
century masters, is well established, and the subject of much recent scholarship.
2
 His earlier 
influence has not been so well studied, nor his influence always given its due place. This is 
partly perhaps because of historiographical habit, and partly because of the habit of twelfth-
century authors of not acknowledging their sources and debts, particularly amongst modern 
authorities. In a similar manner to the difficulties in identifying Anselm’s own sources of 
influence, ideas have to be traced in a number of forms, from direct borrowing or quotation, 
occasionally openly acknowledged, more often not, to whole areas where lines of thought 
have been absorbed, digested, and which re-emerge in a different context, expression and 
with different valance.  
However, once undertaken the question of Anselmian influence becomes an area of 
fruitful investigations. As Constant Mews has demonstrated, Anselm’s influence upon the 
early figures within northern French scholastic writing, such as William of Champeaux and 
Abelard, can be established as formative.
3
 The present discussion is cast as a contribution to 
this on-going exercise. As will be shown below, Anselm’s thought was debated at the School 
of Laon, in so far as the Sententiae attributed to Master Anselm and his brother Ralph, can be 
securely dated. The form of reception in this context is important. Anselm’s ideas were not 
adopted tout court, but epitomized, and as a result somewhat distorted. Nevertheless, by 
breaking down Anselmian ideas into manageable formulae for teaching purposes, early 
twelfth-century masters helped to ensure that the basic principles of his thought, notably of 
                                                          
1
 R.W. Southern, Saint Anselm and his Biographer (Cambridge, 1966), p. 354. 
2
 M. Robson, ‘The Impact of the Cur Deus Homo on the Early Franciscan School’ in G. R. Evans and D. 
Luscombe (eds.) Anselm: Aosta, Bec and Canterbury (Sheffield, 1996), pp. 334-347. See also Anselm of 
Canterbury and His Legacy, G. E. M. Gasper and I. Logan (eds.) (Toronto 2012).  
3
 Mews, C. J., ‘St Anselm and the Development of Philosophical Theology in Twelfth-Century Paris’, in 
Gasper, G. E. M. and Kohlenberger, H. (eds.) Anselm and Abelard. Investigations and Juxtapositions (Toronto, 
2006), pp. 196-222. 
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Cur Deus homo, were available in a form that could be used easily in the scholastic 
environment, and that his ideas could gain a central place in contemporary debate on the 
redemption. 
Anselm’s theological vision was also discussed in detail at the school of St Victor in 
Paris, and was an important source for Hugh of St Victor’s account of the theological 
development in his major treatise De sacramentis christianae fidei (c. 1130-37).
4
 In De 
sacramentis, Hugh used Anselmian arguments concerning the necessity of the incarnation of 
the God-man in order to make satisfaction for sin, in a passage that was later used by Peter 
Lombard in his Sententiae and his commentary on Romans.
5
 Through his influence on 
Lombard, as well as the continued and widespread popularity of De sacramentis itself, Hugh 
was one of the major channels through which Anselm’s argument entered the mainstream of 
scholastic thought from the mid-twelfth century onwards, up to the resurgence of his thought 
in the later twelfth and early thirteenth century. 
As Southern pointed out, Anselm’s posthumous memory was preserved in the two 
monastic communities in which he lived, and whose members he led. Anselm as saintly 
figure, as monastic guide, and as the figure whose resistance to William Rufus and Henry I of 
England remained the subject of political and historical narrative, was preserved particularly.  
It should be noted that the present thesis will not explore questions of the impact and 
influence of Anselm’s ethical or political thought; nor will it explore his legacy in terms of 
affective piety and prayer. Rather, the focus will be squarely laid upon his influence on 
doctrinal issues, and the development of theological thought within the first half of the 
twelfth century. The major figures on whom his influence can be identified in creative or in 
critical modes have been mentioned above. In what follows it is particular areas of doctrinal 
development that will form the structural basis for discussion. In this, pre-eminent place is 
given to the understanding of the redemption of mankind. In terms of the necessity of the 
incarnation and atonement, the rights of the devil, and the particular circumstances of Jewish-
Christian writings, Anselm’s thought is readily identifiable as a major reference point for 
twelfth-century scholars. Other areas to be considered are the related subjects of free will, 
original sin, and the Trinity. 
                                                          
4
 Hugh of St Victor, De sacramentis christianae fidei (hereafter DS), ed. R. Berndt, Corpus Victorinum, Textus 
Historici, 1 (Munster, 2008). 
5
 Peter Lombard, Sententiarum libri quattuor, ed. J. Hamesse, Corpus christianorum. Thesaurus patrum 
latinorum (Turnhout, 1991), 3.20.2; Commentaria in epistolam ad Romanos, PL, 191, 1301-1534, 5.8-10. 
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Of Anselm’s theological treatises, Cur Deus homo had the greatest impact on thought 
in the early twelfth century.
6
 In it, Anselm explored the reasons why God became incarnate 
and died on the cross in order to redeem humanity. Earlier writing on the redemption 
typically presented it in terms of a contest between God and the devil for lordship over man. 
There was a long history in patristic texts of analogies for the redemption that relied on the 
idea that, in sin, man had voluntarily placed himself under the devil’s jurisdiction so that he 
could not justly be rescued by God without infringing on the devil’s rights. In order for man 
to be redeemed justly, the devil had to give up his claims over him. Patristic authors 
suggested numerous analogies to describe how God could justly achieve this, and their 
images remained popular throughout the medieval period.
7
 However, Anselm rejected them 
completely. He denied that the devil had any right to hold power over man, and that God had 
no need to take his claims into account in the redemption. 
Instead of a battle between God and the devil, Anselm presented the redemption as 
being concerned solely with the relationship between God and man. His argument focused on 
man’s need to make satisfaction for sin in order to be reconciled with God and enter into the 
eternal beatitude for which he had been created. By dishonouring God through sin, man 
incurred a debt that he could never hope to pay; even the entire created universe would be 
insufficient payment. The immutability of divine justice meant that satisfaction needed to be 
made for sin before man could enter the heavenly kingdom. Otherwise, sin would go 
unpunished and God’s honour would not be restored. As it was impossible for such disorder 
and injustice to exist in God’s good universe, it was necessary for satisfaction to be made by 
man for his sin. Only man owed this debt, but only God could pay it; nothing less than God 
was of sufficient value. Therefore, God became man, so that the incarnate God-man Christ 
could offer his life as payment for the sins of humanity and make the atonement that would 
allow man’s full reconciliation with God and restoration to his place in the heavenly 
kingdom. 
Anselm devoted the majority of Cur Deus homo to an extended discussion of his 
satisfaction theory of the redemption, the argument that only one who was both God and man 
could make just and sufficient atonement for sin. However, he also addressed an alternative 
explanation of the redemption, which was popular among patristic and early medieval 
writers. This explanation discussed man’s redemption in terms of a cosmic battle between 
                                                          
6
 Anselm, Cur Deus homo (hereafter CDH), ed. F.S. Schmitt, Sancti Anselmi Opera Omnia (Edinburgh, 1946), 
vol. 2, pp. 37-133. 
7
 For discussion of specific examples, see Chapter 2. 
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God and the devil for power over man, in which the devil was utterly defeated. It was widely 
held that, when man first sinned, he handed himself over to the devil’s power. Some authors 
believed that this gave the devil certain rights over mankind, so that God could not justly 
seize man back from the devil’s grip by force. This concept of the devil’s rights led to 
explanations of the redemption which aimed to demonstrate how Christ’s death could justly 
liberate man, by manoeuvring the devil into giving up his own rights. Patristic and medieval 
authors used a variety of analogies to describe how Christ’s incarnation and crucifixion 
allowed this to happen, and there was no single universal theory behind it. However, the 
prevalence of ideas which depended on the premise that the devil had some right to power 
over man was such that it is possible to identify a genre of ius diaboli argumentation.
8
 
Anselm’s discussion of the ius diaboli in Cur Deus homo was unusual for him in that 
he made use of a contemporary sententia from the school of Laon as a basis for the structure 
of his own writing, quoting a statement made by Ralph of Laon that he considered erroneous, 
and going on to refute it in some detail. This provides a clear example of Anselm’s interest in 
contemporary discussion in the schools, and his concern to correct what he saw as 
inconsistencies and false doctrine in their teaching. Anselm rejected the ius diaboli, and the 
various images associated with it, completely. Not only were there no grounds on which the 
devil could claim a just right to power over man, or the right to be treated ‘justly’ by God; 
discussions of Christ’s death in terms of a ransom or trap for the devil must also be rejected 
absolutely, on the grounds that the God of justice and truth could never be involved in an act 
of deception. 
Later sententiae from Laon, and the writings of other early twelfth-century authors, 
reveal a mixed reception of Anselm’s argument concerning the devil. While authors such as 
                                                          
8
 Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, Patrologia latina (hereafter PL), 75, 505-76, 782, 33.7.14, and Rufinus of 
Aquileia, Expositio symboli, ed. M. Simonetti, CCSL, 20 (Turnhout, 1961), pp. 133-182, 14, both used the 
image of the devil being hooked like a fish using the bait of Christ’s human flesh. Augustine, DT, 13.15.19, 
Augustine, Sermo 130, PL, 38, 725-8, 2, and Leo the Great, Sermo 22, 3-4, used a similar analogy of the cross 
as a trap for the devil. These analogies work on the principle that when the devil abused his rights by attempting 
to exert power over Christ, who was not under his jurisdiction, he could justly be deprived of his rights to power 
over the rest of humanity. Closely linked to the ‘abuse of power’ model was the ‘ransom’ model, which has 
roots in the statement in St Matthew’s Gospel, that the Son of Man came ‘to give his life as a ransom for many’ 
(Matthew 20:28). In his Commentarium in euangelium secundum Matthaeum, ed. R. Girot, Sources chrétiennes, 
162 (Paris, 1970), Origen explained that the life of Jesus was given to the devil as a ransom for humanity. 
Having paid the ransom, God could justly remove man from the devil’s power, while the devil was deceived 
into thinking he could exert power over Christ and utterly defeated by Christ’s superior strength. Augustine’s 
account in DT did demonstrate some ambiguity regarding the legitimacy of the devil’s claim that he had a just 
right to power over man, discussed below (p. 63). However, any account of the redemption that relied on the 
need for God to treat the devil’s claims with justice inevitably implied that the devil had some form of just right 
to those claims. Gustaf Aulén described this form of thinking as the ‘Classical model’ of the redemption, which 
was challenged by Anselm’s ‘Latin model’ of the Atonement. Aulén, Christus Victor. An Historical Study of the 
Three Main Types of the Idea of Atonement, trans. A.G. Herbert (Eugene, Oregon, 1931). 
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Hugh of St Victor and Peter Abelard appreciated the logic of his argument, others were 
reluctant to jettison an image that had such a powerful emotive appeal. Southern claims that 
‘it may be said at once that the verdict of Anselm’s immediate successors was against him’, 
and that ‘even those...who appreciated the rest of his argument, were unwilling to abandon 
the rights of the devil.’9  According to Southern, only Peter Abelard accepted Anselm’s 
rejection of the rights of the devil wholeheartedly.
10
 This is an exaggeration; as well as 
Abelard, Hugh of St Victor, Bernard of Clairvaux, Odo and Herman of Tournai and some of 
the later Laon authors followed Anselm in rejecting the notion that the devil had any just 
right to power over man, although Bernard in particular continued to make use of traditional 
imagery associated with the ius diaboli in his polemical writing. Anselm’s satisfaction theory 
was not necessarily seen as incompatible with earlier models of the redemption that 
concentrated on the battle between God and the devil, and a number of authors combined 
elements of both in their writing.
11
  
Anselm’s rejection of an idea that had been dominant in patristic and early medieval 
literature may have led to fears that he was contradicting authoritative teaching, abandoning 
what had been considered sufficient for the catholic faith for centuries in favour of his own 
novel ideas. As in his discussion of the concept of ‘necessity’ in the redemption, discussed in 
the previous chapter, Anselm sought to clarify the teaching of the Church and its authorities, 
notably Augustine, and to bring greater consistency to the mass of ideas and images 
contained within earlier works. Where traditional images, such as the ‘rights of the devil’ 
idea, were incompatible with the demands of logic, Anselm was willing to abandon them in 
favour of alternative approaches. The varied weighting given to the competing demands of 
traditional ideas and rational argumentation by Anselm’s contemporaries and successors 
played a significant role in their responses to his approach to the problem of the ius diaboli.  
The reception of Cur Deus homo in the schools of Laon, St Victor and Peter Abelard, 
is an area in which Anselm’s arguments concerning the necessity and justice or fittingness of 
the incarnation and redemption had immediate relevance to contemporary debate. Anselm’s 
work could be read as a commentary on Augustine, drawing together ideas that appeared at 
various points in Augustine’s writings, and providing a detailed and coherent analysis of key 
concepts and terminology. Apart from scholastic discussion, the arguments of Cur Deus 
homo also proved a useful source for the rising genre of disputation literature in the early 
                                                          
9
 Southern, Portrait, p. 210. 
10
 Ibid. 
11
 This can be seen particularly in a number of works of Jewish-Christian disputation, discussed in Chapter 3. 
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twelfth century. By offering a reasoned explanation for the necessity of Christ’s incarnation 
and death in order to save humanity, Anselm’s satisfaction theory established a useful 
framework for writers such as Gilbert Crispin, Guibert of Nogent, Odo of Tournai and the 
author of the anonymous Dialogus inter christianum et iudeum de fide catholica.  
With the exception of Odo of Tournai, these authors were relatively uninterested in 
theological and linguistic subtleties such as the different forms of necessity described by 
Anselm, and their accounts of the redemption presented simplified versions of his argument, 
along with generous quantities of scriptural quotation. Like Honorius Augustodunensis, 
whose account of the redemption in Elucidarium will be discussed in Chapter One, the 
authors of Jewish-Christian polemics were primarily concerned with providing a simple, 
irrefutable demonstration of the reasonableness and validity of the redemption. Anselm’s 
satisfaction theory was repeatedly combined with traditional images associated with the ius 
diaboli argument. Like Bernard of Clairvaux, to be discussed in Chapter Two, they were 
eager to harness the rhetorical power of such images to engage and inspire their audience, 
without necessarily being aware of, or concerned about, the reasons why Anselm had rejected 
their use as an explanation for the redemption. 
One of the major themes of discussion on the incarnation and redemption in the early 
twelfth century concerned the relationship between divine justice and power, freedom and 
necessity. Anselm’s discussion of the necessity of the redemption in Cur Deus homo 
constituted a significant contribution to this discussion. However, the redemption was not the 
only subject in which the concept of freedom played a crucial role, and for which Anselm’s 
work provided a stimulus for discussion. In his early treatises De libertate arbitrii and De 
casu diaboli (1080s), and later in De concordia (c. 1107), Anselm discussed the meaning of 
freedom of choice, whether human, angelic or divine, and the relationship between human 
freedom, sin and grace.
12
 Anselm’s arguments in these texts enjoyed a mixed reception in the 
schools of the early twelfth century. In particular, passages where he appeared to go beyond 
or even contradict earlier authorities such as Augustine proved controversial, and were firmly 
rejected in texts from the school of Laon. Anselm’s thought on freedom was to a considerable 
extent derived from Augustine, but he presented his arguments in a new way, expanding 
concepts and definitions to encompass a broader frame of reference than his predecessor had 
conceived. In the attempt to present and interpret Anselm’s thought in a manner that was 
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more obviously compatible with the traditional Augustinian framework, writers such as 
Honorius Augustodunensis and Hugh of St Victor gradually adapted Anselmian ideas into 
forms that had more immediate relevance and utility for contemporary discussion in the 
schools and beyond.  
Following Cur Deus homo, Anselm returned to Christological concerns in his next 
treatise, De conceptu uirginali et de originali peccato (1099-1100), which asked how the 
sinless God-man could have been conceived from the massa peccatrix of fallen humanity, 
through the Virgin Mary.
13
 Anselm conceived De conceptu as a supplementary appendix to 
Cur Deus homo, returning to the further investigation of a question raised in the earlier work. 
Anselm’s discussion of the Virgin, conceived from the mass of sinful humanity, but purified 
and raised to a level of sanctity beyond anything else in creation, in order to be worthy of 
bearing the Son of God in her womb, fed into the growth in Marian theology and devotion in 
the twelfth century, particularly the controversy surrounding the doctrine and feast of the 
immaculate conception in England.  
De conceptu also provided a distinctive contribution to discussion of the nature and 
transmission of original sin. Anselm’s approach differed from that of the majority of his 
contemporaries in that he defined original sin as injustice, rather than concupiscence. Only 
Odo of Tournai followed Anselm’s definition in the twelfth century, and his treatise De 
peccato originali was heavily influenced by Anselm’s work. The debate on the transmission 
of original sin as it developed during the early decades of the twelfth century was largely 
preoccupied with the problem of the origin of the soul, which had been declared unsolvable 
by Augustine, but was now considered a suitable subject for definition in the atmosphere of 
heightened confidence produced by the increasing systematization of theology in the schools. 
In his own writing on original sin, Anselm did not directly address the origin of the soul, and 
his assumed position has been the subject of debate, both at the school of Laon in the early 
twelfth century and among modern historians. As with Cur Deus homo, Anselm’s decision to 
write was motivated in part by his awareness of the questions and concerns facing his friends 
and colleagues both in monastic communities and the secular schools. Nevertheless, his 
alternative definition of original sin, and failure to approach the subject along similar lines to 
the general course of debate, meant that his argument did not fit easily into the broader 
framework of discussion in the schools or provide answers to the particular questions that 
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were being asked by the majority of his contemporaries. The impact of De conceptu on the 
development of the doctrine of original sin in the early twelfth century was therefore limited. 
Equally limited in its apparent impact was Anselm’s discussion of the Trinity, and the 
influence of his earlier writings, in particular the Monologion and Proslogion.
14
 Here, to 
return briefly to Southern’s statement quoted at the beginning of this preface, the evidence of 
manuscript production should be taken into account. While direct discussion of Anselm’s 
ideas on the relational aspects within the Godhead was limited, copies of his works were 
made, and their circulation was assured within the twelfth century. The later twelfth century 
and thirteenth century interest in these Anselmian questions draws on a more consistent 
engagement with Anselm in the century following his death.  
The following chapters will trace Anselm’s influence on the development of 
redemption theology in particular amongst a wide range of authors within the first half of the 
twelfth century. Some, such as Gilbert Crispin are known to have studied under Anselm, and 
emerged from his own monastic communities; Eadmer of Canterbury, and possibly 
Honorious fit into this mould. Others, Abelard, Hugh of St Victor and Bernard represent 
different directions in which twelfth century thought could and would travel. All of the 
figures discussed here, whether perceived as major or more minor, played their part in the 
development of twelfth century thought, and all, whether in agreement or not, drew 
considerable inspiration from the Archbishop of Canterbury, and Prior and Abbot of Bec.   
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Chapter One 
Cur Deus homo and the Necessity of Satisfaction 
 
Anselm’s aim in Cur Deus homo was to offer a rational explanation for the doctrine of the 
redemption, which relied on logic and reason rather than earlier authority. Instead of citing 
scriptural passages and patristic texts, he attempted to explain the redemption remoto Christo, 
removing the person of Christ altogether from his argument until he had demonstrated, by 
logical reasoning, that no other course of action would have been possible. Although he did 
not discuss the work of earlier authors explicitly, Anselm’s thought was firmly grounded in 
patristic authority; throughout his career, he took care to emphasize his orthodoxy, and 
refused to contemplate ideas that contradicted the doctrine of the catholic faith as it had 
developed through the work of earlier authorities. Nevertheless, as he explained in his 
commendation of Cur Deus homo to Pope Urban II, ‘even [the Fathers]...were not able to say 
all that they could have said if they had lived longer; and the reasoning of truth is so copious 
and profound that it cannot be exhausted by mortals.’15 This consideration justified Anselm in 
going beyond the statements of earlier authors in order to develop a new model for 
understanding the redemption. 
Anselm’s discussion of the necessity and justice of the incarnation and redemption 
explored questions that had been raised by earlier authors such as Augustine, and were the 
subject of debate among Anselm’s contemporaries, notably at the school of Laon. Although 
Augustine had argued that the incarnation of the Christ was the most fitting way for God to 
redeem mankind, he did not believe that this was the only possible option, and stressed that 
God could have chosen a different method, had he wished. Anselm’s claim that it was 
necessary for the redemption to be brought about through the incarnation and death of the 
God-man Christ was controversial, as it appeared to impose limitations on divine freedom 
and omnipotence. This was not in fact the case, and Anselm was careful to stress the 
complete freedom of God’s grace throughout the redemptive process. He distinguished 
between two different kinds of necessity, one of which compels action, while the other 
compels nothing, but results from the inevitable consequences of free choices already made. 
In this way, Anselm was able to argue that the incarnation was necessary without impinging 
on divine power and freedom. However, not all of his early commentators understood the 
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subtleties of his thought on necessity, and the idea remained controversial in the twelfth 
century. 
Cur Deus homo enjoyed a wide circulation soon after its composition.
16
 The 
prevalence of manuscript copies in schools and monastic houses in the early twelfth century 
suggests that it was considered a useful and important contribution to writing on the 
redemption. Evidence of discussion of his argument in the schools of Laon, St Victor and 
Peter Abelard indicates that Anselm’s claims regarding the necessity of the incarnation were 
of particular interest, and provoked considerable debate. The relationship between necessity 
and freedom, and the meaning of divine omnipotence, was an important subject of discussion 
in the schools of the early twelfth century, and the redemption offered an important case 
study for these broader concerns.
17
 In addition, Anselm’s discussion on the subject could be 
read as a commentary on statements made by Augustine, developing ideas that Augustine had 
discussed only briefly, and locating particular statements within a broader conceptual 
framework. The process of reading and interpreting Anselm in an Augustinian context can be 
seen in discussion at the schools of Laon and St Victor in particular, and will be a recurring 
theme in later chapters concerning different aspects of Anselm’s thought. 
Although Anselm’s statements concerning the necessity of the incarnation remained 
controversial in the early twelfth century, his satisfaction theory enjoyed wide popularity. As 
well as being employed in scholastic texts by authors such as Hugh of St Victor, it was also 
adopted, in a simplified form, by authors such as Honorius Augustodunensis, who found in it 
a valuable means of explaining the incarnation and redemption to a less educated audience in 
terms that could be easily understood and that did not allow for rational doubt. The logical 
force of Anselm’s argument also made it suitable for use as the basis for polemical writing on 
the redemption, particularly in the context of Jewish-Christian disputations. The use of Cur 
Deus homo in disputation literature is the subject of Chapter Three. 
Anselm’s rejection of the ‘rights of the devil’ (ius diaboli) also stimulated discussion 
in the early twelfth century. Although texts associated with the school of Laon continued to 
argue in terms of the devil’s just power over man, other authors such as Hugh of St Victor 
and Peter Abelard followed Anselm’s argument, and employed his description of the devil as 
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a rebel slave of God in their own discussions on the subject. Nevertheless, numerous authors 
whose accounts of the redemption in terms of satisfaction indicate that they were familiar 
with Anselm’s arguments in Cur Deus homo continued to employ analogies associated with 
the ius diaboli idea that Anselm had rejected, and apparently saw no incompatibility between 
the two forms of argument. Anselm’s approach to the ius diaboli concept, and its reception in 
the schools of the early twelfth century, will be discussed in Chapter Two. The current 
chapter will focus on the impact of Anselm’s satisfaction theory, and his arguments for the 
necessity of the incarnation, in the schools. 
 
Necessity: Anselm, Augustine and the School of Laon 
 
In patristic and early medieval thought, it was often argued that God could have chosen some 
other means of redeeming the human race, had he wished.
18
 God was omnipotent and 
limitless in his freedom; to suggest that God could not have saved the human race without 
being made man would be to impose insupportable constraints on divine power and freedom. 
On the other hand, why should God have chosen such a difficult and demeaning method, 
sending his own Son to suffer the shames and pains of mortal existence, culminating in an 
agonizing death on the cross, if he could have saved humanity with a simple word of divine 
command? As an attempt to resolve this problem, Augustine had turned to the concept of 
fittingness. Although God, ‘to whose power all things are equally subject, did not lack any 
other possible way’, ‘no other way [than the incarnation] was more fitting for healing our 
wretchedness.’19 Augustine went on to argue that the incarnation of the Son of God was 
necessary (necessarium fuit) in a sense, in order to demonstrate the extent and cost of God’s 
love for man.  
 In Cur Deus homo, Anselm explored the concept of fittingness in the incarnation, 
developing the idea beyond what could be found in Augustine’s work. For Anselm, 
fittingness meant acting according to the demands of justice and rectitudo. He had already 
explored the meaning of justice and rectitudo in his earlier treatises De ueritate and De 
libertate arbitrii, where he defined freedom and power in terms of the ability to act with 
perfect justice. Arbitrary action, which was not perfectly in line with justice, was not true 
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freedom but a weakness, a liability to fall into injustice and sin.
20
 In Cur Deus homo, Anselm 
applied his understanding of the meaning of justice, power and freedom in general to God’s 
action in the redemption in particular. The incarnation was necessary because any other 
course of action was incompatible with the demands of justice, and therefore unfitting for a 
just God. God’s perfect power and freedom meant that nothing could prevent him from acting 
in accord with his own just nature, and so he could not act in any other way.  
Anselm was careful to avoid implying that the necessity of the incarnation imposed a 
limitation on divine power and freedom by compelling God to act in a particular way. He 
qualified his use of the term necessitas by differentiating between the necessity that imposes 
external constraints on an agent (necessitas praecedens) and the necessity that arises from the 
consequences of the agent’s prior decisions (necessitas sequens).  
 
For there is a preceding necessity, which is the cause for a thing’s being, and 
there is a consequent necessity, which the thing brings about. It is preceding and 
efficient necessity when it is said that ‘the sky revolves because it is necessary 
that it should revolve’; but it is consequent necessity which effects nothing but is 
itself brought about when I say ‘you are speaking by necessity, because you are 
speaking’. For when I say this, I mean that nothing can bring it about that, while 
you are speaking, you are not speaking; not that something is compelling you to 
speak.
21
 
 
It was necessity in the second sense that Anselm had in mind when he spoke of the 
‘necessity’ of the incarnation. It was necessary that while God was just, he could not be 
unjust, but had to act in a manner that was fitting and in accord with the demands of justice 
and rectitudo. God was not constrained to act as he did through any external, effectual 
necessity, but because to do so was his own will, immutable and infallible. ‘All these things 
were through necessity, because he himself so willed it...if he had not so willed, they would 
not have been.’22 Anselm was thus able to explain how Christ’s death on the cross was both 
necessary and free simultaneously, without any limitation being imposed on divine freedom 
and omnipotence.  
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 The concept of the necessity of the incarnation was the subject of discussion at the 
school of Laon in the late eleventh century. A sententia attributed to Ralph of Laon asked 
why it was necessary for God himself to have become incarnate. Why could he not have sent 
an angel or a sinless man to redeem humanity instead? The author argued that no man was 
capable of redeeming man, because no man was free from sin. ‘If man were redeemed 
through a pure man, the corrupt would be liberated through the corrupt; but the corrupt could 
not redeem the corrupt. For the whole human race was corrupted through the sin of the first 
parent.’23 With regard to the possibility of an angelic redeemer, the author argued that ‘the 
angelic nature was in part corrupted and if an angel were made incarnate it could certainly 
sin, its nature having been corrupted already through the sin of pride.’24 This argument was 
repeated in another sententia, also attributed to Ralph of Laon, and which formed part of the 
same collection, appearing immediately before the sententia quoted here in the manuscript.
25
  
The sententia concluded that ‘no one else could free the human race, except he who 
was God. For it could not be done faithfully by anyone else, since a man or a pure angel 
could sin, if changed into flesh.’26 Although he did not use the term necesse in this sententia, 
the author implied that the redemption could not reasonably have happened in any other way. 
The term necesse was used in two other sententiae attributed to Ralph. The first, after 
rejecting the idea that man could be saved either by an angel or a man, concluded with the 
statement that ‘it was necessary for God to become man as, because God cannot sin, he could 
strengthen the man united with him, so that he could in no way be conquered by temptation 
and sin.’27 A further sententia, possibly the source for this one, also concluded that ‘it was 
necessary for the son of God to become man as, because God cannot sin, he could strengthen 
the man united with him so that he could not sin.’28 
 The question of whether the redemption of mankind could have been brought about 
through a sinless man or an angel was repeated by Anselm in Cur Deus homo.
29
 Anselm’s 
response differed from that of the Laon author in that he did not admit the inevitable 
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corruption of human and angelic nature to be a precluding factor. Human nature was only 
sinful through descent from Adam; God could create a new man in the same way as he had 
created Adam, who would still be free from sin. Although he did not address the notion of a 
saviour angel separately in this context, Anselm would not have agreed with the claim that 
the angelic nature had already been partially corrupted and retained the capacity to sin, which 
contradicted his belief that the angels who persevered were confirmed in their goodness so 
that they could no longer sin.
30
 It also implied that angels shared a common genus, an idea 
which Anselm rejected.
31
 However, the concluding statement in the sententia expressed an 
opinion that was in concurrence with Anselm. ‘If a creature were to redeem the creature, the 
creature would then be subject to that creature, and in some way the dignity of man, who had 
been made in the image and likeness of God, would be diminished.’32 This was the argument 
used by Anselm in Cur Deus homo: 
 
Surely you understand that, were any other person to rescue man from eternal 
death, man would rightly be judged his slave? If he were such, he would in no 
way have been restored to that dignity which he would have had, if he had not 
sinned. For man, who had the prospect of being the slave of no one except God 
and equal to the good angels in everything, would be the slave of one who was 
not God and to whom the angels were not enslaved.
33
 
 
This passage in Cur Deus homo demonstrates the extent to which Anselm was aware of 
contemporary debate in the schools, and concerned to make his own writing relevant to the 
issues of his day. Anselm’s particular awareness of, and interest in, contemporary teaching at 
the school of Laon, has been primarily attributed to his student Boso.
34
 According to Eadmer, 
and the Vita Bosonis of Milo Crispin, Boso was an intelligent and well-educated young man 
who had come to the school at Bec troubled by perplexing questions, which he discussed with 
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Anselm at length. Anselm later summoned Boso to join him at Canterbury.
35
 We know very 
little about Boso’s education before his arrival at Bec, and there is no mention of where he 
studied in the Vita Bosonis, although Laon is highly probable.
36
 Anselm later acknowledged 
Boso and his questions as a major motivation for the composition of Cur Deus homo.
37
 In a 
separate passage in Cur Deus homo, addressing the concept that the devil had rights over man 
which God could not justly ignore, Anselm cited almost verbatim the Laon sententia, albeit 
without reference to his source, and completely denied the validity of its argument. This will 
be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
Early twelfth-century sentence collections from Laon show that Cur Deus homo was 
read and discussed there soon after its composition, and that Anselm’s arguments concerning 
the need for a God-man to make satisfaction for sin were quickly absorbed into the school’s 
teaching on the redemption. This can be seen particularly in the Sententie diuine pagine.
38
 As 
with other sentence collections associated with the school of Laon, it is impossible to 
establish the precise dating and authorship of the text. René Silvain argued that it can be seen 
as a collection of reportationes of the oral teaching provided by Anselm of Laon himself.
39
 
Silvain’s view has not been widely accepted. Odon Lottin pointed out that, while it is 
possible that the collections were based on reportationes of Anselm’s teaching, there is no 
evidence to suggest that this was the case.
40
 Nevertheless, Lottin accepted that the Sententie 
diuine pagine has a significant basis in Anselm’s teaching.41  
In its discussion of whether God could have used some method other than the 
incarnation and death of the God-man Christ for redeeming man, the Sententie diuine pagine 
stated that ‘saints say that it could not have happened otherwise.’42 Anselm of Canterbury is 
not mentioned in this passage. However, it seems a reasonable conjecture that this is who the 
author had in mind; he was clearly familiar with the arguments of Cur Deus homo, citing the 
text explicitly in several points elsewhere in the collection.
43
 The author rejected the idea on 
the grounds that God could have redeemed man merely by commanding that it be done (solo 
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uerbo); but he went on to argue that, while it was not the only way by which redemption 
could be achieved, the incarnation of the Christ was certainly the most fitting (conueniens). 
Had God acted through word alone, man would not have received the supreme example of 
love and humility presented by Christ, and the redemption would not have provoked so much 
awe and wonder. 
The author pointed out that a true reconciliation between God and man required a 
great sacrifice. ‘For when man stole himself away from God, it was right that reconciliation 
should take place through that which was greater, or at least equal, to that which he had 
stolen.’44 While not using the Anselmian terminology of satisfactio, the thrust of the 
argument here is the same as that of Cur Deus homo. After reviewing, and rejecting, other 
possibilities for the redemptive sacrifice, the author concluded that only the God-man would 
do. 
 
Because it could not happen by any of these means, God became incarnate to 
humanity; for because man had sinned, it was fitting that redemption should 
happen through man; but because this could not happen through a man who was 
[both] pure and subject to sin, God was made man, because in this way one 
person was God and man, that is Christ, who is the mediator between God and 
man, which is the most fitting for both.
45
 
 
The Laon author’s association of the ideas of fittingness and necessity has parallels with Cur 
Deus homo, in which Anselm argued that it was necessary for God to become man because 
no other way would be fitting for divine justice and the good order of the universe. Anselm 
used the terminology of conuenientia throughout Cur Deus homo, as the Laon author did in 
this sententia. The author was unwilling to endorse the conclusion that, if the redemption 
could not fittingly take place in any other way, it was necessary for it to happen through the 
incarnation of the God-man. This could be due to the weight of patristic authority in favour of 
the view that man could have been set free by divine command alone, and the fear that to 
suggest otherwise might impinge upon divine omnipotence. The Laon author was willing to 
utilize aspects of Anselmian thought where they could be of use in elucidating traditional 
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problems, but was unwilling to follow his ideas to potentially controversial and 
unauthenticated conclusions. 
A later sententia identified by Lottin as belonging to the school of Laon also cited 
Anselm of Canterbury’s arguments on the necessity and fittingness of the incarnation. 
Entitled Cur Deus homo, the sententia asked whether it was necessary for Christ to be made 
incarnate in order to redeem humanity.
46
 The author argued that, although other means of 
redeeming man were possible for God, ‘it could not be done more justly or more fittingly 
than through the God man.’47 
 
Another way was possible for God, but none would have been more fitting for 
healing our wretchedness; this possibility must refer to God alone, not to 
creatures. If it is found elsewhere, ‘it could not happen otherwise’, the possibility 
must be understood to have been removed not from God but only from creatures. 
For this could not happen worthily through an angel nor through a simple man, 
since both were corrupted in nature; for this to be done worthily and fittingly it 
was necessary for divine and human nature to be joined in a unity of person; the 
divine, which alone could, and the human, which alone should. From which 
archbishop Anselm: God could, man should.
48
 
 
This sententia demonstrates a better understanding of Anselm’s arguments for the necessity 
of the incarnation than the passage from the Sententie diuine pagine discussed above, 
although its overall conclusion was similar. No other method of redemption would be fitting, 
as the penalty for sin which man alone ought to pay, could not be paid by any except God. As 
God could never act in a way that was unfitting, so it could be said that it was necessary for 
him to act in this way. However, this in no way impinged on divine omnipotence, which was 
absolute. The author was thus able to reconcile the concept of a necessary incarnation with 
the absolute power and freedom of God, and to accept the conclusions that Anselm had 
drawn in Cur Deus homo with fewer reservations than the author of the Sententie diuine 
pagine. 
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 The line attributed to Anselm in the sententia above, ‘God could, man should’, has the 
air of a catch-phrase. It provided a neat summary of the basic principle of Anselm’s 
satisfaction theory in an easily memorable formula for the benefit of students who lacked 
either opportunity or inclination to study the text of Cur Deus homo in detail. There is 
sufficient evidence from the surviving sententiae to indicate that Cur Deus homo was closely 
read and discussed by at least some of the scholars of Laon, but many students may have had 
little more understanding of Anselm’s argument than what could be summarized in a few 
simple slogans. Much of the complexity of Anselm’s thought was inevitably lost in the 
process, which could lead to misunderstandings. The controversy surrounding his arguments 
on necessity in the twelfth century was primarily due to critics whose grasp of Cur Deus 
homo did not extend to recognition of the very specific sense in which Anselm used the term 
necessitas.  
Although the discussion of the necessity and fittingness of the incarnation in the 
Sententie diuine pagine was apparently written with Anselm’s work in mind, the author did 
not cite Cur Deus homo explicitly in this passage. The author did address Anselm directly in 
the context of a discussion of why the fallen angels had to be replaced with men rather than 
other angels. The author began his discussion with the simple statement that ‘the ultimate 
cause was the good pleasure of God.’49 However, he then went on to discuss two alternative 
answers suggested by Anselm of Canterbury.
50
  
 
In the book entitled Cur Deus homo, there are two conjectures, of which the first 
is this. If God restored the number of angels from angels, this would seem to be 
contrary to the first creation of things... The second conjecture is this. If he were 
to be restored to that place, he should be equally blessed as he would have 
become if he had stood fast. But if he had stood fast, he would be blessed without 
the example or fear from the preceding fall, and so he would not be equally 
blessed, and so that place ought not to be restocked from angels.
51
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Both of these ideas appear in Cur Deus homo. As the Laon author had identified, Anselm 
argued that the restored angel, having experienced the horror of the fall, could never reach the 
same degree of merited blessedness as the angel who persisted in the good from the 
beginning for its own sake. Therefore, he could never enjoy equal beatitude to the good 
angel, and so could not take his place in the heavenly city. 
 
Other angels cannot be restored in place of [those who fell] – to say nothing of 
how this seems repugnant to the perfection of the original creation –  because 
they should not be restored unless they could be such as those others would have 
been if they had not sinned, and if they had persevered without seeing the 
punishment for sin. But this would be impossible for those others who were put in 
their places after their fall. For he who knows nothing of punishment for sin, and 
he who looks constantly upon eternal punishment, are not equally praiseworthy, if 
they stand in the truth.
52
 
 
In Cur Deus homo, Boso responded to Anselm’s exposition of these arguments with the 
statement that ‘you have proved that bad angels ought to be replaced from the human race,’ 
rather than being reinstated themselves or replaced by other angels.
53
 The author of the 
Sententie did not share Boso’s confidence. In response to the first point, that it would seem 
contrary to the original perfection of creation, the Laon author criticized Anselm for failing to 
explain clearly that ‘God created everything in perfection, including the angel who fell. But 
he who was restored to his place seems to be of greater dignity than he who fell, because he 
did not fall as the other had.’54 If God needed to create new angels to replace those who had 
fallen, it would imply a failure in his initial creation, a mistake which needs to be rectified. 
More significantly for his critique of Anselm, the author claimed that the entire argument was 
invalid, because the same objection could also be made to the replacement of the fallen 
angels with men.
55
 The author also discounted Anselm’s second argument, that the angels 
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who were created or restored in the wake of the fall could never have the same degree of 
merit as those who had persevered from the beginning, on the grounds that this, too, applied 
equally well to men.
56
 
 In the following paragraph, the author of the Sententie went on to ask, as Anselm had 
done, whether man was created for the sole purpose of replacing the angels who had fallen in 
the heavenly city, or whether he was created for his own sake. Like Anselm, he concluded 
that man was created for his own sake, and he used Anselmian arguments as part of his 
explanation for why this should be the case. The Laon author began, as Anselm had done, 
with the question of whether angels and men were created simultaneously, or whether man 
was created after the angels’ fall. This question had been debated for centuries, particularly in 
relation to the interpretation of the creation narrative in Genesis.
57
 Neither Anselm of 
Canterbury nor the Laon author felt able to draw any definite conclusions on the question, but 
both sought a solution to the purpose of man’s creation that could work under either temporal 
model of creation. The Laon author began by arguing that if angels and men were created 
simultaneously, then there was no reason why man should have been created solely to replace 
the fallen angels, although he did acknowledge the possibility that God created man because 
he had foreseen the fall. If man was created after the angels, it was still likely that men were 
not created solely to replace the fallen angels, although it could not be proven. 
 
If angel and man were created at the same time...there is no reason why man 
should have been created for that restoration, since he was created before the fall 
of the angel...But if he was created afterwards, then it is probable, but not 
conclusive.
58
  
 
This point had been argued in greater detail by Anselm, in his discussion of whether the 
angels had been created in sufficient numbers to fill the heavenly city if there had been no 
fall, and consequently whether man was created solely in order to replace the fallen angels. 
Anselm concluded that  
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that perfect number, by which the heavenly city was to be completed, was not in 
the angels. For if mankind was not created at the same time as the angels, it is 
possible that this is the case, and if they were both created simultaneously...it 
seems to be a necessity.
59
 
 
The Laon author became more compelling on the idea that man was created for his own sake 
later in the paragraph, where he made more use of Anselm’s arguments. The author claimed 
that, if man were created solely to replace the fallen angels, and could not have attained 
beatitude without the fall, he would rejoice in the sin and suffering of the fallen angels which 
had led to such great happiness for himself.
60
 This mirrors Anselm’s argument that the 
‘perverse joy’ that man would feel in his own happiness at the cost of another’s fall would be 
a sin that should preclude him from enjoying a place in heaven.
61
 
 In Cur Deus homo, Anselm also discussed the relative numbers of established angels, 
fallen angels, and elect men. The argument that man could not be created simply to replace 
the fallen angels seemed to indicate that the number of men who would be taken into the 
heavenly city must exceed the number of angels who fell; man must be there on his own 
account. He then referred to a verse from Deuteronomy which stated that God ‘determined 
the limits of the peoples according to the number of the children of Israel’.62 Anselm noted 
that an alternative version of the text referred to ‘the angels of God’, and that this had led 
earlier authorities to argue that this meant that the number of elect men would equal the 
number of good angels.
63
 He argued that this did not contradict his earlier discussion, 
 
assuming it is not certain that the same number of angels remained steadfast as 
had fallen. For, if there are more elect angels than wicked ones, it is a necessity 
that elect humans should replace the wicked angels and it is a possibility that they 
will be equal to the number of the blessed ones; and thus there will be more 
righteous humans than unrighteous angels.
64
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Anselm stressed the uncertainty of his conclusions which, although they appeared logical, 
could not be held as definite, as they were unconfirmed by authority. He concluded a lengthy 
discussion of the two versions of the text by arguing that both translations implied that as 
many men would be taken into heaven as there were angels who had kept their place. 
However, there was nothing in the text to suggest that more angels kept their place than fell. 
The logical argument he had set out in favour of the idea that there should be more elect men 
than fallen angels might seem to lead to the conclusion that more angels therefore must have 
persevered than fell, but this was unsubstantiated by authority and so could not be absolutely 
affirmed. 
 The Laon author concluded his discussion of the purpose of man’s creation in a 
similar way to Anselm. He argued that ‘as more angels remained than fell, and as many men 
ascended as remained, it appears that man was not created only for restoration, because if he 
were created only for restoration, then more would not have ascended than fell.’65 The author 
did not refer to any authorities in this passage, but it seems likely that his argument was 
primarily taken from Anselm’s work, albeit in a simplified form, and without any of 
Anselm’s analysis of the problematic nature of the texts. The Laon author treated the 
Gregorian interpretation of the Deuteronomy text as perfectly logical and incontrovertible, 
and did not see any need to question the idea, as Anselm had done.  
Anselm’s discussion of the creation of angels and men in Cur Deus homo raised a 
number of questions that had been debated by patristic authors, such as whether or not they 
had been created simultaneously, and whether angels and men would dwell in the heavenly 
city in equal numbers. This chapter of Cur Deus homo can thus be seen in part as an 
elaboration on, and exegesis of, patristic texts, particularly Augustine’s various commentaries 
on Genesis. This was a primary activity of the school of Laon, and may go some way towards 
explaining the Laon author’s interest in Anselm’s interpretation. The chapters of Cur Deus 
homo relating to man’s creation to replace the fallen angels and enter the heavenly city 
appear as a digression from the main text, instigated by a question from Boso. In the 
dialogue, Anselm initially displayed reluctance to address the question, on the grounds that it 
was irrelevant to the subject of the incarnation, and had to be persuaded into it by a reminder 
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from Boso that ‘God loves a cheerful giver!’66 This is essentially a literary conceit, and 
justification for an uncharacteristic digression. However, the fact that Anselm felt it necessary 
to enter into lengthy discussion on the subject in spite of its perceived irrelevance to the task 
in hand demonstrates that he considered it an important topic for his readers to understand, 
perhaps because he was aware that the problem was exercising his contemporaries in the 
schools. It is perhaps no coincidence that it was Boso, the confused ex-schoolman, who 
raised the subject in the dialogue, just as it was Boso who was later to raise the even more 
controversial question of the devil’s rights over man.67 
 
Hugh of St Victor: Satisfaction and Necessity 
 
 In De sacramentis, Hugh presented his account of the redemption using the analogy 
of a law suit with three claimants, God, man and the devil.
68
 The devil was convicted of 
having done injury both to God and to man. At the same time, man was convicted of having 
done injury to God, by rebelling against him in sin. Man’s offence against God meant that, 
although he had a just case against the devil, who had no right to inflict punishment on him, 
the trial could not be brought to court. This is because the only advocate with the power to 
ensure the devil’s conviction was God himself. God was unwilling to act as man’s advocate 
against the devil because of his continued anger regarding man’s sin. Therefore, it was 
necessary for man to be reconciled with God in order to enter suit with the devil, with God as 
advocate, and to be liberated from the punishment of servitude to sin.  
 Hugh discussed the reconciliation between God and man in terms of man making 
reparation for his sin. He argued that man ‘could not placate God rationally, unless he 
restored the damage which he had caused and made satisfaction for his contempt.’69 Hugh 
identified two separate elements that were both necessary in order for the reparation to be 
adequate. Not only did man have to return that which he had stolen from God, he had to 
render back to God more than he had taken, to compensate for his contempt. This accords 
with the definition of satisfaction given by Anselm in Cur Deus homo.
70
 However, Hugh 
distinguished between the two elements of satisfaction more strongly than Anselm, using 
them as the basis to describe the two principle stages of Christ’s incarnation and death. 
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Hugh followed Anselm in stressing man’s utter incapability of providing sufficient 
recompense to God for his sin. Man had nothing which could compensate God worthily for 
the loss incurred, since anything he could offer from irrational creation would be insufficient 
to cover the loss of rational humanity. Even the gift of a man himself would be inadequate, 
since man in his fallen state was inferior to Adam in his created state of justice and 
innocence. ‘Therefore, man found nothing with which he could placate God for himself, 
because whether he gave what was his or himself, it would not be worthy recompense.’71  
For this reason, God himself became incarnate in humanity, so that the sinless God-
man would provide a worthy recompense. ‘For in the birth of Christ God was justly placated 
toward man, since such a man was found for man who was not only equal to but even greater 
than man.’72 
The birth of the God-man Christ provided the means for man to restore to God a being 
of sufficient value to pay the debt owed for the loss of the first man in the fall. However, ‘it 
still remained for man that, just as by restoring damage he had placated anger, so also by 
making satisfaction for contempt he should be made worthy to escape punishment.’73 Even 
after the original debt had been paid, man still owed God additional compensation to atone 
for his guilt and cover the injury caused by his contempt. Only by providing such satisfaction 
could man justly be freed from the punishment of subjection to the tyranny of the devil.  
Hugh argued that ‘this could not be done fittingly unless he assumed of his own 
accord and obediently the punishment which he did not owe, so that he might become worthy 
to be rescued from the punishment which he had deserved through disobedience.’74 Man 
could not do this, as his punishment was the just consequence of his sin. Therefore, in order 
that man might justly escape the punishment due, ‘it was necessary that such a man who had 
owed no punishment assume punishment for man.’75 Christ alone owed no punishment, so 
Christ alone could freely take man’s punishment upon himself and atone for man’s guilt. In 
this way, Christ’s incarnation and death enabled man to be justly forgiven his sin and 
reconciled to God, so that he was no longer to be punished at the hands of the devil. The case 
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between God and man had been settled; now, with God as advocate, the case between man 
and the devil could be brought to its rightful conclusion.  
Hugh’s account of the redemption, with its focus on the weight of man’s offence and 
the need to make adequate satisfaction to God which was not only equal to, but exceeded that 
which had been lost, has a clear basis in Anselm’s work. In Cur Deus homo, Anselm defined 
sin as ‘not to give God his due.’76 The debt owed by man to God was a totally obedient will 
and perfect honour. In sin, man failed to render to God the honour due. He would remain in a 
state of guilt until he had repaid he honour which he had stolen. However, the repayment of 
the debt to the value that had been taken away was in itself insufficient; further payment 
needed to be made in compensation for the injury caused through the offence. Man was 
incapable of making adequate satisfaction for sin, because he already owed his entire being to 
God as Creator and Lord. He therefore had nothing left to offer as extra compensation. 
Adequate satisfaction for sin could only be made by one ‘who would pay God for 
man’s sin something greater than everything that exists apart from God.’77 Only God himself 
was capable of this, and so Christ became incarnate. Anselm further explained the value of 
Christ’s death on the grounds that  
  
no man except him ever gave to God, by dying, what he would not have lost some 
time by necessity, or pay what he did not owe. But he voluntarily gave to the 
Father what he would never lose by necessity, and he paid for sinners what he did 
not owe for himself.
78
  
 
In these passages, Anselm identified two factors that rendered Christ’s death an adequate 
payment for man’s sin. First, there was his intrinsic worth as a divine being, ‘greater than 
everything that exists apart from God.’ Second, there was the fact that, as a sinless and 
immortal being, it was not necessary for him to die, and death was not part of the debt he 
owed to God. For these reasons, the voluntary death of the God-man offered a payment to 
God that was greater than the debt owed to God, and thus not only restored the value of what 
man had taken from God in his sin, but also provided satisfaction for the insult committed 
against God in the process.  
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Both these virtues of the God-man appear in Hugh’s account. However, there is a 
significant difference between the way they were used in De sacramentis and Cur Deus 
homo. Rather than using them as two explanations of the same thing, Hugh separated them. 
He described Christ’s birth, and superiority over fallen man, as restoring the debt (debitum) 
owed to God for his loss (dampnum). The voluntary nature of his sacrificial death atoned for 
the guilt (reatus) caused by man’s contempt (contemptus) for God. This led him to separate 
the two elements of the redemption, reparation for the damage done and satisfaction for sin, 
in a way which Anselm did not.  
 Hugh’s analogy of the law suit provided one of the principal means by which 
Anselm’s understanding of the redemption in terms of man’s need to make satisfaction for sin 
were transmitted from the mid-twelfth century to a wider audience than those who studied 
Cur Deus homo directly. The dramatic appeal and simplicity of the image of the law court 
helped to make the basic concepts easily accessible, and the analogy was adopted by Peter 
Lombard in his Sententiae.
79
 Although the form of Hugh’s discussion was very different from 
that of Anselm, the content of his argument was strikingly similar to Cur Deus homo.  
Where Hugh’s argument has been seen as differing from that of Anselm is his 
approach to the question of the necessity of the incarnation. While Anselm argued that it was 
necessary for God to act in this way in order for man’s restoration to be justly achieved, Hugh 
seems to have argued the opposite. In De sacramentis, he stated that ‘God could have 
accomplished the redemption of mankind even in some other way, had he so willed.’80 Hugh 
identified justice explicitly with the will of God. This meant that whatever course of action 
God had chosen to take in the redemption, whether to save sinners or to condemn them, 
would inevitably be just. ‘Whatever he willed was good and just, so that even if he had willed 
differently it would not have been unjust, because the power is in his will that without 
injustice he can do whatever he wills.’81 
In contrast, Anselm’s discussion of the ‘necessity’ of the redemption might seem to 
imply that God was constrained by the requirements of an external justice which demanded 
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that he act in a particular way in order to avoid charges of injustice. Stephan Ernst argues that 
Anselm excluded the possibility that God could remit man of his sins through mercy alone, 
and save him without complete satisfaction having been made, because otherwise God would 
have to be considered unjust. He contrasts Anselm’s position with that of Hugh, saying that 
Hugh believed that no conditions could be imposed under which God’s action would be 
unjust.
82
 A similar distinction was made by Poppenberg, who claimed that Anselm’s position 
on this question constituted an error (fehler), avoided by Hugh.
83
  
Neither Ernst nor Poppenberg give adequate acknowledgement of the fact that 
Anselm consistently argued that God was not constrained by the demands of any external 
justice; the only necessity involved was that arising from the inevitable unchangeability of his 
own free will. The fact that Anselm’s ‘necessity’ did not impose any external constraints on 
God is recognized by Luis Ladaria, who argues that Anselm’s understanding of the necessity 
of the redemption is inseparable from his understanding of God’s freedom as Creator and 
desire to save man. Nevertheless, Ladaria sees a difference in emphasis between Anselm’s 
teaching and that of Hugh, suggesting that Anselm was more inclined to admit the necessity 
of the incarnation and death of Christ, while Hugh limited himself to the convenience of the 
particular method chosen by God.
 84 
 Although he argued that ‘God could have accomplished the redemption of mankind 
even in a different manner had he willed,’ Hugh stressed the need for God’s action to be 
‘reasonable’ (rationabilis) and ‘fitting’ (conuenientius), arguing that this was done according 
to the needs of human infirmity. Divine reason transcended human reason and could never be 
fully understood in human terms, but ratio was a fundamental tool of divine revelation. In 
order for there to be any possibility of understanding God’s character and love as 
demonstrated through his redemptive action, it needed to be comprehensible in human terms. 
In addition, Hugh discussed the ‘fittingness’ of God’s chosen method of redeeming humanity 
in terms of the example provided to man:  
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It was more befitting our infirmity, that God should be made man and assuming 
the mortality of man for man should reform man to the sight of his immortality, 
so that man should not doubt that he could ascend to the goods of him whom he 
had seen descend to bear his evils. And so that humanity, glorified in God, might 
be an example of glorification to men; and in that he suffered they would see 
what they ought to return to him, but in that he was glorified they should consider 
what they ought to expect from him, so that he himself might be the way in 
example and the truth in promise and the life in reward.
85
  
 
The importance of carrying out the redemption in a manner that accorded with human 
perceptions of justice and rationality was such that Hugh actually argued that ‘it was 
necessary’ for Christ to act as he did in voluntarily taking man’s punishment on himself.86  
The form and content of Hugh’s argument here reflected Augustine’s discussion on 
the same subject. In response to those who asked whether God could not have freed man in 
some other way, Augustine argued that God, who had supreme power over all creation, could 
have done so, but that 
 
there was no other way more fitting for healing our misery, nor need there have 
been. For what was so necessary for raising up our hope, and for freeing the 
minds of mortals, cast down by the condition of mortality itself, from despair of 
immortality, than that it should be demonstrated to us at how greatly God valued 
us, and how greatly he loved us?
87
 
 
Hugh’s discussion of the necessity and fittingness of the incarnation can be interpreted in part 
as an attempt to reconcile Anselm’s ideas about freedom and necessity with those of 
Augustine. Hugh’s statement that God could have acted differently had he wished is entirely 
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in accord with the Augustinian tradition. Hugh thus emphasized his own orthodoxy, and 
avoided the controversial problems about divine freedom and omnipotence which discussion 
of necessity tended to provoke. Nevertheless, in following Anselm’s argument for the need 
for man to make satisfaction for sin, which could not be achieved except through the 
incarnation of the Christ, Hugh implicitly accepted the idea that there was scope for the 
language of necessity with regard to the incarnation within a carefully defined framework. He 
expressed this necessity in terms of what was reasonable and fitting, and combined ideas 
derived from both Anselm and Augustine, in a way that stressed the fundamental orthodoxy 
and patristic precedent for Anselm’s arguments. A useful parallel can be drawn with the 
Sententia diuine pagine from the school of Laon, which similarly discussed the incarnation in 
terms of divine freedom, fittingness and necessity, and sought to interpret Anselm along 
broadly Augustinian lines. The attempt to reconcile Anselm with Augustine, and resolve 
apparent contradictions between them, was a recurrent theme among twelfth-century 
commentators, and led to some of the most fruitful discussion of Anselm’s work in a variety 
of fields. 
  
Peter Abelard 
  
Peter Abelard did not write a treatise on the redemption per se, and he did not reproduce 
Anselm’s arguments in the same systematic manner as the authors discussed above, who 
largely tended to follow the basic structural model of argumentation that Anselm had used in 
Cur Deus homo. Abelard’s discussion of the redemption in his Commentaria in epistolam 
Pauli ad Romanos (c.1133-7), was very different from Anselm’s work, both in form and 
content. Other than his rejection of the ‘rights of the devil’ idea, which has long been 
recognised as derived from Cur Deus homo, Abelard has traditionally been interpreted as 
proposing a completely ‘subjective’ explanation for the redemption, emphasizing Christ’s 
death as the supreme example of God’s love for man, in stark contrast with Anselm’s concern 
with justice and the ‘objective’ efficacy of Christ’s death making satisfaction for sin.88  
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However, a wider study of Abelard’s works demonstrates that his debt to Cur Deus 
homo, particularly with regard to the necessity of the incarnation, was greater than is often 
acknowledged. Although Anselm and Abelard were writing in different contexts, with very 
different forms and structures, this did not mean that Anselm’s influence on Abelard’s 
thought was diminished. On the contrary, Abelard was able to take a more holistic approach 
to his study of Anselm, and to absorb and ponder the implications of his ideas more deeply. 
Abelard’s analysis of the meaning of divine necessity and freedom in his Theologia 
christiana revealed a more sophisticated understanding of Anselm’s teaching on the subject, 
in relation to the incarnation and more generally, than can be found in other authors whose 
discussion of the necessity of satisfaction was, superficially, much closer to that of Cur Deus 
homo than anything Abelard wrote. 
Abelard did not expound his understanding of the redemption in a systematic manner. 
The nearest he came to doing so was a quaestio inserted into his Commentaria in epistolam 
Pauli ad Romanos, where he asked  
 
by what necessity did God assume humanity to redeem us from dying according 
to the flesh, or from whom did he redeem us, who held us captive, either by 
justice or by power, and by what justice did he free us from this power, or what 
price did he give that he wanted him to receive so that he would release us?
89
 
 
Abelard rejected the idea that Christ’s death constituted a payment for sin in any way. The 
crime of murdering the Son of God was in itself a sin, apparently much greater than the mere 
eating of an illicit apple in Eden. If Adam’s sin was so grave that it could be expiated by 
nothing less than the death of the Son of God, how could man possibly offer satisfaction for 
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the sin of his crucifixion?
90
 Furthermore, Abelard argued that Christ’s death could not 
constitute payment for sin, as the only person to whom such a payment could be made was 
God himself. Therefore, if a payment were being made, God would have to have demanded 
the payment of himself, which was absurd. Besides this, the God of goodness and justice 
could never act so cruelly as to demand the blood of an innocent man, least of all his own 
Son, as payment for the sins of another.
 91
 
Richard Weingart suggests that in this passage Abelard may have been parodying 
Anselm’s teaching in Cur Deus homo, where he described Christ’s death as offering 
satisfaction to God for sin. Weingart argues that Abelard rejected Anselm’s ‘satisfaction’ 
theory on the grounds that it presented God as a harsh tyrant demanding justice and payment 
for sin at the expense of divine love and mercy.
92
 Particularly abhorrent to Abelard was the 
notion that Anselm’s satisfaction theory imposed an external necessity on God’s actions. 
Weingart argues that ‘the concept of satisfaction imposes an extraneous necessity, because it 
falsely concedes that God must be reconciled to man through a change in attitude toward men 
which is accomplished only when his honour is satisfied and his anger appeased...In so far as 
Abailard understands satisfaction as the fulfilment of a debt demanded by God, he is 
consistent in his rejection of this theory.’93 
 If Abelard believed that Anselm’s ‘satisfaction theory’ imposed an external necessity 
on God by means of an inevitable demand for the payment of man’s debt, this would 
represent a serious misunderstanding of Anselm’s thought on necessity and the nature of 
divine justice, to an extent which Weingart himself admits would be highly surprising.
94
 
However, closer examination of Abelard’s analysis of divine necessity, not only in the 
Commentaria but elsewhere, demonstrates that his understanding of the nature of divine 
omnipotence and the meaning of necessity was far closer to that of Anselm than is often 
appreciated. 
 Abelard’s fullest explanation of the meaning of necessity with regard to divine 
omnipotence is found in the fifth book of his Theologia christiana, composed during the 
1120s. Here, Abelard appeared to reject use of the language of necessity in relation to God. It 
was not necessity that underlay divine actions, but fittingness or honour (honestas).  
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But we depend more on fitting than on necessary reasons, since it is always 
principally established among the good that more is commended from fittingness, 
and that reason is always better which inclines towards fittingness rather than 
necessity, especially when those things which are fitting give pleasure in 
themselves and immediately attract us to themselves through a certain power of 
their own.
95
 
 
Later in the book, Abelard related the question about necessity and divine omnipotence in 
general to the specific question of the incarnation. He began this section with the statement 
that ‘it is written that God could have redeemed the human race by a different means from 
that which he did,’96 followed by a number of statements from patristic texts that supported 
this view. However, he did not use these texts to prove the utter invalidity of all talk of 
necessity with relation to the divine action. Instead, he pointed out the difficulties inherent in 
such texts, and the bitterness of the controversy surrounding them. 
 
And so with these reasons as much as authorities heavily entangled on both sides 
of the dilemma, I have not easily found an approach by which we can explain 
ourselves. For the more violent the controversies on these questions, the solutions 
of course are necessarily more difficult.
97
 
 
Abelard went on to explain that the fact that God was not constrained by any external 
necessity to act as he did, did not mean that there was no sense in which the language of 
necessity was valid in discussion of divine actions. God’s supreme goodness was such that he 
was unable to act in any way that contradicted this goodness. Thus, although whatever he 
willed, he willed freely, it was impossible to him to will in any other way, and so he willed it 
from necessity. 
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And so it seems to us that God – who is supremely good and can neither grow nor 
diminish in his goodness, which he has naturally and substantially from himself, 
not in our way through accident, - for he always has from himself such ineffable 
goodness, that I may say in human terms, that whatever he wills, he wills from 
necessity, and whatever he does, he does from necessity. For he cannot be 
without the good will which he has, for it is natural to him and coeternal, not 
foreign as ours is to us. And everything that is in the nature of the divine, is in 
him necessarily and inevitably in every way, as justice, piety, mercy, and 
whatever works a good will creates.
98
 
 
In this passage, Abelard reveals an understanding of an intrinsic necessity arising from the 
supreme goodness of the divine nature, which effectively meant that no other course of action 
was possible. This is very similar to Anselm’s argument that necessity could only be applied 
to God in the sense that the immutability of divine grace meant that he was always obliged to 
act in the most honourable manner, and to fulfil his promise, freely made at the dawn of time, 
to complete man’s salvation and bring him into the heavenly city. Although Anselm admitted 
that ‘necessity’ must be something of a misnomer in this case, which was entirely governed 
by grace, it still had some utility in describing the inevitability of what must be.
99
 
 Abelard’s overarching emphasis on the absolute freedom of divine love and grace in 
the Commentaria on Romans, more explicitly central to Abelard’s argument than to 
Anselm’s, led him to be more cautious than Anselm had been in using the concept as a 
central theme of his argument; but his discussion of divine necessity in the Theologia 
christiana seems to indicate a detailed understanding of, and agreement with Anselm’s 
position in Cur Deus homo. Even in the Commentaria, he occasionally used the language of 
necessity with regard to the incarnation, such as his statement that as it was impossible for 
man to be saved through the written law alone, ‘it was necessary that the Christ should come’ 
as the fulfilment and consummation of the law.
100
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 Abelard’s acknowledgement of the controversy surrounding the concept of a 
necessary incarnation indicates the importance of the debate, to which Anselm was a major 
contributor, in the teaching of the schools of the early twelfth century. The opposition that 
Anselm’s apparent rejection of the weight of patristic authority had provoked among his 
critics is illustrated by a letter written to Abelard by his former master Roscelin of 
Compiègne. The letter mainly focused on Trinitarian disputes, and Roscelin’s deeply troubled 
personal relationship with his former protégé. However, it also raised the question of 
Anselm’s teaching on the necessity of the incarnation in tones which clearly demonstrated its 
controversial nature.  
 
But of Master Anselm the archbishop, who is both honoured for the sanctity of 
his life and extolled for his exceptional learning beyond the common measure of 
men, what shall I say? For he says, in the book which he calls Cur Deus homo, 
that God could not save man by any other way than this, that is unless he became 
man and suffered all that he suffered. The words of the sacred doctors, by whose 
teaching the Church is illuminated, strongly oppose his opinion.
101
 
 
Roscelin then went on to list various quotations from patristic texts which opposed the idea 
that God acted by necessity in his means of redeeming mankind, including several which 
Abelard would go on to cite in his discussion of the subject in the Theologia christiana.
102
 
The context of this passage was Roscelin’s defence of errors made and recanted earlier in his 
career, on the grounds that even the greatest men were vulnerable to error, without 
necessitating accusations of heresy. The combination of Roscelin’s specific criticism of 
Anselm’s position on the necessity of the incarnation with praise for Anselm’s great learning 
and sanctity in general reveals much about Anselm’s reputation, as a holy man and as a 
scholar, by the 1120s. It is particularly striking that Roscelin chose to praise Anselm in this 
way, as the two men had been involved in bitter controversy in the past; Anselm had been 
instrumental in the condemnation of Roscelin’s teaching on the Trinity at the Council of 
Soissons in 1093.
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 In his letter to Abelard, Roscelin presented Anselm’s argument on necessity in a way 
that was simplified to the extent of severe distortion. He implied that Anselm’s God was 
limited by external necessity to a single course of action whose only alternative was the 
eternal damnation of mankind and ultimate failure of the divine purpose of creation. This 
imposed a serious limitation on divine omnipotence and freedom. Whether Roscelin was 
deliberately over-simplifying Anselm’s argument to make a rhetorical point about the 
seriousness and lack of precedent for his claim, or whether he was genuinely unaware of the 
caveats which Anselm made for his use of the term ‘necessity’, is unclear, but it seems likely 
that similar arguments against Anselm’s work were being raised by Roscelin’s 
contemporaries in the schools, some of whom undoubtedly had only an extremely limited 
knowledge of the content of Cur Deus homo. 
Rolf Peppermüller suggests that it was Roscelin’s depiction of Anselm’s teaching on 
the necessity of the incarnation in his letter to Abelard, rather than Cur Deus homo itself, that 
provided the main source of Abelard’s knowledge of the argument.104 Peppermüller argues 
that there is no real evidence to suggest that Abelard had any direct knowledge of Cur Deus 
homo, but only knew the arguments at second hand. It is true that, in his discussion of the 
controversy in Theologia christiana, he cited several of the same patristic sources as 
Roscelin, although he did not use these texts, as Roscelin had done, to prove the utter 
invalidity of all talk of necessity with relation to the divine action, but to point out the 
difficulties inherent in such texts, and the keenness of the controversy surrounding them. 
Abelard’s discussion on the meaning of divine necessity in Theologia christiana was close 
enough to that of Cur Deus homo to suggest that he was familiar with the details of Anselm’s 
argument, and there is nothing to suggest a significant shift in his position by the time he 
wrote the Commentaria in Romanos.  
Although Abelard understood the subtleties of Anselm’s discussion of the necessity of 
the incarnation, and its relation to divine power and freedom, he must also have been aware 
of the way in which Anselm’s arguments were liable to misinterpretation and the mistaken 
belief that he subjected God to the constraints of external necessity. Roscelin’s letter would 
have made the danger abundantly clear, even if he had not already recognized it from his own 
interactions with students and fellow masters in the schools. Abelard’s apparent rejection of 
the concept of necessity in the Commentaria may have been in part a response to the 
misconception that divine omnipotence could be limited by external necessity.  
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Honorius Augustodunensis 
 
Debate concerning the subtleties of the definitions of necessity and divine freedom in relation 
to the incarnation and redemption formed the basis of discussion of Cur Deus homo in the 
schools of Laon, St Victor and Abelard, as the masters struggled to reconcile the notion that it 
was necessary for God to act as he did with his own illimitable freedom from all external 
constraints. The potentially conflicting demands of necessity, justice, fittingness and freedom, 
which Anselm attempted to reconcile, were already apparent from a reading of patristic texts, 
notably Augustine’s De trinitate. Cur Deus homo can, to some extent, be seen as a 
commentary on Augustine, providing a model for the interrogation and harmonization of 
various disparate passages within the earlier author’s work, and submitting them to 
systematic, reasoned analysis. In the schools discussed above, the discussion and definition of 
theological concepts such as necessity and freedom was a primary concern, as an early stage 
in the general trend towards the development of a fully comprehensive, and conceptually 
consistent, systematic theology in the twelfth century and beyond. 
 By contrast, outside the schools discussed above, other writers were less interested in 
the subtleties of metaphysical concepts and the definition of terms. Honorius 
Augustodunensis was primarily concerned with the need for a clearly argued and 
straightforward exposition of Christian doctrine which could be used as a guide for teachers 
and preachers, without unnecessary complication. In his account of the redemption in his 
Elucidarium, a compendium of questions and answers relating to all essential areas of the 
Catholic faith, Honorius made extensive use of Anselm’s arguments in Cur Deus homo 
concerning the need for one who was both God and man to make satisfaction for sin. 
Elucidarium enjoyed wide popularity in the twelfth century; there are forty-one extant 
manuscripts of the Latin text from the twelfth century alone, and it was translated into several 
vernacular languages.
105
  It was particularly popular in South Germany and Austria, and 
provided one of the major channels through which Anselmian ideas on the redemption 
became known in these areas. Elucidarium offered a simplified version of the arguments of 
Cur Deus homo, with much of the complexity and subtlety of Anselm’s thought removed. 
Nevertheless, it presented the basic principles in a way that was clear and easy to follow, and 
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enabled Anselmian thought to permeate the ideas and beliefs of those outside the relatively 
narrow confines of the scholarly and monastic communities who could access the text of Cur 
Deus homo itself. 
Honorius’ use of Anselmian arguments in Elucidarium is also interesting, as the text 
is thought to have been completed before the publication of Cur Deus homo in 1098. 
Honorius’s early knowledge of Anselm’s thought must have come from his personal 
acquaintance with Anselm, and oral conversations during a period of study under Anselm at 
Canterbury. The precise nature of the connection between Anselm and Honorius is 
impossible to know, as very little is known in detail about his life. Even the identity of 
‘Augustodunensis’ is uncertain, although various theories have been raised.106 However, it 
seems likely that Honorius was born around 1070, was at various points in his career both a 
canon and a Benedictine monk, and lived for at least the second half of his life in 
Regensburg. He died around 1140.
107
 Although the limited evidence available is insufficient 
to draw any definite conclusions, it does seem likely that Honorius was connected with 
Canterbury, and studied under Anselm there.
108
 The role of personal and oral communication 
in the transmission of ideas within monastic and scholarly communities is, by its nature, 
difficult to assess due to the lack of surviving written evidence. Nevertheless, it must have 
been an important channel through which Anselmian ideas were shared among his immediate 
circle, both at Bec and Canterbury; and informal discussion with friends and students is likely 
to have played an important role in the development of Anselm’s own thought, and the 
genesis of texts.
109
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Honorius’s account of the redemption in the Elucidarium shows significant parallels 
with Anselm’s argument in Cur Deus homo. Like Anselm, Honorius began his discussion of 
man’s need for redemption with a reminder of the weight of sin. He stressed the gravity of 
Adam’s sin in disobeying God, arguing that the will of God was greater than the whole 
world. A single glance contrary to the will of God, even if the continued existence of the 
entire created universe depended on it, was a sin for which nothing in the created universe 
could atone. 
 
If therefore you were standing before God and someone were to say ‘Look back, 
or the whole world will perish’, but God said, ‘I do not want you to look back, 
but to look upon me’, ought you to despise God, who is the Creator of all things, 
and the joy of the angels, so that you might free the transitory world?
110  
 
Anselm had used the same example in Cur Deus homo: 
 
[Anselm] If you were to see yourself in the sight of God, and someone were to 
say to you, ‘look over there’; but God said, ‘it is totally against my will that you 
should look’: consider in your heart what there is in everything that exists, on 
account of which you should make that look contrary to the will of God...What if 
it were necessary either for the whole world and whatever is not God to perish 
and return to nothing, or for you to do such a small thing contrary to the will of 
God?... [Boso] I have to confess that I must do nothing contrary to the will of 
God, even to preserve the whole of creation.
111
 
 
In Elucidarium, Honorius went on to explain that looking away from God was exactly what 
Adam had done at the Fall: ‘He stood before God and, at the instigation of the devil, looked 
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back and committed a sin that was greater than the world.’112 In order for man to atone for 
this sin,  
 
he should restore the honour which he had stolen from God and make satisfaction 
for the sin which he had committed. For it is most just that he who steals 
another’s property should both restore what had been stolen and make satisfaction 
for the injuries incurred.
113
 
 
The claim that it was necessary for man, not only to restore the honour that had been stolen, 
but also to provide additional compensation for injuries incurred, was argued by Anselm in 
Cur Deus homo:  
 
He who does not render to God this honour due, steals from God what is his own, 
and dishonours God; and this is to sin. As long as he does not repay what he has 
stolen, he remains guilty. And it is not sufficient merely to repay what he has 
stolen: rather, he ought to repay more than he stole, for the insult inflicted. For 
just as it is not sufficient for he who injures the health of another to restore that 
person’s health, if he does not make some recompense for the painful injuries 
inflicted; so it is not sufficient for he who violates someone else’s honour, to 
restore that honour, if he does not, in accordance with the harmful act of 
dishonour, give as restitution something which pleases the person whom he has 
dishonoured.
114
 
 
Honorius argued that, in order for man to restore the honour he had stolen from God, it was 
necessary for him to conquer the devil, and restore all those predestined to eternal life.
115
 
However, merely restoring the damage was not enough, as man also needed to make 
satisfaction; but this was beyond man’s capability. ‘Because he committed a sin greater than 
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the world, he was obliged to pay God with something greater than the world.’116 God could 
not simply overlook man’s debt. 
 
If God were to overlook his honour in this way, because he could not have it, he 
would be impotent. But if he were to take sinful man into glory unpunished, from 
which he had expelled angels for a single thought, it would be unjust. 
Furthermore, if sin were to remain unpunished, something in the kingdom of God 
would be disordered; but nothing is left disordered in his kingdom: therefore the 
sinner must be punished. For who would return a jewel that had been buried in 
the mud to his treasury uncleansed?
117
 
 
This point, along with the pearl analogy, was also derived from Cur Deus homo. Anselm 
argued that it would be unfitting for God to allow sinful man into heaven without satisfaction 
having been made, as a sinner could not be the equal of the angels whose ranks he was to 
complete in the heavenly city, or worthy in himself to  enjoy perfect beatitude. He used the 
analogy of a man who owns a pearl, which gets knocked into the mud, but who picks it up 
and gives it pride of place in his treasury without first washing the mud from it. 
 
Surely God would be doing the same thing, if he held in his hand in the garden 
man, who would be the companion of the angels without sin, and permitted the 
devil, burning with envy, to throw man down, albeit consenting, into the mud of 
sin...surely, I say, he would be doing the same thing, if he were to bring man, 
stained with the filth of sin and without any cleansing, that is without any 
satisfaction at all, back to paradise, from which he had been expelled?
118
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Honorius’ argument that there could be nothing unfitting in God’s kingdom was also an 
important theme of Anselm’s argument in Cur Deus homo.119 
The student in the dialogue then suggests various ways in which it might have been 
possible for a created being to save mankind, each of which the master rejects. It would be 
inappropriate for an angel to redeem man, because then man would be subject to the angel, 
when he should be his equal.
120
 A newly-created man, not descended from Adam and 
therefore not corrupted by original sin, would not be of Adam’s race, and so would be unable 
to make satisfaction for Adam’s sin, ‘for he who makes satisfaction for man, ought to be of 
his own race.’121 A member of Adam’s race, such as a patriarch or prophet, could not redeem 
man because all men, however virtuous, are corrupted by original sin from the moment of 
their conception.
122
  
The first two of these arguments can be found in Cur Deus homo. In response to 
Boso’s question about why man could not have been redeemed either by an angel or a new 
man, free from sin, Anselm argued that man would then be subject to his redeemer, when he 
should be equal to the angels and subject to none but God.
123
 
In a later passage, Anselm also argued that it was necessary for the God-man redeemer 
to be descended from Adam, as only a member of Adam’s race was under obligation to pay, 
and it would be unfitting for anyone else to do so. ‘If [God] creates a new man who is not 
from the race of Adam, this new man will not belong to the human race which is descended 
from Adam. He will not owe satisfaction for this race, because he will not be of this race.’124 
Here, again, Anselm returned to the idea that, if man were to be restored by one of a different 
race, he could not be restored to his original dignity, and God’s purpose would be seen to 
have failed. As this was unfitting, it was necessary for the man through whom Adam’s race 
was to be restored should be taken from Adam’s race. 
Honorius concluded his discussion of why only the God-man Christ could redeem man 
by arguing that 
 
since an angel ought not to redeem man, and man could not make satisfaction for 
himself, the Son of God, through whom all things were made, in order that they 
                                                          
119
 Anselm, CDH, 1.12. 
120
 Honorius, Elucidarium, 1.115. 
121
 De suo enim genere esse debuit, qui pro homine satisfaceret. Ibid., 1.116. 
122
 Ibid., 1.117. 
123
 Anselm, CDH, 1.5. 
124
 Si nouum hominem facit non ex Adae genere, non pertinebit ad genus humanum quod natum est de Adam. 
Quae non debebit satisfacere pro eo, quia non erit de illo. Ibid., 2.8. 
51 
 
might also be redeemed through him, assumed full humanity and was made one 
person with two natures. And in that nature which was God, he defeated the devil, 
as he himself had defeated man, and opened heaven who to all who were 
predestined, and equal to the angels; which God alone could do. And in that 
nature by which he was man he made payment for the injury that was greater than 
the world, when he submitted to death that he did not owe; which man alone 
ought to do.
125
  
 
The idea that it was necessary for the God-man to become incarnate and die for the sin for 
which God alone could, and man alone should, pay, epitomized Anselm’s argument in Cur 
Deus homo.
126
 
 Honorius’s explanation of why only mankind, and not the fallen angels, could be 
restored, also reflects Anselm’s discussion on the subject. Honorius argued that because the 
angels fell without the instigation of another, they ought to rise again without the help of 
another, which was impossible.
127
 This statement closely echoes that of Anselm in Cur Deus 
homo.
128
 A further Anselmian argument against the redemption of angels, which Honorius 
reproduces, relates to the generation of angels, each of his own genus. Anselm wrote that  
 
just as it was not right that man should be restored by another man who was not 
of the same race, even if he were of the same nature, similarly it is not right that 
an angel should be saved by another angel, even if he were of the same nature, 
since angels are not of one race as human beings are.
129
  
 
Honorius also used this argument: 
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the angels were all created at the same time, and not from one angel, as men are 
born from one man. Therefore if Christ had taken the nature of an angel from one 
angel, he would have redeemed that one alone, and the others would have 
remained outside redemption.
130
    
 
It is widely accepted that the close parallels between Honorius’s arguments regarding the 
redemption in Elucidarium, and those expounded by Anselm in Cur Deus homo, are such that 
Honorius must have known Anselm’s work.131 This would seem to suggest that Honorius 
could not have been writing before 1098, when Cur Deus homo was completed. However, 
this assumption is challenged by a twelfth-century Italian manuscript of the text, which has 
been studied in some detail by Virginia Brown.
132
 The manuscript was compiled during the 
reign of Roger II of Sicily (d. 1154) for Stephen, abbot of the monastery of San Salvatore in 
Telese, and contains a copy of the earliest recension of Elucidarium, as well as Hugh of St 
Victor’s De tribus diebus, a medical remedy and a collection of penitential texts.133 Brown 
suggests that the explanation for the presence of Elucidarium in Telese ‘may lie in the link 
that had been established some fifty years previously between the monastery of San Salvatore 
and Anselm of Canterbury.’ John, abbot of San Salvatore in 1098, had been Anselm’s pupil 
at Bec, and accompanied him to Sciavi in the spring of 1098.
134
 Brown also suggests that ‘it 
is tempting to speculate that Anselm could have brought the Elucidarium with him to 
Southern Italy and that the text of the Rimini manuscript may be a copy of a very early 
witness.’135 
 If this speculation is correct, Honorius could not have had access to the full text of 
Cur Deus homo while he was writing Elucidarium. This makes the question of how Honorius 
could have known about Anselm’s thought on the subject even more crucial. Cur Deus homo 
grew out of discussions with other monks in Anselm’s circle. Anselm explained in the 
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preface to the completed text that it was written ‘in response to a request’, presumably from 
those who had heard his oral discourses on the subject and wanted to have a written version. 
If Honorius had been in Canterbury at the same time as Anselm, it is likely that he would 
have been a participant in these discussions. However, the similarities, not only in terms of 
the structure of the argument, but also of terminology and phrasing, that can be seen in 
multiple places between Elucidarium and Cur Deus homo, indicate that it is more likely that 
Honorius had access to Anselm’s written text itself, at least in part, at the time of writing. 
 Although we know that Anselm completed Cur Deus homo in the summer of 1098, 
during his stay in Capua, it is unclear when he began to write. He stated in the Preface that he 
began the work in England, so it must have been underway before he left for his first period 
of exile in October 1097. The dating of Cur Deus homo has been discussed at some length by 
René Roques in the introduction to his edition of the text. Roques discusses Gerberon’s claim 
that the work was begun in 1094, after the completion of De incarnatione Verbi, but suggests 
instead that it was more likely that Anselm did not begin to write until shortly before he left 
the country, in 1097.
136
 The lack of evidence means that it is impossible to know when 
Anselm began to write. However, we do know that parts of Cur Deus homo were in 
circulation before the work was completed. In the Preface to the finished text, Anselm 
complained about ‘some people who, before it was completed and fully worked out, copied 
out the first parts of the work without my knowledge.’137 The precise content of the prima 
partes of the work that were being distributed in this way are unidentifiable, as is the date 
from which they began to circulate. However, it does seem possible that Honorius may have 
had access to parts of Anselm’s written text before its completion in 1098. This may help to 
explain textual similarities between Elucidarium and parts of Cur Deus homo, even if 
Honorius was writing before 1098. 
 The only positive evidence that we have for the latest possible date of completion for 
Elucidarium is an English translation, in a manuscript dated c. 1125, now held in the British 
Library.
138
 The text must therefore have been composed before this date, and was likely to 
have been considerably earlier, for it to have been translated already. Beyond this, evidence 
for the dating of the text is inconclusive. Brown’s suggestion that the Telese manuscript was 
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taken from an extremely early copy of Elucidarium, brought to Italy by Anselm himself, is 
only speculative. However, it is not the only evidence to suggest an early dating of the work. 
A library catalogue from Blaubeuren in Baden-Würtemburg, dating from the abbacy of 
Aezelinus (1085-1101), includes a reference to a ‘librum lucidarium’. Although it is 
impossible to identify this text positively, Gottschall suggests that it may well refer to 
Honorius’s Elucidarium.139 If he is correct, this narrows the time span within which it could 
have been written to within a couple of years of the completion of Cur Deus homo.  
Additional support for an early dating of Elucidarium is contained in the fact that 
Honorius did not use any of Anselm’s later works. His discussion of the beatitudes awaiting 
the blessed in the life to come was apparently derived from Anselm’s sermon De 
beatitudine.
140
 There are minor differences between Honorius’s list of the beatitudes and that 
contained in the text of Anselm’s sermon as recorded by Eadmer. This may indicate that 
Honorius’s discussion was not based on Eadmer’s text, but his own recollections of Anselm’s 
oral teaching and preaching at Canterbury before his first period of exile.
141
 Alternative 
versions of the same sermon are recorded by Alexander of Canterbury, and in De moribus 
humanis and the Dicta Anselmi.
142
 Alexander did not accompany Anselm on exile and so 
could not have heard the sermon at Cluny, as Eadmer did. All the available evidence suggests 
that Anselm preached on the subject several times, so it is highly possible that Honorius may 
have based his account on a version heard at Canterbury. However, there is no evidence that 
Honorius knew any of Anselm’s later works at the time of writing.143  
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Apart from his early knowledge of Cur Deus homo and De beatitudine, demonstrated 
in Elucidarium, further evidence to support the idea that Honorius spent time at Canterbury 
may be found in his sermon collection Speculum ecclesiae. Honorius presented the collection 
as a response to a request from the ‘brothers’ (fratres). The letter containing this request was 
included as a preface to the text itself, and referred to a recent visit to their community made 
by Honorius.
144
 In the early manuscripts, the letter was attributed to the monks of Canterbury, 
apparently indicating that Honorius had spent time in Canterbury.
145
  
Elucidarium presented Anselmian arguments and ideas in a simplified form, 
described by Loris Sturlese as a banalisierung of Anselm’s work.146 Honorius’ aim was to 
provide monks and clergy with a practical handbook of theology, offering sound doctrinal 
teaching and clear answers to the sorts of questions they were likely to face in pastoral work. 
For this reason, he concentrated on the basic principles of the weight of sin, man’s inability to 
pay his debt, and his need for a God-man to make satisfaction on his behalf. Subtleties within 
Anselm’s argument, such as the distinction between preceding and subsequent necessity, 
would be unnecessary complications for Honorius’ intended audience, explaining his failure 
to discuss them.  
Elucidarium was not the only text in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries to 
employ a simplified version of Anselm’s satisfaction theory, without any extensive 
discussion of the precise meaning of terms such as ‘necessity’. A similar simplification of the 
argument can also be found in a number of works of Jewish-Christian polemics. These will 
be discussed in Chapter Three. Although the majority of the argument of Cur Deus homo was 
devoted to Anselm’s exposition of his satisfaction theory, and discussion of the necessity of 
the incarnation, he also addressed an alternative model of the redemption, focussing on the 
means by which God was able to defeat the power of the devil. As with his arguments 
concerning necessity, the role of the devil in the redemption was another area in Anselm’s 
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thought that apparently contradicted earlier authority, and it enjoyed a mixed reception in the 
early twelfth century.  
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Chapter Two 
Cur Deus homo and the Rights of the Devil 
 
 
Illud quod dicere solemus 
 
Anselm opened his discussion of the argument concerning the rights of the devil in Cur Deus 
homo with a reference to a contemporary opinion on the subject, summarizing the idea that 
the devil had a just claim to power over man, which God could not justly overlook in the 
redemption.  
 
But that other thing which we are accustomed to say, that God was obliged to act 
against the devil through justice rather than force in order to free man, so that 
when the devil killed him in whom there was no cause for death and who was 
God, he justly lost the power which he had held over sinners; otherwise [God] 
would have acted with unjust violence towards him, since he had possessed man 
justly, for he did not abduct man with violence, but man went over to him 
voluntarily.
147
 
 
According to this argument, when man sinned voluntarily, he willingly placed himself under 
the lordship of the devil. The devil thus had the right to exercise lordship over man, and God 
could not justly steal man away from him by force. Instead, God concealed himself in human 
form. When the devil tried to exercise the power of death over Christ, who was not under his 
jurisdiction, he overstepped the bounds of his authority, and so forfeited the right to exert any 
further power over the rest of humanity. God could now justly free man from the power of 
the devil without violently destroying the devil’s rights. 
This passage in Cur Deus homo is an almost verbatim reproduction of part of a 
sententia attributed to Ralph of Laon. The sententia asked ‘why God the Father willed to 
redeem the human race through the human incarnation of the Word.’148 The majority of the 
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sententia comprised arguments and ideas to which Anselm would have no objection. 
However, it also included a discussion of the way in which, in killing the Christ, the devil 
justly lost power over man, which until then had been held justly. 
 
The devil unjustly brought death to him over whom he had no just cause to 
exercise power. Therefore he justly lost his power over man, who unjustly 
exercised his tyranny over Christ; so that when the devil killed him in whom there 
was no just cause for death and who was God, he justly lost the power which he 
had held over sinners. Otherwise Christ would have acted with unjust violence 
towards the devil, who had justly possessed man whom he did not abduct with 
violence, but man went over to him voluntarily.
149
 
 
Anselm did not acknowledge his source for this passage in Cur Deus homo, but the textual 
parallels are close enough to demonstrate that he must have taken it from the Laon sententia. 
He did not cite the argument because he agreed with it, but immediately followed his 
summary with the statement that ‘I do not see what force this argument has.’150 Anselm 
argued that, as a created being, the devil was under God’s jurisdiction, just as man was, and 
owed obedience to God. The devil was nothing more than a rebellious slave who had 
encouraged man, his fellow slave, to join him in his rebellion. The devil thus had no right 
whatsoever to claim dominion over man, and so there was no need for God to respect his 
position in the act of redemption. 
 
Since neither the devil nor man belong to anyone except God, and that neither 
stands outside the power of God, what ought God to do with, concerning or in the 
case of his own, except punish his slave, who had persuaded his fellow slave to 
desert his lord and come over to him and, a traitor, had received a fugitive and, a 
thief, received a thief with the stolen property of his lord?...If God, the judge of 
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all, were to rescue man thus possessed, from the power of the one who was so 
unjustly holding him,...what would be the injustice in this?
151
 
 
Anselm returned to the Laon sententia for a further quotation, again unacknowledged, later in 
the chapter. The second passage, which followed immediately after the first in the sententia, 
stated that 
 
the devil is said to possess man justly because God justly permitted this and man 
justly suffered what he had deserved. Man is not said to have suffered justly 
through his own justice, but because he suffered through the just judgement of 
God.
152
 
 
Anselm’s reproduction of this opinion in Cur Deus homo contained a change of terminology 
that significantly altered its meaning. Where the sententia stated that the devil possessed man 
justly, in Anselm’s version, he now only tormented him justly. 
 
In this way, the devil is said to torment man justly because God justly permitted 
this, and man justly suffered it. But this which man is said to suffer justly, he is 
not said to suffer justly through his own justice, but because he is punished 
through the just judgement of God.
153
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The claim that the devil possessed (possidere) man justly could be interpreted as implying 
that man was now subject to the devil as lord, in contrast to his original status as one subject 
only to the lordship of God. In the intervening paragraphs between the two passages from 
Cur Deus homo cited above, Anselm had already refuted this notion, arguing that the devil, 
like man, was created by God with obligations to serve God; as a fellow slave, the devil could 
not possibly claim just lordship over man. Having dealt with this point, the question remained 
as to whether the devil, acting with divine permission, could be said to torment (uexare) man 
justly. Anselm argued that he could, in the sense that it was just that man should be punished 
for his sin, and that this punishment could occur at the hands of the devil, but that the devil 
himself was not acting justly in usurping authority over man, and could not claim just 
possession of man. ‘For although man was justly tormented by the devil, nevertheless the 
devil tormented him unjustly. For man deserved to be punished...but the devil in no way 
deserved to punish him.’154 
Anselm argued that the justice by which man was punished did not necessarily imply 
that the punisher himself was just, although some people had mistakenly assumed so. 
 
Those people who are of the opinion that the devil has just cause for his 
possession of man are led to this conclusion by the fact that they see that man is 
justly subject to harassment by the devil and consequently reckon that the devil is 
acting justly in inflicting it. For it can happen that one and the same thing is, from 
different points of view, both just and unjust.
155
 
 
By altering the wording of the Laon sententia from possidere to uexare, Anselm confirmed 
the conclusions he had drawn in the preceding paragraph. The rest of the passage cited 
completed the examination of whose justice it was by which man was punished, by 
eliminating the possibility that man himself was in possession of any justice in the matter, 
leaving God as the sole source and arbiter of all justice. This statement in the Laon sententia 
was uncontroversial, and could therefore be reproduced without comment or qualification. 
 Anselm did not quote verbatim from the Laon sententia, or acknowledge that he was 
citing any particular source; his only indication that he had a contemporary opinion in mind 
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was the brief reference at the start of the chapter, to ‘that other thing which we are 
accustomed to say.’156 Citations of contemporary sources, even when unacknowledged and 
made for the specific purpose of being disproven, are rare in Anselm’s work, and not all 
commentators agree that he was citing Laon here. The parallels between the Laon sententia 
and Chapter Seven of Cur Deus homo were first noticed by Jean Rivière, who believed that 
the sententia was the later text, and that Ralph was quoting Cur Deus homo.
157
 More recently, 
Jay Rubenstein has come to the same conclusion, viewing the Laon sententia as Ralph’s 
response, on behalf of the school of Laon, to Anselm’s critique of its teaching on the devil.158 
The impossibility of dating the sententia means that we cannot be certain; it is not even clear 
whether the attribution of the text to Ralph is accurate. However, as Southern has 
demonstrated, it is more likely that the sententia was written first, and that Anselm cited 
Laon, rather than the other way around.
159
 Anselm used the first extract as a starting-point for 
his discussion of the ius diaboli idea, as it provided a neat summary of the argument that he 
wished to disprove. His reproduction of the argument did not need to be a literal quotation, 
but he accurately conveyed the sense of the extract under consideration. His reproduction of 
the second extract was much closer linguistically to the first, but the replacement of possidere 
with uexare drastically altered its meaning. Anselm here harnessed the positive content of the 
Laon sententia, correcting its error and explaining to the reader how and why the change 
needed to be made, even without explicitly acknowledging that this was what he was doing. 
 Southern emphasizes the role of Boso in promoting Anselm’s awareness of 
contemporary teaching at Laon concerning the rights of the devil. He points to the dominant 
role given to Boso in the dialogue, in contrast to those of the anonymous discipuli of 
Anselm’s earlier dialogues. Most notably, the whole of Book One, Chapter Seven, which 
contains the statement of the rights of the devil theory, as well as its refutation, was put into 
Boso’s mouth. Southern argued that ‘in giving his pupil the initial breakthrough...[Anselm] 
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wished to give Boso some credit for an important moment in his own theological 
development.’160 
 The fact that Boso was given the initial identification and refutation of the problem is 
not necessarily significant in itself, as the dialogue was simply the literary form chosen by 
Anselm for the composition of his treatise, not the record of an actual discussion between the 
two men. Nevertheless, support for Southern’s argument is found in the fact that Anselm 
himself credited Boso with a significant role in inspiring the composition of Cur Deus homo. 
In the Prologue to his treatise De conceptu uirginali (c. 1099), Anselm addressed Boso, 
stating that ‘you more than anyone else impelled me to write.’161  
Frederick Van Fleteren also credits Boso with a role in drawing Anselm’s attention to 
the problems inherent in the ius diaboli idea, but without making any reference to 
contemporary teaching at Laon. Instead, Van Fleteren focuses on patristic precedent for the 
ius diaboli idea, particularly the complex Augustinian heritage.
 162
 In answer to the question 
of why it was necessary for God to become man and die in order to save mankind, rather than 
simply defeating the devil through a supreme display of divine power, Augustine argued that, 
although God could have used force against the devil, he preferred to defeat him with justice, 
as a method more befitting his all-encompassing goodness. He described how 
 
it pleased God that, in order to rescue man from the power of the devil, the devil 
should be conquered not with power but with justice; so that thus men, imitating 
Christ, should seek to conquer the devil with justice, not with power. Not because 
power should be avoided as something evil, but order must be preserved by which 
justice is first.
163
 
 
Augustine emphasized the voluntary nature of man’s sin, arguing that man had wilfully 
placed himself under the power of the devil. God allowed this to take place, so that man’s 
slavery would be the just punishment for his sin.
164
 Augustine stopped short of claiming that 
the justice by which man was enslaved to the devil implied that the devil had a just right to 
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exert this dominion over man, arguing instead that the devil’s power was entirely contingent 
on man’s sin.165 Christ’s death, the perfect sacrifice made once for all on account of sin, 
meant that man’s penalty had been paid, so that he could justly be freed from the punishment 
of servitude to the devil. In De trinitate, he described how ‘by his death, one true sacrifice 
poured out for us, he purged, abolished and destroyed whatever faults there were by which 
principalities and powers justly held us so that we should pay the penalty.’166 
Interpreting passages such as this one as a complete account of Augustine’s 
understanding of the justice by which man was enslaved to the devil is problematic, as it does 
not explain his concern to demonstrate how God treated the devil with justice. The passage 
quoted above continued with a description of how Christ’s death meant that the devil ‘lost 
man whom he possessed as if with complete justice, as he had been seduced through his own 
consent.’167 Augustine’s use of the word tanquam (as if) in relation to the devil’s claim to 
justice indicates the ambiguity inherent in his discussion of the ius diaboli. Nevertheless, as 
C.W. Marx points out, ‘Augustine’s statements that God chose to treat the devil with justice 
imply that God chose to respect some element of right in the Devil’s possession of humanity 
which was over and above that power which depended on humanity’s state of sin. Augustine 
never articulates the issue in this way, but it is implicit in how he describes the defeat of the 
devil.’168 
Van Fleteren argues that both the ‘accustomed answer’ cited by Boso at the beginning 
of the chapter, and its refutation, derive from passages in De trinitate 13. ‘Boso, intentionally 
we may believe, uses Augustine to refute an objection taken out of context by others from 
Augustine’s own writings. Likely, a few of Anselm’s contemporaries had raised this 
objection from Augustine’s own words.’169 By focusing solely on the ambiguities inherent in 
one book of one text by one author, Van Fleteren greatly understates the prevalence of 
arguments and analogies that relied on the ius diaboli idea in patristic and early medieval 
texts, many of whose authors were much less cautious than Augustine had been in their 
approach.  Leo the Great (d. 461), was unequivocal in his argument that the voluntary nature 
of man’s sin in putting himself in the power of the devil meant that the devil could justly 
claim lordship over him. 
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For the pride of the ancient enemy did not claim a just tyranny over all men 
undeservedly, nor did he crush with unowed despotism those whom he had lured 
away from the law of God to obey his will of their own accord. And so it would 
not be just for him to lose the original servitude of the human race unless he was 
conquered by that which had surrendered.
170
 
 
It was this argument that was being taught at Laon in the late eleventh century. 
 
The School of Laon and the Reception of Cur Deus homo 
  
Later sententiae from the school of Laon demonstrate a mixed reaction to Anselm’s 
arguments concerning the rights of the devil. While some acknowledged the problems 
inherent in the ius diaboli idea, demonstrating preference for an explanation of the 
redemption that was much closer to Anselm’s satisfaction theory, others continued to express 
support for the ius diaboli as taught by Ralph. A sententia entitled Cur Deus homo cited with 
approval Anselm’s argument for the necessity of the God-man (‘Archbishop Anselm: God 
could, man should.’),171 but also cited Augustine’s argument that God conquered the devil 
with justice, rather than power, so that man should imitate him in preferring justice to power. 
The devil was defeated justly because, in killing the sinless Christ, he justly lost the rest of 
mankind.
172
 This statement seems to imply that the author allowed some degree of justice in 
the devil’s possession of man which was lost when he overstepped his rights by killing the 
Christ. The argument is thus closer to that of Ralph on the question of the ius diaboli, even 
though the author employed Anselmian arguments on the necessity and fittingness of the 
incarnation. This may be indicative of the author’s reluctance to follow Anselm into territory 
that seemed to contradict earlier authority. Similarly, another sententia describes how ‘the 
devil lost his right over the human race’173 by attacking Christ, who remained pure and 
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incorrupt in spite of taking on human nature. In attacking what was not his own (Christ), he 
lost what was his own (man).
174
  
The Liber Pancrisis, attributed to Anselm of Laon, seems to follow a similar 
argument. The author described how 
 
Adam truly consented, and it is known how he consented, indeed by his own will, 
with the devil bringing no force to bear on him. And because he sinned 
voluntarily, he was subjected to the power of the devil and in this way corrupted 
himself and his descendants and was justly sold into servitude to the devil.
175
 
 
This passage seems to follow the same argument as the Ralph sententia, which emphasized 
the voluntary nature of man’s sin. Because man freely surrendered himself to the power of 
the devil, the devil could claim a just right to dominion over him.  
The author went on to argue that ‘unless it was a man who conquered the devil, man 
would not be taken from him justly but violently.’176 The devil’s claim to the right of 
dominion over man was such that it would be unjust for God to snatch man away from him 
through a show of divine power. After a brief discussion of why man’s redeemer needed to 
be one who was both God and man, the author returned to the voluntary nature of man’s sin, 
and the devil’s resulting imperium over him. ‘We know that God is just, and therefore would 
not seize from the devil with violence what was his own.’177  
However, the author of the sententia apparently recognized the problem inherent in 
claiming that the devil had a just right to power over man, as he followed this last statement 
with a counter-argument: ‘but did not the devil attack what was not his own unjustly? – Yes 
indeed.’178 The devil acted wrongly in tempting man to sin and deceiving him into giving up 
his obedience to God and the blessedness that came from it. Therefore, the author concluded, 
‘God justly sought and redeemed what was his own. Behold, you have the justice of God 
against the injustice of the devil.’179 The sententia ended with the statement that ‘man 
himself, if he was able to, would justly save himself from the devil, because he had been 
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seduced through a trick’, through the devil’s false promise that he could make man like 
God.
180
 
The next sententia in the Liber Pancrisis manuscripts also demonstrated the 
problematic nature of the argument that the devil had a just right to power over man. The 
sententia emphasized the devil’s ius over mankind which could not be removed by force 
without injury. It was only when the devil attempted to usurp power over the sinless God man 
Christ that he justly lost dominion over man.
181
 However, the sententia also included a 
description of the various claims that could be made in a law suit between God, man and the 
devil, which proved that God was supremely just, and the devil supremely unjust.
182
 The 
devil claimed just possession over man, although he had seduced man into sin through 
deception and false promises, ‘because without force, but by your own will alone, you were 
more obedient to me than to your creator, I possess you by right.’183 As far as man was 
concerned, it was entirely right that he should suffer servitude to the devil. However, God had 
a prior claim to lordship over man, and could order the devil to ‘return to me my slave for, if 
he wandered from me because of your lies, he must still be returned to me, for I am your 
Lord God and his.’184 In response, the devil had to acknowledge that, as both he and man 
belonged to God, God could take man back if he wished. As man deserved to be punished, he 
could claim some defence against man, but not against God.
185
 The author concluded that ‘by 
this judgement, it can be seen that if God had liberated his creature from his [the devil’s] 
power, he would not do him injury.’186 The devil had no right to power over man which 
meant that God could not liberate him without injustice. Nevertheless, in respect to the 
devil’s claim that man had voluntarily placed himself in his power, God preferred that the 
devil should lose man by his own hand (suo commisso), by attempting to assert power over 
one who was not under his jurisdiction. By this means, the devil ‘lost by right those whom he 
had once seemed to hold by right.’187 The sententia illustrates the complexity and ambiguity 
inherent in the ius diaboli idea, as the author struggled to reconcile the justice of man’s 
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possession and punishment by the devil, with the injustice of the devil himself, and the 
relative strength of the claims of God, man and the devil. 
The Liber Pancrisis illustrates the debates on the position of the devil that were taking 
place in Laon in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries. The sententiae on the 
redemption acknowledged the problems inherent in the idea that an unjust devil could 
possibly claim a just right to power over man, when this power was usurped through 
deception and trickery, and the theft of one of God’s creatures by another. The focus of the 
Liber Pancrisis on man’s sin and resulting servitude to the devil meant that it was liberation 
from the power of the devil, rather than the reconciliation of man to God, which provided the 
central focus of the argument. In this it presented the redemption along traditional lines, 
following the emphases established by Augustine and other patristic authors. The need to 
make sense of the ambiguities contained in Augustinian writing on the redemption may well 
have been the primary motivation for the Laon authors’ interest in the question in the late 
eleventh century, and the arrival of Anselm’s argument in Cur Deus homo must have made a 
significant contribution to the ongoing debates. Other, later, sententiae associated with the 
school of Laon are less ambiguous, and follow much more closely Anselm’s argument that 
the devil acted unjustly in deceiving man, so that although it was just for man to be punished 
for his sin, the devil had no just right to usurp power over him.
188
 
 The variation among the Laon sententiae concerning the ius diaboli means that it is 
impossible to identify a single Laon position on the subject. While some sententiae, such as 
those associated with Ralph discussed at the beginning of this chapter, support the idea that 
the devil had a just claim to power over fallen man, others denied that an unjust devil could 
have any just claim to power. The precise impact of Cur Deus homo on debates concerning 
the ius diaboli concept at Laon is difficult to assess. The Liber pancrisis raised questions and 
difficulties that could have been derived from a critical reading of the ambiguities inherent in 
Augustine without the need for direct Anselmian influence. Nevertheless, it seems significant 
that the sententiae which rejected the concept of the devil’s rights unequivocally are those 
which Lottin identifies as later in date. We know that Cur Deus homo was read and discussed 
at Laon soon after its composition, as Anselmian arguments on necessity, satisfaction and the 
position of the angels were cited in later sententiae. It therefore seems probable that his 
arguments on the ius diaboli had a similarly significant impact on debates at Laon in the early 
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twelfth century, contributing to the broad shift in opinion that can be seen in the later 
sententiae. 
   
Hugh of St Victor 
 
The distinction between the justice by which man was punished for his sin, and the injustice 
of the devil’s action in punishing him, as discussed in Cur Deus homo and the Laon 
sententiae, also played an important role in Hugh of St Victor’s account of the redemption in 
De sacramentis. Hugh’s analogy of the law suit began with the trial of the devil, who was 
convicted of having done injury to God, ‘for he abducted man, his slave, by deception, and 
held him by violence.’189 At the same time, the devil was also convicted of having done 
injury to man, ‘for first he deceived him by promising goods, and afterwards he harmed him 
by inflicting evils.’190 The devil’s actions of theft, deceit and harm meant that he ‘had no just 
cause whereby he should claim to have rights over man.’191 Therefore, God had no need to 
take the devil’s claims over man into account. Hugh thus followed Anselm in rejecting the 
‘rights of the devil’ argument for the redemption. 
However, although the devil had no right to inflict punishment on man, the fact of 
man’s punishment was not in itself unjust. By willingly disobeying divine precepts and 
voluntarily placing himself in the power of the devil, man had offended against God and so 
deserved to be punished.  
 
Therefore the devil holds man unjustly, but man is held justly, because the devil 
never deserved that he should oppress man as his subject, but man deserved 
through his sin that he should be permitted to be oppressed by him...Justly 
therefore was man subjected to the devil, as regards his sin, but unjustly, as 
regards the devil’s deception.192 
 
This statement echoes that of Anselm in Cur Deus homo, that man was justly tormented by 
the devil, although the devil was unjust in tormenting him.
193
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Man’s offence against God meant that, although he had a just case against the devil, 
the trial could not be brought to court. This is because the only advocate with the power to 
ensure the devil’s conviction was God himself. God was unwilling to act as man’s advocate 
against the devil because of his continued anger regarding man’s sin. Therefore, it was 
necessary for man to be reconciled with God in order to enter suit with the devil, with God as 
advocate. Hugh’s explanation of how Christ’s incarnation and death effected this 
reconciliation between man and God, like that of Anselm, can be understood entirely 
separately from any discussion of the devil. The reconciliation between man and God 
provides the main focus of Hugh’s argument. Man’s liberation from the power of the devil, 
which was made possible as a result of this reconciliation, was a vital consequence, but 
ultimately distinct from the main action of the redemption. 
The similarity of Hugh’s position on the role of the devil in the redemption to that of 
Anselm is not always recognized. Clanchy argues that Hugh ‘treats the devil as if he has 
rights’, and ‘blithely ignores’ Anselm’s rejection of the ius diaboli idea.194 This claim is 
based on a serious misunderstanding of Hugh’s argument. Clanchy claimed that Hugh’s devil 
had a legitimate power over man which could only be terminated by Christ paying the due 
price for man’s release with his own blood. This is not the case. Hugh argued, as Anselm did, 
that the devil had no right to power over man, and did not need to be bought off with a 
ransom. Before the case between man and God was even brought to court, the devil had 
already been convicted for his unlawful abduction of man, and excluded from further 
involvement in man’s case. It was not the devil who received Christ’s sacrificial death as 
compensation for man, but God. The structure of Hugh’s account of the redemption in De 
sacramentis, which was based on the analogy of a court room, gave the devil a more 
prominent position than he had held in Cur Deus homo. However, Hugh’s devil played no 
more of an active role in the drama of redemption than Anselm’s had done. Unlike the court 
case described in the Liber Pancrisis, Hugh did not allow the devil to claim any rights, either 
with regards to man or God.  
Clanchy emphasizes the litigious nature of Hugh’s court room analogy, and claims 
that he ‘portrays God like an angry and capricious man. The arbitrary anger of a medieval 
lord might be placated only by money or blood, but God should have a higher sense of 
justice.’195 Clanchy uses Hugh primarily to provide a contrast with Peter Abelard’s focus on 
love, and to emphasize the radical nature of Abelard’s argument. His claim that ‘in Hugh’s 
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analogy of the lawsuit there is no mention either of God’s love for man, nor of man’s love for 
God’ may be technically correct, but that is because, within the context of the particular 
analogy that Hugh was drawing, it would not have been appropriate for him to do so. The 
redemption as the supreme expression of God’s love for man, and the answering love which 
it inspired, lay at the heart of Hugh’s theology, and was inseparable from his understanding 
of justice and justification, as it had been for Anselm.  
Neither Anselm nor Hugh saw the divine justice of the redemption as a justice based 
on legalism and human concepts of the rights of lordship. Although they both used legalistic 
terminology to describe aspects of the redemption, this was essentially an analogy, and their 
arguments can be understood entirely apart from feudal law. Terms such as debitum and 
honor had much broader biblical and liturgical connotations than is often apparent from their 
usual English translations, and should not be interpreted in a purely legalistic light.
196
 The 
necessity of making satisfaction for sin was emphasized in the Rule of St Benedict, as well as 
early medieval penitential literature.
197
 Similarly, discussion of man’s servitude to the devil 
and to sin were not primarily rooted in medieval notions of vassalage, but in scriptural 
accounts of man’s slavery, particularly in the epistle to the Romans. 
   
Peter Abelard and the Council of Sens 
 
The impact of Anselm’s work on Hugh of St Victor’s rejection of the ius diaboli idea has 
received relatively little attention from historians. By contrast, Peter Abelard’s approach to 
the devil, and its basis in Anselmian thought, is widely recognized.
198
 In his Commentaria in 
Romanos, Abelard described the devil, as Anselm had done, as a rebel slave of God who had 
seduced man, his fellow slave into joining him in his rebellion. The devil therefore had no 
just right to claim possession over man. 
 
For what right could the devil have in possessing man, unless perhaps he had 
received him, with God permitting or even handing him over, to be tortured by 
him? For do you think that if any slave wills to desert his lord and put himself 
under the power of another, it is lawful for him to do this, so that his lord could 
not rightfully seek him out and bring him back, if he should wish? For who 
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doubts that if a slave of any lord seduces a fellow slave by his persuasion and 
makes him turn away from obedience to his own lord, how much more guilty the 
seducer is held by his lord than the seduced? And how unjust would it be if he 
who seduced another deserved to have something of privilege or power over him 
whom he had seduced, who, even if he had some right over him beforehand, 
deserved to lose that right from the very wickedness of his seduction?
199
 
 
Abelard’s explanation of why the devil, who himself owed obedience to God as Lord, could 
not justly have any right over his fellow slaves, bears strong similarities to the argument used 
by Anselm in Cur Deus homo.
200
  
Abelard did not deny that man was in the power of the devil. He argued that God had 
allowed man to be handed over to the devil in just punishment for sin, but that the devil did 
not have any just right to exercise this power on his own account. Abelard also rejected the 
idea of Christ’s death as a ransom for sin, on the grounds that the devil was not man’s rightful 
lord, but merely his torturer under God’s command. The devil could not receive payment, as 
‘it is not the torturers but their masters who arrange or receive the price for their captives.’201 
The only person who could legitimately receive a ransom payment was God, but God could 
not receive a ransom that he himself had demanded. The notion that a just God could demand 
the blood of an innocent man, let alone his own Son, as the price of anything, implied a 
cruelty and wickedness that was impossible to imagine in God. Therefore, Christ’s death 
could not be considered a ransom in any way.
202
 
Southern presents both Anselm and Abelard as eliminating the devil entirely from the 
process of redemption. This emphasizes the way in which both authors rejected the idea that 
the devil had an active role in the drama of redemption, focussing instead purely on the 
relationship between God and man, but it does not draw sufficient attention to the fact that 
neither Anselm nor Abelard denied the presence of the devil, and the reality of his power 
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over man. Although the devil himself had no just right to punish man, man’s punishment by 
him was nevertheless just from the perspective of man’s sin and the justice demanded by a 
divinely ordered universe. The strengths of the ‘rights of the devil’ argument outlined by 
Southern include the fact that ‘it conformed to recognizable norms of justice in human 
society, and...satisfied an underlying desire for justice in the universe’, and that ‘it recognized 
the cosmic scale of man’s fall.’203 Neither of these advantages was lost in Anselm’s 
argument, which took the reality of man’s sin, the devil’s power and the need for justice in 
the redemption into full account.  
Abelard also recognized the de facto reality of the devil’s power, and that the weight 
of sin was such that man could not possibly effect his own redemption, however great his 
love. However, these underlying principles in his thought were not readily apparent from his 
account of the redemption in the Romans quaestio, which concentrated purely on the 
exemplarist power of Christ’s human life and death. His teaching on the redemption was thus 
open to the charge that his rejection of the devil’s rights implied a rejection of the devil’s 
power and, consequently, of the entire objective efficacy of the redemption. It was one of a 
number of ‘heretical’ doctrines that led to Abelard’s condemnation at the hands of William of 
St Thierry and Bernard of Clairvaux at the Council of Sens in 1141. The attacks made by 
William and Bernard on Abelard’s teaching on the devil are revealing, not only for their 
fundamental misinterpretation of Abelard’s position, but also for perceptions of the status of 
the ius diaboli argument more broadly, forty years after Anselm had condemned it in Cur 
Deus homo. 
 It was William who first provoked the attack on Abelard’s ‘heretical’ teaching. In a 
letter to Bernard, he described a number of heretical teachings that he had found within 
Abelard’s books, and urged Bernard to take action and use his influence to put a stop to them. 
The letter began with a list of the heresies involved briefly stated, followed by longer 
discussions of particular items. In the chapter concerning Abelard’s teaching on the 
redemption, William provided Bernard with a lengthy ‘quotation’ from Abelard’s argument. 
This was not in fact a direct quotation of Abelard’s words, but a paraphrase of what William 
saw as his main argument. 
 
“It must be known”, he says, “that our doctors since the apostles agree on this, 
that the devil held dominion and power over man, and that he possessed him 
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justly, for this reason, that man consented voluntarily to the devil from the 
freedom of choice which he had. For they say that if someone conquers someone 
else, the conquered is agreed to be justly the slave of the conqueror. Therefore, as 
the doctors say, the Son of God became incarnate for this necessity, so that man, 
who could not otherwise be liberated, should be justly liberated from the yoke of 
the devil through the death of an innocent man. But, as it seems to us, the devil 
did not have any right over man, except perhaps with God’s permission, as a 
prisoner, and the Son of God did not assume flesh in order to liberate man.”204  
 
By beginning his ‘quotation’ with the statement that ‘our doctors since the apostles agree’ 
with the argument that the devil could claim a just lordship over man, due to the voluntary 
nature of man’s sin, William presented Abelard as deliberately flying in the face of a 
thousand years of authoritative doctrine. This was powerful rhetoric, but ignored the complex 
and varied history of the ius diaboli idea. Although authors such as Leo the Great did not 
hesitate to express the redemption in those terms, others, such as Augustine, were much more 
ambiguous in their interpretation of the devil’s position. William made no reference to 
Anselm’s rejection of the ius diaboli, or of the other writers who followed him, but presented 
Abelard as proclaiming something completely new and unprecedented. However, elsewhere 
in the letter, William himself argued that the devil had no just right to power over man, when 
he wrote that ‘power over man was not justly gained by the devil, but wickedly assumed, and 
justly permitted by God.’205 It was just that man should be punished for sin, but the justice 
was that of God, who permitted man’s just punishment to be carried out by the devil. The 
devil himself had no justice whereby he could claim the punishment of mankind as a right.  
 William thus agreed with Abelard and, although he did not feature in the argument, 
with Anselm, that there was no danger of doing injustice to the devil in setting man free, as 
the justice of man’s captivity lay not with the devil, but with God. It is significant that, in his 
‘quotation’ of Abelard’s work, William did not present him as altogether rejecting the 
concept of the justice by which man was held by the devil. His inclusion of the caveat ‘except 
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perhaps with God’s permission’ implies acceptance of the fact that man was captive to the 
devil as a prisoner, and that there was a sense in which this captivity could be seen as just. 
Although the devil had unjustly usurped power to which he had no right, God permitted him 
to continue to exert this power so that man might receive the just punishment for his sin. The 
devil’s power over man could therefore be said to be just, as it existed by the will of God, 
which is always just. The justice of the devil’s power was not that of the devil, but of God. 
 Taking his understanding of the content of Abelard’s teaching from William’s 
account, Bernard expressed surprise that the point should have come up at all. In his letter to 
Innocent II, he described Abelard as  
 
labouring to teach and to persuade that the devil neither could nor ought to have 
had any right to claim man for himself, except by the permission of God, and that 
without injury to the right of the devil, God could seek out his fugitive again, if he 
wished to have mercy on him, and could rescue him by his word alone, as if 
anyone denies this.
206
 
 
Bernard’s contemptuous tone in this passage implies that he considered the fact that God 
could in no way injure any just claim of the devil in redeeming mankind to be immediately 
obvious and without need of explanation. His professed incredulity that anyone could doubt 
the point is undoubtedly exaggerated for rhetorical effect, and it ignores the long history of 
texts which implied that the devil did have rights over man, from patristic authors such as 
Leo the Great to the near contemporary teaching of Ralph of Laon. However, it does seem to 
imply that Anselm’s rejection of the devil’s rights had gained considerable acceptance in the 
years since the publication of Cur Deus homo. 
 Although, in this passage, Bernard claimed that it was obvious that the devil had no 
rights over man, elsewhere in the letter he appeared to express support for the ius diaboli. As 
a starting point for his discussion, Bernard quoted John’s Gospel.207 
 
“You would not have any power over me, unless it had been given to you from 
above.”...I do not think he will claim that that power from above was given 
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unjustly. Therefore he will learn that the devil had not only power, but also rights 
over man, so that, consequently, he will see this, that the Son of God came in the 
flesh to set men free. But even if we say that the power of the devil was just, 
nevertheless his will was not. Therefore, it was not the devil who attacked, nor 
man who deserved it, but the Lord who demanded it, that was just. For one is said 
to be just or unjust not through power, but through will. Therefore the devil had a 
certain right over man, and even if it was not justly gained but wickedly usurped, 
nevertheless it was permitted justly. And so man was justly held captive, but the 
justice was neither in man nor in the devil, but in God.
208
 
 
In this passage, Bernard claimed that the devil did have a certain right over man, but it is 
clear from the context that he did not understand this right as belonging to the devil himself, 
but to God. It was right for the devil to punish man for sin, but his power over man was not 
justly gained, but unjustly usurped. Man’s captivity was just because God justly permitted it 
as the just punishment for sin. Therefore, the devil’s power over man could be said to be right 
and just in one sense, although this justice was not that of man or the devil, but of God. The 
devil himself had no justice whereby he could claim just rights over man. Bernard’s position 
here was ultimately far closer to Anselm’s argument that man was enslaved justly, although 
his enslaver seized him unjustly, than might at first appear. 
The close resemblance between the teaching of Anselm and Abelard regarding the 
position of the devil has led a number of commentators to raise the question of why, in his 
condemnation of Abelard’s argument, Bernard made no mention of its precedent in Cur Deus 
homo. Burcht Pranger emphasizes the ‘high esteem’ in which Anselm was held by Bernard’s 
contemporaries, arguing that in the years since his death ‘he had somehow managed to 
become “a doctor”, if not “another Augustine”...and thus to carry a kind of authority which 
could not be ignored.’ He suggests that Bernard’s silence with regard to Anselm’s teaching 
on the subject therefore ‘hints at some embarrassment on his part’.209 
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Alternatively, Constant Mews suggests that ignorance of Anselm’s argument is the 
most likely explanation for the omission, arguing that ‘the abbot of Clairvaux was not 
sufficiently familiar with this part of Anselm’s teaching to realise that Abelard was here 
influenced by ideas first put forward by the archbishop of Canterbury.’210 Apart from 
Bernard’s denial of the devil’s rights in his letter to Innocent, there is considerable evidence 
to suggest that Bernard was familiar with the argument of Cur Deus homo as a whole. The 
treatise was widely available in the twelfth century, and Bestul has identified three 
manuscript copies at Clairvaux.
211
 There are a number of elements within Bernard’s writings 
on the redemption that display parallels with Anselm’s work. Although he argued that God 
could, without any injustice, have rescued man from the devil with a single word, Bernard 
maintained that it was necessary for the Son of God to take flesh and suffer, and made 
repeated use of the language of fittingness (conuenientia, decentia, congruentia, commodia) 
to explain why.
212
 Gillian Evans also points to Bernard’s use of the image of a picture painted 
not on a solid base, but on a cloud, as one taken from Cur Deus homo, although he used it for 
a different purpose than Anselm.
213
 She argues that the parallels between Bernard’s writings 
on the redemption and those of Anselm are sufficient to justify the conclusion that Bernard 
‘had certainly read Cur Deus homo.’ 214 
Bernard’s description of the Holy Sepulchre in his treatise In laude nouae militia (c. 
1128) also contained a lengthy discussion of the redemption. Here, like Anselm, Bernard 
discussed the redemption purely in terms of man’s relationship with God, without reference 
to the devil. Physical death was the just penalty for man’s rebellion against God. By 
voluntarily accepting death, which he did not deserve, Christ paid the penalty on behalf of 
man, so that man could justly be freed from the power of sin and death. 
 
Accepting the punishment, yet without participating in the fault, he underwent a 
voluntary but only physical death and won for us both life and justice. Otherwise, 
if he had not suffered physically, he would not have paid what was owed, and if 
he had not died willingly his death would have been without merit. Now then, if 
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death is what sin deserves and death is what sin owes, as we have seen, then 
Christ in remitting the sin and dying for sinners has removed both what is 
deserved and what is owed.
215
 
 
This account of Christ’s death paying the just penalty for sin so that man might justly be set 
free and reconciled with God has parallels with Anselm’s argument in Cur Deus homo. 
 The fact that Bernard was apparently familiar with Anselm’s argument in Cur Deus 
homo is not incompatible with Mews’ suggestion that Bernard may not have realised the 
extent to which Abelard’s argument was based on Anselm’s work. There is no evidence that 
Bernard read the Commentaria in Romanos for himself; his critique of Abelard was based 
entirely on William’s report of his teaching, which gave the erroneous impression that 
Abelard rejected not only the devil’s right to power, but also the de facto reality of that 
power. William mistakenly believed that Abelard was arguing that mankind was not under 
the yoke of the devil, and so did not need to be liberated. It was this second part of Abelard’s 
argument, ‘that the Son of God did not assume flesh to liberate man,’ that really provoked the 
wrath of William and, following him, of Bernard. If Bernard did not see the connection 
between the arguments of Anselm and Abelard, he would have no reason to mention the 
Anselmian precedent for the rejection of the ius diaboli idea. Bernard’s claim that the 
invalidity of the ius diaboli concept was universally recognised would make naming 
Anselmian authority unnecessary and irrelevant. 
 In contrast to Bernard, the question of William’s awareness of, and attitude towards, 
Anselm’s argument has received little scholarly attention. There is no mention of Anselm in 
any of William’s writings and, with the notable exception of his argument that the devil had 
no rights over man, but was only permitted to exert power over him in the role of a prisoner, 
his works offer little indication that he may have been familiar with the arguments of Cur 
Deus homo. It would seem surprising if William was not aware of Anselm’s work, given the 
wide availability of the text in the twelfth century, and William’s continued interest in 
scholastic activity, even after entering the monastery.  
Little is known about William’s early life and education. He was born in Liège, and it 
seems likely that he received his early training in the liberal arts at one of the schools there, 
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before moving on to Reims to continue his studies, either in the liberal arts or theology.
216
 It 
has been suggested that he may also have attended Anselm’s school at Laon. In his letter to 
Bernard, William stated that he had ‘loved’ Abelard.217 Jean Déchanet believed that this 
phrase implied a personal acquaintance between the two men, and argued that this was likely 
to have been formed at Laon.
218
 However, this claim has been disputed by more recent 
historians.
219
 If William had studied at Laon, the argument that he was directly influenced by 
Anselm of Laon’s teaching on the rights of the devil would be more convincing. As it now 
seems unlikely that William attended Laon, the differences between his position on the devil, 
and that witnessed by the Laon sententiae, are less surprising. 
 Although Bernard and William rejected the principle of the ius diaboli, they both 
continued to use associated analogies in their explanations of the redemption. In his letter to 
Innocent, Bernard used the ‘abuse of power’ theory to explain how Christ justly freed man 
from the power of the devil. 
 
The prince of this world came, and did not find anything in the Saviour, and when 
he nevertheless laid hands on an innocent man, he most justly lost those whom he 
had held; when he who owed nothing to death, accepted the injury of death, he 
justly released from the dominion of the devil he who had been guilty, and 
deserving of death.
220
 
 
Bernard used the idea of an abuse of power on the part of the devil to explain how the devil 
justly lost power over man. Being deceived by Christ’s humanity into thinking that he was 
not divine, but a fallen man like any other, the devil attempted to exert the power of death 
over him and, in so doing, overstepped the bounds of his authority. As a consequence, he 
could justly be deprived of his power of the rest of humanity.  
A similar passage appears in William’s treatise De natura et dignitate amoris. Here, 
William argued that it was necessary for Christ to hide the power of his divinity behind the 
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infirmity of his human flesh as, if the devil had realised who he was, he would never have 
killed the Son of God. 
 
The old deceiver was deceived; he inflicted the punishment for sin, that is a most 
horrible death, on him who was guilty of no sin. The just man having been killed 
unjustly for the sake of justice obtained a new justice concerning the enemy, that 
is of death unjustly brought upon him. As this death was not necessary for him, 
because he was without sin, in joining himself to sinful man, he absolved the 
guilty through the punishment of his own innocence.
221
 
 
Bernard’s discussion of the devil’s abuse of power, with its implicit acceptance of the idea 
that the devil was deceived into killing the Christ, contradicted Anselm’s argument that the 
God of truth and justice could never practise any form of deception, even against the devil. It 
is possible that Bernard was not fully aware of Anselm’s position here. Although it was 
fundamental to his thought on the redemption, Anselm did not discuss the concept at length 
in Cur Deus homo.  It played a more obvious role in his Meditatio de redemptione humanae 
(c. 1098), which functioned as a contemplative companion piece to Cur Deus homo. Here, 
Anselm asked  
 
Why did you conceal such power under such humility? Was it so that you might 
deceive the devil, who by deceiving man had thrown him out of paradise? But 
truth deceives no one...Or  so that the devil might deceive himself? But just as 
truth deceives no one, so it does not intend that anyone should deceive 
himself...You did not do this to deceive anyone, or so that anyone might deceive 
himself, but only so that you might do what needed to be done, in all things 
established in the truth.
222
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Bernard may not have read the Meditatio; no copies are listed in the library catalogue of 
Clairvaux from this period, and its general circulation was narrower than that of Cur Deus 
homo. This would not necessarily imply ignorance of Anselm’s argument concerning the 
rights of the devil. Alternatively, Bernard may have understood Anselm’s position, but felt 
that the image still had value as an explanation for the devil’s loss of power over mankind 
following the killing of the Christ. Bernard used a wide range of images and analogies in his 
preaching and elsewhere to illustrate particular aspects of the redemption in a way that would 
be easily comprehensible and powerful for his audience. Nevertheless, the essentials of his 
teaching on the redemption, notably his rejection of the rights of the devil and his 
understanding of the redemption in terms of the payment of a debt, do seem to indicate a 
significant degree of Anselmian influence on Bernard’s thought. 
The fact that Bernard and William continued to use the image of the devil’s abuse of 
power in their accounts of the redemption, in spite of explicitly denying the devil’s right to 
power, illustrates the fact that the ‘rights of the devil theory’ was not a fully coherent and 
comprehensive ‘theory’ of the redemption at all, but a collection of images and analogies 
used by various authors in various combinations to describe particular aspects of the 
redemption. Bernard and William exemplify the way in which the dramatic and imaginative 
force of the ‘abuse of power’ argument could still be deemed valuable, even when its 
underlying premise was removed.   
It was not Abelard’s rejection of the idea that the devil had a just right to power over 
man that concerned William and Bernard as much as the perceived implication that the devil 
had no power over man at all, and that man therefore had no need of liberation. In Cur Deus 
homo, Anselm had made it clear that a rejection of the devil’s rights did not constitute a 
rejection of the devil’s power, or of the liberating efficacy of Christ’s death. The lack of 
reference to Anselm’s work in both William and Bernard may be partly due to the fact that it 
had little relevance to the particular issue under debate, which ultimately had little to do with 
the devil or the justice of his power. It was about the power of sin and man’s inability to save 
himself without the liberating power of divine grace, given through Christ.
223
 Abelard’s 
rejection of the rights of the devil was relatively uncontroversial, and both Bernard and 
William appear to have held views on the subject that were closer to that of Abelard, and of 
Anselm of Canterbury, than is often recognized.  
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The search for theological arguments that were rationally consistent was a hallmark of 
Anselm’s work, and the logic of his thought was one of its main attractions for later authors 
at the schools of Laon, St Victor and Abelard. Nevertheless, the imaginative appeal of older 
analogies of the redemption, centring on the defeat of the devil, remained powerful. Outside 
the theological speculation of the schools, other authors were less concerned with the 
demands of logical consistency and the subtle distinctions between different forms and levels 
of justice. For them, the powerful rhetoric of the battle for men’s souls, played out between 
God and the devil, had an impact that was too important to lose, and had formed the basis of 
teaching and preaching on the redemption for a millennium. Anselm’s satisfaction theory was 
not necessarily seen as incompatible with the continued use of images and ideas associated 
with the ius diaboli, both of which accepted the justice by which man was under punishment 
for sin. The following chapter will explore the combination of both forms of argumentation in 
the genre of Jewish-Christian disputation. 
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Chapter Three 
Cur Deus homo and Jewish-Christian Disputation 
 
It has been suggested that Cur Deus homo itself may have been written in part as a polemical 
treatise, providing arguments for use in disputation either with Jews or Muslims. Felix 
Asiedu stresses the structure of the treatise, which took as its starting point the objections to 
Christian doctrine that were being raised by the Jews, and argues that Anselm’s focus on 
these questions ‘implies a missiological and apologetic intent.’224 The argument of the first 
book of Cur Deus homo began with the statement that 
 
Unbelievers, deriding us for our simplicity, object that we are inflicting injury and 
insult on God when we assert that he descended into a woman’s womb, was born 
of a woman, grew up nurtured on milk and human food and – to say nothing of 
many other things which do not seem suitable for God – suffered weariness, 
hunger, thirst, scourging, crucifixion between two robbers and death.
225
 
 
The claim of the Jews that, by making God suffer the shame and pain of mortal life and death 
on a cross, Christians inflicted insult and injury on divine honour, was a common topos of 
disputation literature, and featured in numerous texts.
226
 Before writing Cur Deus homo, 
Anselm had apparently been involved in extensive discussion concerning the redemption and 
with his friend and student Gilbert Crispin, whose Disputatio iudei et christiani (1092-3) 
constitutes the earliest written account of the satisfaction theory.
227
 Gilbert’s treatise provided 
a model for later examples of disputation literature, highlighting the utility of Anselm’s 
argument in the genre. 
Apart from the Jewish context, Anselm was also involved in discussion with Muslims 
at Capua in 1098, the year Cur Deus homo was completed.
228
 If Anselm had in mind 
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disputation not only with Jews, but also Muslims, by the time the final chapters of Cur Deus 
homo were written, this might explain Boso’s concluding claim that Anselm had produced an 
argument which would satisfy ‘not only Jews, but also pagans.’229 
 Anselm’s interest in the challenges raised by Jewish opponents of Christianity and the 
need to provide rational and compelling answers to them must have been an important factor 
in his decision to write Cur Deus homo, but the treatise should not be seen as a work of anti-
Jewish disputation in itself. Anselm’s primary concern was for his own students and the 
monks in his community, and their need for a clear explanation of sound Christian doctrine to 
help them to understand the faith which they already believed.
230
 Throughout his career, 
Anselm had stressed the primacy of faith over understanding, arguing that without pre-
existing faith, one could not hope to gain understanding.
231
 Rather than attempting to convert 
the Jews through his rational argumentation, Anselm hoped to increase the faith and 
understanding of those who already believed, and to resolve any difficulties they might be 
experiencing. His concern with contemporary teaching in the schools, and the questions it 
provoked among students such as Boso, was his central purpose. In the process, Anselm 
produced an argument that proved extremely valuable for later authors who sought to explain 
rationally the tenets of Christianity, not only to a Christian audience, but also to Jews. As 
Boso pointed out at the beginning of Cur Deus homo, ‘although [unbelievers] seek reasons 
because they do not believe, while we seek them because we believe, nevertheless that which 
we seek is one and the same.’232 Cur Deus homo thus constituted a valuable resource for the 
writers of Jewish-Christian disputations throughout the twelfth century. 
 
Gilbert Crispin 
 
The earliest text to show signs of Anselmian inspiration in its account of the redemption was 
a work of Jewish-Christian disputation, Gilbert Crispin’s Disputatio iudei et christiani (1092-
3). The text enjoyed widespread popularity, and survives in thirty-two manuscripts, twenty of 
which date from the twelfth century.
233
 By providing an early model for the developing genre 
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of Jewish-Christian writing, the Disputatio provided an important vehicle for the transmission 
of Anselmian arguments for the necessity of the incarnation, albeit in a simplified form. The 
popularity of Gilbert’s text, which relied heavily on arguments for the ius diaboli alongside 
Anselmian arguments, may also have strengthened the idea that the two forms of argument 
were not incompatible; numerous later disputations followed Gilbert in incorporating both 
into their argument. Gilbert completed his treatise several years before the composition of 
Cur Deus homo, so that his understanding of Anselmian thought can only have come through 
oral communication. Study of the Disputatio can provide interesting evidence for the 
development of Anselm’s own thought, and the genesis of Cur Deus homo in the context of 
discussion with students and friends. Even more than Honorius Augustodunensis’ 
Elucidarium, discussed in Chapter One, Gilbert’s Disputatio exemplifies the way in which 
Anselm’s inspiration on his immediate circle was as much oral as written. 
 Gilbert would have had plenty of opportunity for discussion with Anselm both before 
and during the composition of the Disputatio. He had been a student of Anselm at Bec, before 
being brought to Canterbury by Lanfranc in 1079. He was later appointed abbot of 
Westminster, a position he held until his death in 1117.
234
 Anselm came to England in the 
autumn of 1092.
235
 His movements between arriving in England and his consecration as 
archbishop the following March are unclear. However, a letter to Bec, sent around Christmas 
1092, asking for some books to be sent on, suggests that he was then at Westminster.
236
 
Although this is impossible to demonstrate, it seems likely that he spent most of the winter 
with Gilbert.
237
 A prolonged stay at Westminster would have allowed the two men plenty of 
opportunity for detailed discussion of a range of theological and pastoral questions. Gilbert’s 
arguments concerning the incarnation and redemption can thus be interpreted as reflecting, at 
least in part, the outcome of discussion with his former master Anselm. The text must have 
been completed before Anselm’s elevation to Canterbury in March 1093, as the dedicatory 
letters of the early manuscripts address him as pater et dominus Anselmus or pater et dominus 
Anselmus abbas; he is not described as archiepiscopus until a later recension of the text, 
containing a few minor alterations.
238
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 In the Disputatio, Gilbert emphasized the weight of sin and impact of the fall for all of 
humanity. As a result of Adam’s sin, all his descendants were born subject to sin and 
condemned to misery and death.
239
 Gilbert argued that, as man had sinned voluntarily and 
deliberately in stealing himself from God, man should make satisfaction for that sin.
240
 
However, because of the fall, not even a day-old infant was free from sin, and there was no 
man on earth with enough justice in himself to atone for his own sins, let alone those of the 
entire human race.
241
 Therefore, it was necessary for God to become man in Christ, in order 
to undertake man’s obligations and fulfil the debt. Gilbert argued that 
 
lest man should perish for eternity, man ought to be restored. But he could not be 
restored, unless God assumed man, undertook our necessity, became himself our 
advocate against the enemy...and completed our case. And so man must be 
restored to God, and through man, who had stolen himself from God.
242
 
 
Gilbert argued that it was necessary for God himself to act as man’s redeemer, rather than 
working through the creation of a new man, not descended from Adam, or an angel, on the 
grounds that 
 
if a new man, or one born from another [who was not tainted by original sin], or 
an angel became man, to liberate man, man could not be restored to his original 
status and his natural dignity. For through his creation man, like the angels, was 
obliged to serve only his creator God; he could not be restored to that same status 
of liberty either through a man or through an angel. For anyone who is redeemed 
from servitude by another, is judged to be under obligation to serve that other. 
Therefore, since the full restoration of man could not be achieved by another, it 
was necessary that the Creator should come to the aid of the creature, that the 
Creator should take the place of the creature, so that man, having been restored by 
the Creator himself, would remain obliged to serve the Creator alone.
243
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Gilbert’s argument that it would be inappropriate for man to be saved by any creature other 
than God, on the grounds that man would then be beholden to his saviour and subject to him, 
when he should be subject to none but God, was later repeated by Anselm in Cur Deus 
homo.
244
  
 Although Anselm’s discussion of questions such as why God did not redeem man 
through a pure man or an angel reflects ongoing debate among his contemporaries,
245
 his 
main argument concerning the need for man to make satisfaction for sin was new. In the 
Disputatio iudei et christiani, Gilbert incorporated elements of this argument, although his 
main theme in discussion of the redemption was Christ’s liberation of man from the just 
dominion of the devil, which Anselm would reject altogether in Cur Deus homo.
246
 He drew 
closer to Anselm’s argument in a second dialogue, the Disputatio christiani cum gentili. This 
treatise was supposedly the product of discussions with a pagan whom Gilbert had met at a 
secret philosophers’ meeting in London.247 It is thought to be close in date to the Disputatio 
christiani et iudei, although it makes use of arguments from Anselm’s De incarnatione uerbi 
which indicate that it cannot be earlier than March 1093, and Gilbert may have intended it as 
a companion piece, or even a continuation of the earlier work.
248
 
 In the Disputatio christiani cum gentili, Gilbert explained how Christ’s death was 
effective in paying the penalty for man’s sin, enabling atonement to be made to God, in terms 
that were closer to Anselm’s understanding of satisfaction than he had used in the earlier 
Disputatio. 
 
The sin through which we earned the punishment of death ought to be atoned for. 
But who can atone for this sin, corrupted by the mass of sin, when not even a day-
old infant is free of it? Therefore there ought to be born from the same corrupt 
mass but without sin one who will atone for the damage of that sin. Therefore 
Christ was born of a virgin...And so man sinned, and man made atonement. Man 
sinned in Adam; man atoned for that sin in Christ. God created man; God, in 
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Christ and through Christ, recreated man. Therefore man is totally obligated to 
God alone, so that he should fear him, love him, and submit to him in all things, 
because he was both created and recreated by him alone.
249
 
 
In the Disputatio christiani et gentili, Gilbert described the efficacy of Christ’s incarnation 
and death primarily in terms of atonement for sin. He described this process in terms of 
making expiation (expiare) rather than satisfaction (satisfacere), as Anselm would do in Cur 
Deus homo, but the essential principle was the same.  
 It has been suggested that the passages in the Disputatio iudei et christiani that refer 
to the necessity of a God-man to make atonement for sin may not only have found their initial 
inspiration in discussion between Gilbert and Anselm, but that Anselm’s involvement was 
much more direct. Southern sees a clear stylistic contrast between the majority of the treatise, 
which relies heavily upon arguments taken from Scripture, and the relatively brief passages 
which attempt to explain the necessity of the incarnation using rational argumentation. He 
points out that the Jew made no response to these sections in the dialogue, and suggests that 
they may have constituted later interpolations to an already almost finished text, which 
otherwise offered a fairly accurate representation of genuine debates between Gilbert and a 
Jew, based primarily upon arguments based on scriptural exegesis.
250
 Abulafia follows 
Southern in arguing that the statements relating to the necessity of the incarnation did not 
form part of the original dialogue, suggesting that they were added later as a result of 
Gilbert’s discussions with Anselm.251 Bernard Blumenkranz takes this idea further, and even 
suggests that Anselm himself added a number of sentences to Gilbert’s original text when 
Gilbert sent it to him for approval.
252
 This argument is difficult to support. Although in the 
dedicatory preface to the Disputatio, Gilbert wrote that he was sending the text to Anselm for 
comment,
253
 there is no evidence to suggest that the work was sent to Anselm unfinished, or 
that Anselm’s comments were incorporated into a revised second version. As R.J. Zwi 
                                                          
249
 Expiari oportebat peccatum per quod merueramus mortis dispiendium. Sed quis de massa corrupte 
conditionis hoc peccatum expiaret, cum de eadem massa nec infans unius diei a peccato illo immunis esset? De 
eadem igitur massa sine peccato corruptela oportuit nasci qui expiaret noxam illius peccati. Natus ergo est 
Christus de uirgine...Peccauit itaque homo, et expiauit homo. Homo in Adam peccauit, homo in Christum 
peccatum illlud expiauit; Deus creauit hominem, Deus in Christo et per Christum recreauit hominem. Totus 
ergo soli Deo est obnoxius homo, ut eam timeat, diligat, et in omnibus ei optemperet, quia et creatus atque 
recreatus ad eo solo est. Gilbert, DCG, 72-3. 
250
 Southern, ‘Anselm and Gilbert’, p. 92.  
251
 A.S. Abulafia, ‘The Ars disputandi of Gilbert Crispin, Abbot of Westminster (1085-1117)’, in C. M. Cappon 
et al., Ad Fontes. Opstellen aangeboden aan Prof. Dr. C. Van de Kieft (Amsterdam, 1984), pp. 139-152, at pp. 
146-7. 
252
 B. Blumenkranz, ‘Praefatio’, Gisleberti Crispini Disputatio Iudei et Christiani (Utrecht, 1956), p. 9. 
253
 Paternitate et prudentie tue discutiendum mitto libellum quem nuper scripsi. Gilbert, DIC, 3. 
88 
 
Werblowsky argues, ‘there is no need at all to postulate a direct literary influence of 
Anselm’s writings on the Disputatio, or to assume that Anselm had seen a first draft of 
Crispin’s text.’254 The significant change of emphasis in Gilbert’s argument between the 
Disputatio iudei et christiani and the later Disputatio christiani cum gentili can most easily be 
explained with the argument that Anselm did not see a copy of the Disputatio iudei et 
christiani until after the text had been completed, but later expressed his opinion on the 
relative value of arguments involving the necessity of satisfaction and the rights of the devil, 
causing Gilbert to change his approach in his later Disputatio christiani cum gentili. 
The distinction between the ‘Gilbertine’ sections of scriptural exegesis and ‘Anselmian’ 
passages of philosophical reasoning should not be over-stated, as Gilbert frequently 
alternated between passages of exegesis and rational argumentation in his writings. This can 
be seen in his Sermo in ramis palmarum, which has been dated to Palm Sunday 1093, shortly 
after the completion of the first Disputatio.
255
 Gilbert began his sermon by declaring his 
intention to explore the question of why God willed to become man, and why it was 
absolutely necessary (omnino necesse) for him to do so, in order to bring about the salvation 
of mankind.
256
 He then went on to give an account of the Fall that contained a number of 
ideas also found in Anselm’s De casu diaboli and Cur Deus homo, to demonstrate man’s 
need of salvation, before going on to discuss the means of the redemption itself. He described 
how only God could restore to man his original status, on the grounds that  
 
if an angel or another man, born of a virgin without sin, could redeem man 
through his suffering, he still could not restore him to his original liberty. For he 
who is redeemed by another rightly becomes a slave under his dominion.
257
 
 
In the sermon, Gilbert interwove passages of rational inquiry and the ‘philosophical’ 
necessity of the incarnation with numerous scriptural quotations and exegesis, just as his 
account of the fall combined Anselmian arguments taken from De casu diaboli with 
extensive quotations from Genesis about the tree of the knowledge of good and evil and the 
expulsion from the garden of Eden. The sermon illustrates the fact that it is not necessary to 
interpret the combination of different styles of argument within Gilbert’s Disputatio with the 
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Jew as indicative of later interpolation, as this was a common characteristic of Gilbert’s 
writings; it can also be seen in a large percentage of his works with which there is no 
suggestion that Anselm may have been directly or personally involved. 
Gilbert made no attempt to qualify his use of the term necessitas in his discussion of 
the necessity of the incarnation. He did comment that the necessity was not of God, but of 
man,
258
 but this phrase only emphasized man’s need of redemption in order to fulfil the 
purpose of his creation, and he did not engage with the problem of how an omnipotent and 
radically free God could be said to act from necessity. Anselm’s extensive discussion of 
necessity in Cur Deus homo reflects his own interest in the meaning of concepts such as 
necessity, justice and freedom, which was shared by his contemporaries at Laon. The need to 
interpret and reconcile statements in Augustine and elsewhere regarding necessity, fittingness 
and freedom was a central concern in the schools, but was less of a priority for Gilbert. 
The Disputatio christiani cum gentili had little impact, and survives in only one 
manuscript.
259
 In contrast, the Disputatio iudei et christiani enjoyed wide popularity in the 
early twelfth century, and provided a model for subsequent examples of Jewish-Christian 
disputation. Later treatises not only used ideas derived from Gilbert’s Disputatio, but also the 
text of Cur Deus homo, which had not been available to Gilbert. Anselm’s argument was 
particularly useful to the writers of Jewish-Christian literature, because it supplied a 
reasonable answer to the main challenge posed by Jewish opponents to the doctrine of the 
incarnation: why God should abandon his divine power and majesty and subject himself to 
the indignity of birth as a human baby, followed by torture and death at the hands of men. 
Anselm’s account of why it was necessary and fitting for this to happen provided a useful 
tool for later authors. In addition, his satisfaction theory allowed the writers of Jewish-
Christian literature to engage with ideas of sacrifice and redemption in a way that provided 
some points of contact with Jewish practice and belief. 
  
Dialogus inter christianum et iudeum de fide catholica 
 
An example of a Jewish-Christian disputation that drew heavily on both Cur Deus homo and 
Gilbert Crispin’s Disputatio iudei et christiani is the anonymous Dialogus inter christianum 
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et iudeum de fide catholica.
260
 The precise dating of the treatise is unknown, but its 
dedication to Alexander, bishop of Lincoln, indicates that it was probably composed between 
1123 and 1148, the years of Alexander’s episcopacy.261 The text purported to be based on 
real discussions between the author and a Jew, and to have been written at the behest of 
members of the audience of the original debate.
262
 The opening sections of the Dialogus were 
modelled closely on Gilbert Crispin’s Disputatio iudei et christiani, and Bernard 
Blumenkranz dismissed the entire treatise as little more than a rewriting of Gilbert’s work.263 
However, there are significant differences between the two treatises, and the source material 
for the Dialogus was far more extensive than Gilbert’s Disputatio alone. In particular, the 
author made extensive use of several Anselmian texts, including De casu diaboli, De 
conceptu uirginali and Cur Deus homo. Amos Funkenstein argues that the parallels with Cur 
Deus homo were such that the entire treatise constitutes a superficial and inept version of 
Anselm’s work.264 This judgement also gives an unfairly narrow interpretation of the author’s 
source material and skill in composition, but it does emphasize the extent of the debt which 
his treatise owed to Cur Deus homo.
265
 
 The Dialogus began with the Christian claim that Jewish law could not bring 
salvation, and that it should be abandoned as without virtue. As Anselm had done in Cur 
Deus homo, the author emphasized the weight of sin, for which no amount of earthly sacrifice 
could atone. Only God was capable of making sufficient sacrifice for sin, so the incarnation 
of the Son of God was necessary to expiate human guilt. 
 
Because all man sinned in the first father, he fell into death; therefore the law, 
with its carnal sacrifices, was not sufficient to restore this damage, and could not 
open paradise, nor was it able to save its observers from hell, although they were 
just. Therefore it was necessary that the Son of God should come to earth who, 
having been made a sufficient sacrifice for us, would remove carnal sacrifices, 
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and perfect the imperfect law, and bearing our evils destroy our death by his 
death, and open the doors of the heavenly kingdom. Therefore he made expiation 
for our guilt...
266
 
 
The doctrine of original sin was problematic for Christians attempting to engage in dialogue 
with the Jews on man’s need for redemption, because the concept had no place in Jewish 
theology. This fact is recognised in the Dialogus, when the Jew responds to a statement made 
by the Christian about original sin with the objection that 
 
When you say original sin, I think you are talking about the sin which Adam, the 
father of all, committed, but what has that to do with us? Hear what the prophet 
says, the soul which perishes dies itself, the son shall not bear the iniquity of the 
father, etc. Our father Adam bore his own sin which does not relate to us at all, 
because, although we are his sons, we do not bear his iniquity, but you think it is 
ours who were not yet created and were not!
267
 
 
The Christian in the Dialogus responded to this challenge by arguing that, as the whole of 
humanity was contained in Adam at the time of his sin, not only the individual man, but 
human nature itself, was corrupted by the fall. Having dealt with this point, the rest of the 
treatise continued to use arguments which assumed the existence of original sin, and which 
were no longer challenged by the Jew. Abulafia sees the author’s recognition of Jewish 
rejection of the doctrine of original sin as evidence that he was personally acquainted with 
Jews and had engaged in theological discussion with them, even if the Dialogus does not 
provide a direct historical record of a debate, as the author claimed.
268
 In Cur Deus homo, 
Anselm treated the concept of original sin as a universally-accepted fundamental that had no 
need of justification, as did Gilbert Crispin in the Disputatio iudei et christiani. 
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 Having argued that man needed to be redeemed by a sinless being making expiation 
for sin, the author went on to demonstrate why this sinless being had to be the Son of God 
himself, and not an angel or a pure man. 
 
If indeed an incarnate angel were sent to complete this redemption, it would be 
very unfitting; because then man would be subject to four persons, and while 
serving one God in the Trinity he would also have to worship the angel who 
redeemed him; and if some new man were made and came to redeem the old man, 
it would not be at all appropriate, because neither his nature nor that of the angel 
would relate to us, and so could in no way restore us. But rather it was right for 
God to be made man, taking flesh from that sinful nature but without guilt, and 
that the Creator of man, coming himself, should redeem his creature.
269
 
 
The argument that, if man were redeemed by any creature other than God, he would be 
subject to that creature and obliged to worship him alongside the Trinity could have come 
either from Anselm or from Laon. However, the second argument, that only a being who 
shared man’s fallen nature could fittingly make expiation for man’s sin, is distinctively 
Anselmian, and demonstrates a good understanding of Anselm’s teaching on the essential 
unity of the genus humanum as descended from Adam. 
 The Dialogus differed from Cur Deus homo in its discussion of the angelic and 
human population of the heavenly city. The author argued that man had been created after the 
fall, with the purpose of replacing the fallen angels.
270
 In contrast, Anselm had argued that 
man was created for his own sake, and would have been saved even if the angels had not 
fallen.
271
 The author of the Dialogus agreed with Anselm that the angels who fell must be 
replaced by man, and not other angels, arguing that the angels who had persevered from the 
beginning had attained a perfection of charity that could not be achieved by angels created 
after the fall, but went on to describe how it was right that God should replace the fallen devil 
with a man formed from the mud of the earth, so that man should remain truly humble and 
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the devil be driven mad with jealousy by the lowliness of his successor.
272
 This argument was 
very different from anything used by Anselm. 
The Dialogus contained numerous arguments for the incarnation and redemption that 
were apparently derived from the author’s reading of Cur Deus homo. However, there are 
also significant differences between the two texts, and the overall thrust of the argument was 
closer to that of Gilbert Crispin’s Disputatio iudei et christiani. Like Gilbert, the author of the 
Dialogus used the terminology of expiation rather than satisfaction to describe how Christ’s 
death made restitution for sin. More fundamentally, in both treatises, the theme of expiation 
was less dominant than a restatement of traditional arguments for the redemption as freeing 
man from the power of the devil by manoeuvring him into giving up his previously just 
possession, which Anselm rejected.
273
 This reflects a trend in accounts of the redemption in 
Jewish-Christian disputations, further exemplified by Guibert of Nogent’s Tractatus de 
incarnatione contra iudeos. 
 
Guibert of Nogent 
 
A further example of use of Anselmian arguments for the necessity of the incarnation in 
Jewish-Christian disputation can be found in Guibert of Nogent’s Tractatus de incarnatione 
contra iudeos (1111). As a young novice at St-Germer de Fly, Guibert had studied under 
Anselm, then prior of Bec, who was a regular visitor at St-Germer.
274
 The teaching that 
Guibert recalled most strongly in his Monodiae concerned the nature of the will, appetite and 
reason.
275
 However, he was profoundly influenced by Anselm’s thought on a number of 
different subjects, including the doctrine of the incarnation. The Tractatus was composed at 
the request of Bernard, deacon of Soissons, for use against Count John of Soissons, who was 
apparently promoting Jewish critique of Christian beliefs, particularly concerning the 
doctrine of the incarnation.
276
 As with the other examples of Jewish-Christian disputations 
discussed in this chapter, the treatise makes extensive use of arguments taken from scripture, 
but the basic structure of the argument concerning the necessity of the incarnation closely 
reflects that of Anselm in Cur Deus homo. 
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 Guibert emphasized the need for satisfaction to be made for sin in order for man to be 
redeemed. However, the weight of sin was such that it could never be repaid by mere man.
277
 
No man was capable of making satisfaction for sin, because no man was free of sin; even a 
day-old infant was guilty of original sin. Only God was capable of making a payment on this 
scale. However, satisfaction could only be paid by man, as ‘no other nature except that which 
had sinned, could make satisfaction for that sin.’278 Therefore, satisfaction could only be 
made by one who was both God and man. ‘And so it was just that he should act for man who, 
in that he was man, was capable of dying for man but, being free from sin, could bear man’s 
sin; and, in that he was God, could reconcile man to God.’279 
 It is impossible to know whether Guibert gleaned his argument concerning the need 
for one who was both God and man to make satisfaction for sin from the text of Cur Deus 
homo itself, or from discussions with Anselm in person, either before he left Bec or during 
his exile.
280
 However, the linguistic parallels, such as his use of the terminology of 
satisfaction, may well imply access to the text itself. Guibert’s discussion of satisfaction was 
closer to that of Cur Deus homo than Gilbert’s Disputatio iudei et christiani or the Dialogus 
de fide catholica. Nevertheless, like the other disputationes, his treatise combined Anselmian 
arguments for satisfaction with the rights of the devil concept, which Anselm had rejected. 
 
The ius diaboli in Disputation Literature 
 
Although much of Gilbert’s argument in the Disputatio iudei et christiani concerning the 
necessity for God to become incarnate to redeem humanity presaged Anselm’s position in 
Cur Deus homo, he argued the exact opposite to his former master with regard to the question 
of the rights of the devil. Gilbert’s argument assumed that the devil did have a just right to 
exercise power over man following the fall. He described how 
 
the enemy found nothing that was his own in Christ, who had neither been 
conceived in sin, nor participated in sin, nor contracted the stain of sin during his 
life in any way whatsoever. And so therefore he offended by presumptuously 
bringing to an unjust death the man in whom he had found nothing that was his 
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own, and over whom he had no rights whatsoever. Therefore he justly lost his just 
dominion, which he had obtained over the first man and his descendants through 
the sin of the first man.
281
 
 
In this passage, Gilbert described the redemption in terms of an abuse of power on the part of 
the devil. When man sinned, he handed himself over to the power of the devil, who then 
enjoyed the right of dominion over him as subject. The God-man Christ was completely free 
of sin, and therefore not under the devil’s jurisdiction. When the devil attempted to exert 
power over Christ through death, he exceeded the bounds of his authority and consequently 
forfeited his right to exert continued power over the rest of mankind. Man could then be 
rescued from the devil without God laying himself open to any suspicion that he had acted 
unjustly. By contrast, in Cur Deus homo, Anselm unequivocally rejected the notion that the 
devil had rights over man, and any discussion of the redemption that relied on this premise. 
The fact that Gilbert continued to express support for the ius diaboli idea in his Disputatio 
iudei et christiani is therefore of interest for the development and immediate reception of 
Anselm’s thought.  
Precisely how and when Anselm became aware of the ius diaboli concept and its 
inherent difficulties is debatable. Partly on the grounds of Gilbert’s apparent ignorance of the 
problem, Southern believed that it was a late development in Anselm’s thought on the 
redemption.
282
 He finds evidence for this theory in the structure of the text of Cur Deus 
homo, and suggests that Book One, Chapter Seven, in which Anselm refuted the ius diaboli 
argument, was a late addition to the text, arguing that Anselm’s first speech in Chapter Eight 
provides an immediate reaction to the questions raised by Boso in Chapter Six without 
reference to the intervening discussion of Chapter Seven.
283
  
 Arguing that Anselm developed his argument concerning the ius diaboli late enough 
to necessitate an interpolation into an already almost-completed text raises the question of 
how and when this might have happened. He may have been inspired by access to new texts 
and ideas that he encountered during his travels on the continent while in exile.
284
 This raises 
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intriguing questions about Anselm’s source material and intellectual development. However, 
it seems unlikely that the problem had not occurred to him before 1097. Discussions of the 
redemption in terms of a ransom, and the abuse of power motif, were commonplace in 
patristic and medieval writing. Furthermore, the meaning of justice had been central to 
Anselm’s thought for many years, as can be seen from earlier treatises such as De ueritate. 
Anselm’s argument for how an action can be both just and unjust simultaneously from the 
perspective of different agents reflects earlier discussion on the same subject in De 
ueritate.
285
   
Southern’s argument that Anselm suddenly became aware of the problem with the ius 
diaboli and decided to write about it at a late stage in the composition of Cur Deus homo 
seems inconsistent with his other suggestion that his awareness of the problem was primarily 
stimulated by Boso bringing news of Ralph’s teaching from Laon. The difficulty is one of 
chronology, as it would apparently place Anselm’s epiphany, not only several years after 
Boso had first come to him with his perplexae questiones from the schools, but even two or 
three years after the previous occasion on which they are known to have spent time together; 
there is no evidence that Boso joined Anselm on his exile, although he was on the continent 
at the time.
286
 However, as has already been demonstrated, it is likely that Anselm had 
already developed his refutation of the ius diaboli idea several years earlier. The closeness of 
the verbal parallels between the passages under discussion in the Laon sententia and Cur 
Deus homo seem to indicate that Anselm had access, not only to a student’s personal 
recollections of oral teaching, but to the text of the sententia itself. As the precise date of the 
sententia is unknown, it is difficult to speculate on whether Boso could possibly have brought 
it with him to Bec, but the question is ultimately of limited significance, as Anselm 
presumably considered the substance of his argument before he began setting it to paper. If 
Southern’s analysis of the order of composition of the various sections of Cur Deus homo is 
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correct, and the chapter dealing with the ius diaboli argument was among the last to be 
written, Anselm could easily have acquired the text of the sententia while in France on exile 
in 1097. 
Southern’s analysis of Gilbert’s work in relation to the development of Anselm’s 
thought and teaching was primarily focussed on Gilbert’s argument in the Disputatio iudei et 
christiani. However, a comparison with his account of the redemption in the slightly later 
Disputatio christiani cum gentili reveals a significant shift in Gilbert’s thought which may 
well have been the result of discussion with Anselm on the ius diaboli as early as 1093. In 
this second Disputatio, Gilbert did not repeat his argument concerning the rights of the devil 
and the abuse of power which enabled his just deprivation of mankind. Instead, he described 
man’s redemption purely in terms of making expiation for sin, without reference to the devil. 
Gilbert’s apparent change of mind on this point from his earlier Disputatio is significant, and 
may well be indicative of Anselmian influence. It seems reasonable to assume that Anselm 
read the Disputatio iudei et christiani, which was dedicated to him. Assuming that he had 
already identified the problem with the ius diaboli argument, it would be perfectly feasible to 
suggest that, in his response to Gilbert, he would have raised the point. This would provide a 
logical explanation for the change in Gilbert’s argument in the Disputatio christiani cum 
gentili. It could be argued that Gilbert’s omission did not necessarily reflect a new awareness 
of Anselm’s refutation of the ius diaboli argument, but that he may simply have chosen not to 
incorporate it in his second Disputatio, preferring instead to focus solely on the need for 
expiation. However, it seems unlikely that Anselm would have neglected to mention the 
subject in his correspondence with Gilbert following his receipt of the Disputatio iudei et 
christiani.  
A useful parallel can be drawn with Honorius Augustodunensis’ account of the 
redemption in Elucidarium, which was also composed before the completion of Cur Deus 
homo, and before Anselm left for exile on the continent in 1097. Honorius also avoided 
mention of the ius diaboli argument. Unless Anselm had been teaching against the idea in the 
early 1090s, it would be difficult to explain Honorius’s omission of such a popular analogy 
for the redemption, in a work that was intended to provide a complete compendium of 
essential Christian doctrine. 
Gilbert’s use of the ius diaboli concept in his Disputatio iudei et christiani is generally 
assumed to imply ignorance of Anselm’s teaching on the subject. An alternative explanation 
might be that Gilbert was aware of Anselm’s position, but deliberately chose to ignore it. In 
Gilbert’s case, the evidence of a change in argument in the Disputatio christiani cum gentili 
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seems to support the former conjecture. However, there are numerous examples of later 
authors who apparently had access to the full text of Cur Deus homo, following Anselmian 
arguments regarding the necessity of the God-man to make satisfaction for sin, who 
nevertheless also continued to use the analogies for the redemption that relied on the ius 
diaboli concept that Anselm had refuted. 
An example of the combination of elements of Anselm’s teaching on the redemption 
with the continued use of the ransom theory is the Dialogus inter christianum et iudeum de 
fide catholica. The author of the Dialogus did not follow Anselm’s rejection of the ius diaboli 
theory. Instead, he described how, as man had sinned voluntarily, putting himself under the 
devil’s power, the devil could justly claim jurisdiction over him.287 The God-man was able to 
redeem mankind justly by catching the devil like a fish with the bait of human flesh, so that 
he justly lost power over man.
288
  
 Guibert of Nogent’s Tractatus de incarnatione contra iudeos also combined 
Anselmian ideas of satisfaction with continued support of the ius diaboli concept. Guibert 
used the abuse of power argument to explain how Christ was justly able to free man from the 
power of the devil. ‘For since he owed nothing, and was attacked by the devil and forced to 
pay for what he had not taken, [Christ] seized him who had attacked him unjustly and 
removed the human race from his possession.’289 Guibert was more explicit in his support of 
the idea that the devil had a just claim to power over mankind in his treatise De laude sanctae 
Mariae, where he cited Leo the Great in support of his argument that the Son of God wished 
to come to man, but could not, ‘because he should not violently break in on the devil’s rights, 
to whom man had voluntarily given his hands.’290 
 It has been suggested that the continued support for the ius diaboli argument 
demonstrated by both Guibert and the author of the Dialogus should be attributed primarily to 
links with the school of Laon. Abulafia argues that the author of the Dialogus was likely to 
have had connections with the Laon milieu. She points to the dedication to Alexander, bishop 
of Lincoln, who had been educated at Laon, and the close links between the school of Laon 
and the Anglo-Norman court and ecclesiastical circles.
291
 Similarly, Rubenstein argues that 
Guibert’s support of the ius diaboli concept can be attributed to his connections with Laon. 
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Nogent, where Guibert was appointed abbot in 1104, was within the diocese of Laon, and 
Guibert was a frequent visitor; Rubenstein describes the town and its cathedral school as ‘a 
sort of second home for him.’292 Guibert’s admiration for both Anselm and Ralph is clear 
from his description of them in his Moralia in Genesin (c. 1115): 
 
God has placed in such a head [Bartholomew, Bishop of Laon] two eyes brighter 
than stars. On the right you have Anselm, regarded as master of the entire Latin 
world, whose bearing in the presentation of Scripture and the faith is so sound 
that he has at this time made more true catholics by his writings than any false-
thinking person has made heretics. On the other side you have Ralph, whose 
quickness of mind and grasp of doctrine is in no way discordant with his 
brother’s.293 
 
Rubenstein suggests that Guibert’s argument concerning the rights of the devil is indicative 
of Laon influence, and a deliberate decision on his part ‘to side with his new intellectual 
peers rather than with his old teacher.’294 The influence of the teaching to which Guibert was 
exposed at Laon is certainly likely to have played a significant role in the formation of his 
ideas concerning the devil. However, it is by no means certain that the teaching Guibert 
would have heard at Laon in the 1100s was the unequivocal support of the ius diaboli shown 
in the Ralph sententia discussed at the beginning of Chapter Two. The surviving sententiae 
from Laon offer a range of opinions on the subject which indicate that, although the concept 
was widely debated at the school, there was no single ‘Laon position’ for Guibert to follow. 
Guibert’s admiration of Ralph may have been a significant factor in his continued 
support of the ius diaboli concept, but it was not inevitable that his connections with Laon 
should draw him to this conclusion, given the range of opinions to which he would have been 
exposed in discussion. Furthermore, explanations of the redemption that relied on the idea 
that devil had a just right to claim power over mankind were not unique to Laon, but had a 
long history in the patristic tradition. Guibert’s citation of Leo of Great in his treatise De 
laude sanctae Mariae illustrates the range of other sources, beyond Laon, that could have 
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provided Guibert’s principal motivation. Similarly, the argument for the ius diaboli in the 
Dialogus is not necessarily indicative of the direct influence of Laon, but could have been 
taken from a number of patristic sources. The image of the devil being hooked like a fish 
using the bait of Christ’s human flesh could be found in Gregory the Great and Rufinus of 
Aquileia, while similar analogies of the cross as a trap for the devil appear in Augustine and 
Leo the Great.
295
 
  
Odo and Herman of Tournai 
 
Of the examples of Jewish-Christian disputation that made use of Anselmian arguments for 
the necessity of satisfaction for sin, only that of Odo of Tournai omitted entirely any 
argument for the redemption that relied on the concept of the ius diaboli, either implicitly or 
explicitly. Instead, Odo’s account of the redemption in his Disputatio contra iudaeum 
Leonem nomine de aduentu Christi filii dei (c. 1106-13) focussed purely on the impact of the 
fall in terms of man’s damaged relationship with God and the need for atonement, in an 
argument closely based on that of Anselm. There is no evidence that Odo knew Anselm 
personally, although they may have met when Anselm passed through Flanders while in exile 
in 1097. Anselm’s steward Baldwin, who accompanied him on exile, came from Tournai, and 
was the brother of Ralph, provost of St Martin’s, where Odo had been abbot before becoming 
bishop of Cambrai in 1105. Odo was instrumental in the transmission of Anselmian thought 
in Flanders and beyond, both through his own writing and his role in promoting the 
dissemination of copies of Anselm’s works. David Hughes describes how, during Odo’s 
episcopacy, the diocese of Cambrai ‘acted as a bridge to the regions of the east’, particularly 
Liège and the Rhineland, with Odo in particular playing an active role in the transmission of 
manuscripts.
296
 
In his Disputatio, Odo explored the reasons which necessitated the incarnation of the 
Christ. In order to demonstrate that man was completely incapable of achieving remission of 
sins for himself, Odo stressed the gravity of sin.  
 
If God were to forbid you to turn away from him even with a momentary lapse of 
thought, and someone else were to tell you truly that unless you turned your 
thoughts quickly toward another you would immediately perish and return to 
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nothingness, surely you do not think that you ought to turn your thoughts even 
briefly to another and against God for your own sake and in order not to perish, or 
that you should commit so small a sin for your redemption?
297
  
 
This demonstration of the gravity of sin had been used by Anselm in Cur Deus homo, when 
he asked whether one should allow a single glance contrary to the will of God in order to 
secure one’s own redemption, or even the redemption of the entire created universe. 298 As 
Boso had responded in Cur Deus homo, Odo concluded this section of the dialogue with the 
statement that ‘not for one person, nor for all people, nor for the whole of creation, should 
even the smallest thing be done against God.’299 
Odo refuted the claim made by Leo, the Jew in the dialogue, that man could earn 
righteousness through good works accomplished under the law.  
 
Man was not able to make amends for sin by doing good works. For every good 
which he had been able to do before sin he owed to God, from whom he had 
received them. Even if a man should repay every good which he has received, 
nevertheless [something more] is justly demanded of him for the evil he has done. 
Therefore man cannot redeem himself for sin by any act of holiness under the 
law.
300
  
 
Odo argued that man already owed everything he had and was to God, by virtue of his 
creation. This meant that he had nothing left over with which to make satisfaction for the 
additional debt incurred by sin. This argument had been made by Anselm. In the dialogue of 
Cur Deus homo, Anselm asked Boso what he thought he could offer as recompense for sin. 
Boso suggested that it could be done by honouring God through perfect love and obedience, 
penitence and a contrite heart. Anselm responded that Boso already owed all this to God from 
the moment of his creation, and would have continued to do so even if he had not sinned. 
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When you render to God something which you owe him, even if you have not 
sinned, you should not think of this as recompense for what you owe him for sin. 
For you owe all these things you name to God...Therefore, what will you pay God 
for your sin?
301
 
 
Boso was thus led to the conclusion that ‘If, that in order that I may not sin, I owe him myself 
and whatever I can do, even when I do not sin, I have nothing to give him in recompense for 
sin.’302 
 In his Disputatio, Odo concluded, as Anselm had done, that full forgiveness and 
acquittal for sin could not justly be granted unless adequate satisfaction was made, over and 
above the debt already owed by man to God by virtue of his creation. This was far beyond 
human capacity. Even the entire created universe would be inadequate satisfaction for sin. 
‘For the smallest sin outweighs the whole of creation, because the smallest sin is against God; 
but God is greater than all creation. Therefore the whole of creation is insufficient 
recompense for the smallest sin.’303 Only God, who is greater than the whole of creation, was 
capable of making adequate recompense for man’s sin.304 However, it was not right that God, 
who was not guilty of sin, should make recompense for the sin of another. This argument led 
Odo to the necessary reasons for the incarnation of the Christ.  
 
It is necessary for man to come to glory, which he cannot do without satisfaction. 
God can make satisfaction but ought not to; man ought to, but cannot. Therefore, 
it is necessary for the natures of both to come together; that God become man, 
and that the one Jesus Christ become both God and man...In that he is God 
omnipotent, he can make satisfaction for sin; in that he is man, he ought to. He 
can, as God; he ought to, as man.
305
 
                                                          
301
  Cum reddis aliquid quod debes deo, etsiam non peccasti, non debes hoc computare pro debito quod debes 
pro peccato. Omnia autem ista debes deo quae dicis...Quid ergo solues deo pro peccato tuo?Anselm, CDH, 
1.20. 
302
Si me ipsum et quidquid possum, etiam quando non pecco, illi debeo ne peccem, nihil habeo quod pro peccato 
reddam. Ibid. 
303
 Omnem enim creaturam praeponderat minimum peccatum, quia minimum peccatum est contra Deum; Deus 
autem omni creatura major est. Non ergo sufficit omnis creatura ad recompensationem minimi peccati. Odo, 
Disputatio, 1106A-B. 
304
 Ibid., 1108C-D. 
305
  Quia necesse est hominem ad gloriam uenire quod sine satisfactione non potest, satisfacere uero Deus 
potest, sed non debet; homo uero debet, sed non potest; ideo necesse est ut utraeque naturae conveniant, et fiat 
103 
 
 
Unlike other authors of disputation literature, Odo addressed seriously the subtleties of 
Anselm’s discussion of the necessity of the incarnation. He recognised the potentially 
provocative nature of the claim that it was ‘necessary’ for God to act in a particular way, and 
sought to clarify his meaning by explaining how God’s free grace, demonstrated by his 
promise to save mankind, could result in an act that was both necessary and free, in a passage 
that is reminiscent of Anselm’s argument for consequent necessity. 
 
It is necessary to pay what it was not necessary to promise. For one who freely 
promises something obligates himself to pay by necessity so that, although the 
subsequent payment is of necessity, nevertheless the preceding promise is of the 
will and of grace. But this necessity which proceeds from grace, must not be 
separated from grace itself, so that a thing is justly said to be done by grace which 
in the first place had been promised with abundant grace.
306
  
 
In the same way, Anselm had argued that someone who freely promises a gift to another is 
then necessarily obliged to fulfil the promise. Even though it becomes a matter of necessity to 
make the gift once promised, unless one was to become a liar, ‘this should not be called 
necessity but grace, because he undertakes it and carries it out, without anyone forcing him, 
but freely.’307 The ‘necessity’ by which God was said to act in order to redeem humanity was 
nothing more than a necessary obligation to avoid what was dishonourable, and uphold his 
unchangeable honour. For this reason, Anselm concluded, ‘it is necessary that the goodness 
of God, because of his unchangeability, should complete what he has begun concerning man, 
although all the good that he does is grace.’308 Odo’s argument for the consequent necessity 
of God’s action, as a result of his earlier free choice and the immutability of divine goodness, 
had a clear basis in this passage from Cur Deus homo. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Deus homo, et unus Jesus Christus Deus et homo...ex eo quod omnipotens Deus est, pro peccato satisfacere 
potest; ex eo quod homo est debet, potest ut Deus, debet ut homo.
 
Odo, Disputatio, 1108A. 
306
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Odo also utilized Cur Deus homo in his discussion of man’s ultimate destiny in the 
heavenly city. He argued that, following the fall of the angels, the heavenly city was left 
incomplete. God created man in order to complete the work of populating the heavenly city, 
which he had begun with the angels. Although he seems here to have diverged from 
Anselm’s opinion that man was created for his own sake, and not just to replace the fallen 
angels, Odo went on to argue that the final, total population of heaven would be greater than 
the number of the angels before the fall, 
 
for if the number of angels who were created would suffice, man would only be 
able to replace those who fell and would rejoice over the fall of those whose glory 
he would obtain. But since no one but the just may enter heavenly glory, how can 
he be just who will rejoice at another’s sin? Therefore we say that the final 
number of the city will be greater than the number of angels in their original 
state.
309
  
 
The argument that there needed to be more men saved than angels fallen so that man would 
not be dependent on the fall of the angels for his salvation, and would have no reason to exult 
over their loss, echoes Anselm’s argument in Cur Deus homo. It demonstrates that Odo did 
not see the sole purpose of man’s creation as being to replace the fallen angels, although he 
appeared to suggest this in the passage mentioned above.  
Odo’s interest in the sections of Cur Deus homo that relate to the replacement of the 
fallen angels, and to the precise meaning of the necessity of the incarnation and its 
implications for divine omnipotence, reflects to some extent the interests of the Laon authors, 
and provides further illustration of the way in which Anselm’s arguments were relevant to 
contemporary debates. Odo is thought to have studied at Orleans and Toul, prior to taking up 
the abbacy of St Martin’s, and was central to the revival of scholarship at Tournai from 
1096.
310
 His continued interest in the definition of terminology and contemporary discussion 
in the schools reflects his own scholastic background. His greater concern with the subtleties 
of Anselm’s argument relating to concepts such as necessity set Odo apart from the other 
Disputation writers discussed in this chapter. 
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Odo’s Disputatio was a popular text. There are sixteen extant manuscripts, of which 
four date from the twelfth century, and at least ten further manuscripts, now lost, are also 
known to have existed. It appeared in at least three versions during Odo’s lifetime, and was 
included in Lambert’s Liber floridus (c. 1112-20), alongside Cur Deus homo and Gilbert 
Crispin’s Disputatio iudei et christiani.311 Of particular importance for the transmission of 
Anselm’s work in the early twelfth century is a manuscript from the Benedictine house of 
Maria-Laach on the Rhine, in which Odo’s Disputatio appeared alongside Anselm’s Cur 
Deus homo, De conceptu uirginali, De incarnatione Verbi and De fermentate et azymi, as 
well as Gilbert Crispin’s Disputatio iudei et christiani and another disputation, the Dialogus 
inter gentilem et christianum.
312
 The whole codex is written in the same twelfth-century 
hand, with a marginal note in a later medieval hand (fol. 56r), stating that the text was sent by 
Odo to Vulbodo of Affligem. David Hughes believes that the manuscript could well be a 
witness of the text as sent by Odo to Affligem, of which Maria-Laach was a daughter-house, 
and suggests that it may be illustrative of Odo’s instrumental role in the transmission of 
Anselm’s work in the region.313 Odo’s contribution to the dissemination of Anselmian 
thought in the early twelfth century was thus effective in two ways, in promoting the 
accessibility of the text of Cur Deus homo itself, and of absorbing Anselm’s ideas into his 
own writing, demonstrating their continued relevance and utility for theological discussion. 
Odo was deeply concerned with the consequences of original sin throughout his career, and it 
provided the main theme of his earlier treatise De peccato originali (c. 1100-1105). Anselm’s 
discussion of the impact and transmission of original sin in Cur Deus homo and De conceptu 
uirginali were highly relevant to this discussion, and Odo made significant use of both 
treatises in his analysis.
314
 The inclusion of Cur Deus homo in the Maria-Laach manuscript 
alongside several Jewish-Christian disputations also illustrates the association of Anselm’s 
work with Jewish polemics and its continued utility in this field. 
 Odo’s student, Herman of Tournai (c. 1091-1147), also took inspiration from Cur 
Deus homo. In the preface to his treatise De incarnatione Iesu Christi domini nostri, Herman 
emphasized his debt to Anselm. ‘I have put nothing in [this treatise] of my own, but I have 
collected together...what I have read in the sacred doctors of the Church, and especially in the 
books of Master Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, who composed a book on the same 
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subject called Cur Deus homo.’315 As well as Cur Deus homo, Herman also cited Anselm’s 
De casu diaboli and his prayer to Mary, during the course of the treatise.
316
 
 In the first half of his treatise, Herman outlined the reasons for the necessity of the 
incarnation along broadly similar lines to Cur Deus homo. When man sinned and went over 
to the devil, he acted as a runaway slave, depriving God of his rightful property.
317
 In order 
for man to be reconciled to God after sin, man ‘should first restore intact whatever he had 
stolen, or something of equal value. Then he should make satisfaction for the arrogance with 
which he had spurned the precept of his creator and joined his enemy.’318 Herman’s 
distinction between restoration of stolen property and satisfaction for injury reflects Anselm’s 
definition of satisfaction for sin. Herman went on to argue that nothing in the created 
universe, neither a new man, nor an angel, nor the whole world, could make worthy 
satisfaction for the sin of the first man. God alone was capable of paying such a price, but it 
was inappropriate for God to die for the sin of man; man alone should pay the price. 
Therefore, ‘since none could do this except God, and none should do it except man, it was 
necessary that a God-man should do it.’319 Christ, who was both man and God, both could 
and should pay the penalty for sin, and was thus justly able to achieve the redemption of 
mankind. 
 Herman did refer to the devil in his argument, but only to reject the idea that the devil 
had rights over man. 
 
both man and the devil were created by God, and both were slaves of God. And if 
a wicked slave had seduced a simple slave with deceitful counsel, and having 
stolen him away from his master had subordinated him to himself, surely it would 
be just for that wicked slave to be punished for his own wickedness, and for the 
simple slave to be set free from his dominion?
320
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Herman argued that the devil had no independent rights of his own but was, like man, a slave 
of God by virtue of his status as a created being. In tempting man to sin, the devil was 
nothing more than a rebel slave inciting others to join his rebellion. Such a character could 
not possibly claim any just right to authority over his fellow rebels, but deserved to be 
severely punished for his crime. Herman’s argument here closely follows Anselm’s 
description of the rebel slave in Cur Deus homo. 
 Herman and Odo were unusual in their rejection of imagery associated with the ius 
diaboli idea, and other authors of polemic texts and disputations continued to employ images 
such as the cross as a trap and the defeat of the devil for their rhetorical power, whether or not 
they believed in the concept of the devil’s rights per se. Anselm’s teaching regarding the 
rights of the devil, and his rejection of associated imagery, had only a limited impact on 
twelfth century authors. However, his satisfaction theory achieved wide popularity, and was 
often combined with more traditional discussion of the role of the devil in explanations of the 
redemption. Anselm’s use of the language of necessity in relation to the incarnation caused 
some controversy, largely due to misunderstanding of the subtleties of his argument 
concerning the meaning of the term; but his concern with the consequences of original sin 
and man’s inability to effect his own salvation, which provided the foundation for his 
argument, fitted into broader contemporary discussion of the meaning of sin and the 
limitations of human free choice. These will be discussed in the following chapters.  
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Chapter Four – Freedom and the Will 
De libertate arbitrii, De casu diaboli and De concordia 
 
Libertas arbitrii: Anselm, Augustine and the School of Laon 
 
Anselm’s De libertate arbitrii took the form of a dialogue between a master and student, and 
began with a question from the student: 
 
Since free choice seems to be repugnant to grace, predestination and God’s 
foreknowledge, I want to know what freedom of choice is, and whether we 
always have it. For if freedom of choice is ‘to be able to sin and not to sin’, as 
some are accustomed to say, and we always have it, why do we sometimes need 
grace? But if we do not always have it, why is sin imputed to us when we sin 
without free choice?
321
 
 
The definition of free choice as ‘the ability to sin or not to sin’ is characteristic of 
Augustinian theology. Augustine explained the existence of evil in a divinely created 
universe, and man’s responsibility for sin, by arguing that God created man with two desires, 
for things eternal or temporal. The choice of which to follow lay entirely within the will; 
therefore sin existed as a result of free choice of the will.
322
 
 While this definition of the will functioned well as a description of the freedom given 
to man to choose, without constraint, the direction of his own will, it did not provide a 
complete description of freedom in all its forms, as Anselm pointed out. Freedom could not 
just mean freedom to sin or not to sin. ‘If this were its definition, neither God nor the angels, 
who cannot sin, would have free choice, which it is impious to say.’323 On the contrary, 
Anselm argued that God and the angels who were without sin enjoyed the ultimate freedom, 
far beyond that experienced by man. Clearly, the ability to sin could not in itself be a 
component of true freedom, but its antithesis. 
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 Instead, Anselm defined freedom of choice as ‘the power of preserving rectitude of 
will for the sake of rectitude itself.’324 God and the good angels were perfectly free because 
‘he who has what is honourable and expedient for him, so that he cannot lose it, is more free 
than he who has it in such a way that he can lose it and be led into what is dishonourable and 
inexpedient.’325 Ability to sin was not a power enhancing freedom, but a weakness that 
prevented man from fulfilling his potential, condemning him to slavery. 
 The objection that the definition of freedom as ‘the ability to sin or not to sin’ denied 
freedom to God, who could not sin, had been raised by Augustine, in his Contra Iulianum.
326
 
However, Augustine did not use this objection as a starting point for a fresh examination of 
what freedom of choice actually was, as Anselm did, and some medieval commentators 
continued to see ‘the ability to sin and not to sin’ as the Augustinian definition of free choice. 
This can be seen in the Sententie diuine pagine from the school of Laon. In a passage 
discussing the meaning of free choice, the author presented three possible alternative 
definitions, those of Boethius, Augustine and Anselm. 
 
Free choice is, as Boethius says, free judgement of the will; for the decision of 
judgement is not free unless it can freely fulfil whatever part it chooses. 
Augustine says this: free choice is the power of doing good and evil. The bishop 
of Canterbury in his book defines it thus: the faculty of preserving rectitude for its 
own sake; and he posits this in such a way because Augustine’s definition seems 
absurd to him, for, although there was free choice in Christ, it seems to him 
absurd that he had the capacity to do evil. And so it seems to him concerning the 
angels confirmed in the good.
327
 
 
The Laon author opposed Anselm’s definition on the grounds that 
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The capacity to do evil was in Christ according to his humanity, and is not evil, 
but it would be absurd if he had done evil. In the same way, since the angels 
confirmed in evil had the capacity to do good, it is not absurd concerning the 
good angels [that they had the capacity to do evil]. Therefore Augustine’s opinion 
must be upheld.
328
 
 
The Laon author argued that the potential power to do evil was present in both the incarnate 
Christ and the good angels. This potentia could never be realised, as Christ in his divinity and 
the angels in their confirmed goodness would never sin; the very idea was absurd. However, 
the mere possession of the power of doing evil meant that, in the author’s understanding, 
Anselm must be wrong, and the Augustinian definition of liberum arbitrium as the power to 
do good or evil must be upheld. The author did not address Anselm’s main concern, that God 
himself could not sin. Instead, he concentrated on the free choice possessed by the incarnate 
Christ, and the angels. Arguing that the potential to sin was inherent in all rational created 
beings, the author argued that it must therefore have been present in Christ, who took on the 
fullness of human nature. However, because Christ was also fully divine, it was absurd to 
imagine that the potential to do evil would ever be realised by him. 
 This paragraph in the Sententie diuine pagine is paralled in another text identified by 
Lottin as belonging to the school of Laon. Like the Sententie diuine pagine, the author listed 
the three definitions of Boethius, Augustine and Anselm, and related the argument of the 
latter specifically to Christ. ‘The Archbishop of Canterbury defines it thus: the faculty of 
preserving rectitude for its own sake, because he does not concede that the power of doing 
evil was in Christ.’329 The author of this sentence did not go on to analyse the merits of the 
different positions, as the author of the Sententie diuine pagine had done. 
 Of the sentences relating to the nature of free choice in texts associated with the Laon 
school, none express support for the Anselmian definition. Collections such as the Sententie 
Anselmi and the Sententie Atrabatensis make no reference to Anselm’s argument, but offer a 
simple restatement of the Augustinian view.
330
 However, even though the author of the 
Sententie diuine pagine disagreed with Anselm on this point, the fact that he mentioned it at 
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all, and engaged seriously with its claims, demonstrates the relevance of Anselm’s work to 
contemporary debate within the schools at Laon and elsewhere. 
 By focussing purely on the freedom possessed by created beings, the Laon authors 
missed the point. Anselm did not dispute that both angels and men were created with the 
original capacity to sin, but recognized that this was necessary in order for them to have 
freedom of choice. At its most basic level, free choice means the freedom possessed by that 
rational being to choose, without hindrance, the orientation of his own will. For created 
beings, this inevitably implied the initial existence of alternative possibilities. Anselm argued 
that angels and men were created for one purpose; to uphold justice and, so doing, to enjoy 
perfect happiness for eternity. However, in order for man to embrace justice freely, he also 
had to have the possibility of rejecting it. Anselm would explore this subject fully in his next 
treatise, De casu diaboli, which he intended to be read alongside De libertate arbitrii, and 
again at the end of his career in De concordia. His main focus in De libertate arbitrii was on 
the consequences of the fall, and how man could be said to be a slave to sin, completely 
unable to will justice without the assistance of divine grace, without losing his essential free 
choice; a question that was essential to understanding the meaning of the fall, and man’s 
ultimate responsibility for sin. Anselm did not discuss pre-lapsarian freedom of choice in 
detail in De libertate arbitrii, but he did raise the question of how, if the capacity to sin had 
no part in free choice, angels and men could be said to have sinned by free choice.
331
  
Anselm explained that man and the apostate angels fell through free choice (liberum 
arbitrium) because they did so willingly and without being coerced by any external necessity. 
Nevertheless, he argued that, although they sinned through their own free choice, ‘it was not 
through this that it was free, that is through the power by which it was able not to sin and not 
to serve sin, but through the power which it had of sinning, which is neither assisted by the 
freedom not to sin nor compelled to servitude to sin.’332 The fundamental faculty of liberum 
arbitrium essentially meant nothing more than the capacity of the rational will to choose its 
own direction without compulsion. This included the capacity to sin, although the will was 
not truly free unless it was unable to be corrupted by sin. True libertas arbitrii meant the 
inability of the arbitrium to be diverted from what was right and fitting by sin. Nevertheless, 
the arbitrium could be said to be liberum to a certain extent without this ultimate freedom, as 
long as it could not be compelled into any particular desire or action by extraneous necessity. 
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 Once the initial choice between accepting or rejecting justice had been made by the 
rational creature, the outcome was final. The angels who chose justice were confirmed in 
justice, so that they could no longer sin. Similarly, the angels who fell, fell for ever. Man also 
fell, and as a consequence became enslaved to sin, so that he could no longer will justice, 
except with the aid of divine grace. However, this did not mean that he lost the power of free 
choice. Anselm attempted to explain this apparent paradox of slavery and freedom by 
differentiating between the basic faculty of will, and its use. The free choice of the will is an 
essential aspect of human nature that can never be destroyed, even though it is prevented 
from functioning as it should. As an analogy, Anselm compared the faculty of the will to that 
of sight; one may be unable to see because of darkness, or an obstacle in one’s line of vision, 
but this does not mean that the faculty of sight is lost.
333
 
 Anselm thus recognized the need for rational created beings to have the initial 
capacity to uphold justice, or to reject it; to sin, or not to sin. However, he did not believe that 
this definition constituted a full and adequate definition of freedom of choice under all 
circumstances. True freedom implied not just the freedom of self-determination, discussed 
above, but the freedom of self-perfection, the capacity to uphold justice for its own sake and 
thus to fulfil the purpose of one’s existence and to live in perfect happiness. This freedom 
was already possessed by God and the angels who had been confirmed in goodness, but had 
not yet been granted to man. 
 Discussion of both of these two forms of freedom can be seen in Augustine. 
Augustine typically used the phrase liberum arbitrium (free choice) to describe the freedom 
of self-determination, and libertas (freedom) to denote the freedom of self-perfection.
334
 
Anselm sought to combine both into the single concept of libertas arbitrii, freedom of choice. 
This marked a new departure in the theology of freedom, and must account to a considerable 
degree for the confusion shown in the Laon sentences about what he was trying to achieve. 
The Laon author critiqued Anselm’s definition as if it applied only to the original liberum 
arbitrium of created beings, as Augustine’s had been. This interpretation set Anselm against 
Augustine, when in fact Anselm’s thinking was firmly rooted in Augustinian theology, and 
should instead be seen as a development of, and attempt to clarify, Augustine’s thought. 
 Anselm intended his definition of libertas arbitrii to be universally-applicable, and to 
provide an adequate description of the freedom possessed by all rational beings, whether 
created or uncreated. This is not reflected in the discussion of his definition in the Laon 
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sentences, which focus purely on created beings and the incarnate Christ, without actively 
engaging in the question of the freedom possessed by the Godhead as a whole, un-incarnate 
and therefore unrelated to created nature. This may have been one of the factors that led the 
Laon authors to reject Anselm’s definition of libertas arbitrii. They saw no need to abandon 
the Augustinian definition which offered a perfectly reasonable explanation of the status of 
man and the angels, both before and after the fall. The Laon authors were generally more 
interested in pastoral and moral teaching than metaphysics, and the Augustinian definition 
was quite sufficient for their purposes. 
 
Honorius Augustodunensis 
 
The masters of the school of Laon were not the only early twelfth-century authors to find 
themselves confronted by an apparent dichotomy between two alternative definitions of free 
choice. A similar situation can be seen in the various discussions of freedom in the writings 
of Honorius Augustodunensis. Honorius addressed the meaning of free choice several times 
in his career, and his interpretation altered dramatically, almost certainly as a result of 
exposure to Anselm’s arguments in De libertate arbitrii and elsewhere. 
 Honorius first discussed the meaning of free choice in Elucidarium. The text survives 
in more than one recension, and two variations are found in Honorius’ phrasing of his 
definition of free choice. In the earlier recension, in response to the question ‘what is free 
choice?’, the master defines it as ‘the freedom to choose good and evil.’335 In the later, it is 
defined as ‘the power of man to be and to will and to accomplish good or evil.’336 Both 
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definitions ultimately follow the ‘Augustinian’ model of free choice as one between the two 
possible directions of good and evil. However, in De libertate arbitrii, Anselm had explicitly 
rejected this interpretation of free choice. Loris Sturlese believes that this raises serious 
difficulties for the theory that Honorius studied under Anselm in Canterbury, as, if this were 
the case, surely he would have known Anselm’s argument.337 Yet there is no particular reason 
why Honorius should have read De libertate arbitrii, which had been completed long before 
Anselm came to Canterbury and whose subject matter was perhaps no longer of immediate 
interest to him by the time Honorius arrived as a student, and no longer a regular subject of 
discussion.  
Surviving accounts of Anselm’s oral teaching contain little on the subject of freedom. 
The most interesting passage for our purposes survives in only one manuscript of De 
similitudinibus, compiled by Robert de Braci, prior of Llanthony from 1131 to 1137. In a 
section entitled ‘On the Three Modes of Liberty’, Anselm differentiated between freedom of 
action (libertas actionis), of understanding (libertas intelligentiae), and of an upright will 
(libertas rectae uoluntatis). The first two are only good when allied with the third, which 
confers the ability to know and to will what is right. The paragraph ends with the statement 
that ‘below the freedom of the will is the freedom of choice.’338 
 If this, admittedly very brief, paragraph does provide an accurate summary of the sort 
of teaching that Honorius might have received on the subject of the freedom of choice in 
Canterbury, it may go some way towards explaining his own approach in Elucidarium. 
Although freedom of choice or judgement is an essential feature of the highest ‘freedom of an 
upright will’, it is also treated as a separate faculty in its own right. The phrasing of the 
paragraph is somewhat ambiguous, but Anselm appears to have been equating libertas 
arbitrii to some degree with the intermediate libertas intelligentiae. This is the ability of the 
intelligent creature to base the decisions of the will on rational judgement, a greater freedom 
than that of the irrational creature which, while experiencing no external coercion to a 
particular action, and thus enjoying libertas actionis, is nevertheless dominated by the 
demands of sense appetite alone and does not have freedom to judge between different 
courses of action. Similarly, libertas arbitrii is lower than libertas recte uoluntatis, as 
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freedom of choice and judgement is the prerogative of all rational creatures, even those who 
have irrevocably lost the supreme freedom of the upright will, and are thus in slavery to sin. 
 Anselm discussed these ideas more fully in De libertate arbitrii, but this passage in 
De similitudinibus does seem to offer a more explicit distinction between libertas arbitrii as 
libertas intelligentiae and the ultimate libertas recte uoluntatis. If this is the case, the passage 
not only provides a bridge between the traditional Augustinian definition of free choice and 
that used by Anselm in De libertate arbitrii, but is also a very similar concept to that which 
Honorius had in mind in his discussion of free choice. 
 The definition of free choice in the second book of Elucidarium is found in the 
context of a series of questions on the nature of sin. Rather than discussing freedom as a 
universal concept, as Anselm had in De libertate arbitrii, Honorius’ discussion of free choice 
in this context was limited to the question of the freedom given to man to choose between 
good and evil. In a separate passage, earlier in the text, Honorius raised the question of the 
freedom of choice possessed by the angels both before and after the fall of the devil. Here, 
the student asked why God did not create the angels without the ability to sin. The master 
replied that this was done for the sake of justice. It was right for God to reward the good 
angels on account of their merits. Had they been created without the ability to sin, there 
would have been no merit in their not sinning, and so their reward would not have been justly 
earned. ‘Therefore God gave them free choice, so that they would be able to choose and will 
the good of their own accord, and if they chose it willingly, they would justly receive the 
reward of not being able to sin.’339 Had the angels not originally been created with the ability 
to choose evil, they would not have been free to choose the good. Similarly, man was created 
with the ability to choose either good or evil, so that he might freely choose the good, and 
thus be worthy of his place in heaven. This reflects Anselm’s teaching on the need for created 
beings to have been created with the capacity to will in different possible directions in order 
for their wills to be self-initiated, the only thing that could make them truly free. 
 After the fall of the devil, the good angels were confirmed, ‘so that they could no 
longer fall nor sin.’340 They were henceforward unable to sin because they would never will 
it.
341
 As the good angels were confirmed in their choice of the good, so that it was as a result 
of their own free choice that they could no longer choose evil, this inability was in no way a 
restriction of their freedom of choice. Had man not succumbed to the temptation of the devil, 
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he too would have received this blessing, but because of sin, freedom of choice was 
diminished so that he was no longer able to choose the good without the aid of divine grace. 
 Honorius returned to the problem of free choice in his later dialogue, Ineuitabile siue 
de praedestinatione et libero arbitrio. This work survives in two recensions, which contain 
very different accounts of the meaning of free choice.
342
 In the earlier recension, Honorius 
discussed liberum arbitrium in similar language to that already used in Elucidarium. He 
referred directly, if not explicitly, to Elucidarium; on being asked by the master to supply a 
definition of liberum arbitrium, the student replied ‘as you defined it, the freedom to choose 
good or evil.’343 In the second recension of the text Honorius abandoned this definition of 
free choice in favour of that used by Anselm. He no longer referred to his own earlier writing 
on the subject; when asked for a definition of free choice on this occasion, the student only 
suggested that ‘It seems to me that free choice means the freedom to choose good or evil.’344 
However, the master now replied that this definition would not do,  
 
for choice means nothing unless it is between two or more things, where there is 
the option of choosing from the multiple things proposed. But to angels and men, 
to whom alone free choice is given, nothing except justice alone is proposed, so 
that they might enjoy eternal beatitude through having kept it. Therefore this does 
not seem a fitting definition of free choice.
345
  
 
Freedom of choice was not the power to choose between good and evil, but the power to 
choose the good and uphold justice, just as Anselm had defined it. 
 
Because free choice is given solely for the preservation of justice, in which lies 
the salvation of the soul, this definition is thought to be suitable: freedom of 
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choice is the power of preserving rectitude of the will, for the sake of rectitude 
itself.
346
 
 
Honorius repeated this definition in another short treatise De libero arbitrio. Here, he began 
his discussion of free choice with a summary of liberum arbitrium at its most basic level, the 
capacity of the rational will to judge for itself, without coercion, what to will and what to 
avoid.
347
 Honorius argued that this definition was in itself insufficient to describe true 
freedom of choice, as only those who were just could be truly free, and unfettered by 
servitude to sin. He therefore used Anselm’s definition of free choice as the power of 
preserving justice for the sake of justice itself. Honorius did not name Anselm in this passage, 
but he did cite the authority of Augustine to support his argument that the will could not be 
truly just unless it were motivated by a desire for justice alone, uninfluenced by either fear of 
punishment or hope of reward. 
 
Freedom of choice is the power of preserving justice for the sake of justice itself. 
For as Augustine defined it, he who avoids evil for fear of punishment, or does 
good for hope of reward, is not free. For he preserves it, compelled by fear or 
enticed by hope; and when he is dominated by fear or hope, he is rightly found 
not to be free. Only he who does good for delight in justice alone is judged to be 
free.
348
 
 
Free choice was given for the purpose of upholding justice alone, and only the just were free; 
the unjust were slaves of sin. Honorius argued that those who were enslaved to sin still 
possessed free choice, but abused it to their harm, just as a man who, having been given a 
sword to defend himself, used it instead to injure himself.
349
 
In the following paragraph, Honorius went on, as Anselm had done, to address the 
criticism raised by those who believed that, because God and the angels could not sin, they 
could not have liberum arbitrium. Honorius argued that, on the contrary, God and the angels 
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enjoyed supreme freedom, for the very reason that they could not sin but always and 
unceasingly willed justice, the one thing that true freedom of choice demanded. In contrast, 
human liberum arbitrium was weak and prone to fall into sin. It needed the constant 
assistance of divine grace in order to will justice at all.
350
  
Honorius devoted the final two paragraphs of De libero arbitrio to a discussion of 
how man, having been given freedom of choice in order to preserve justice, was able to use 
his free choice to lose his capacity for justice and become enslaved to sin. In order to answer 
this question, Honorius borrowed another argument from Anselm, first discussed in De casu 
diaboli and later expanded in De concordia, about the two wills possessed by man. 
 
Two wills: De casu diaboli and De concordia 
 
In De casu diaboli, Anselm addressed the question of how the devil fell. Why did God create 
the angels with the capacity to sin? Why did he not give the devil the perseverance he needed 
to stand in the good? If the devil received all that he had from God, did God give him an evil 
will? Anselm argued that the angels were created with free choice of the will for the sole 
purpose of upholding justice. Nevertheless, in order to choose justice freely, it was necessary 
for them to have the initial possibility of rejecting it. For an agent to be just, his actions 
needed to be self-initiated; if he was constrained to act in a particular way, his actions could 
not be seen as either just or unjust, but necessary. This meant that the angels had to have the 
initial possibility of sinning, in order for them freely to reject this possibility and choose 
justice. In his explanation of the fact that the good angels had the ability to sin before the fall, 
Anselm argued that 
 
if they had not been able to sin, they would have served justice not through 
power, but necessity. But then they would not have merited grace from God 
because they stood while others fell, since they would have retained a rationality 
which they could not lose. They could not rightly be called just.
351
 
 
Only by freely choosing to preserve justice when they could have abandoned it could the 
good angels be considered truly just and deserving of their place in heaven.  
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Anselm argued that the angels were created with the initial capacity to will two 
things, justice (iustitia) and advantage or happiness (commodum, beatitudo). Anselm argued 
that ‘not only every rational creature, but everything capable of sensation, wills the useful and 
avoids the harmful. This everything wills good for itself, and avoids bad.’352 As a natural 
characteristic of all willing creatures, rational or otherwise, the will for happiness was 
morally neutral. Without it, no creature could ever be happy, or enjoy eternal beatitude in 
heaven. By contrast, the will for justice sought moral goods, whether or not they were of 
immediate advantage to the individual. In order for the rational being to have free choice of 
judgement, it was necessary for him to have been created with both wills. Had he been able to 
will only advantage, or only justice, he could never be truly just.
353
 Justice demanded that the 
will for happiness be subordinated to the will for justice. Sin came when the devil willed his 
own advantage beyond that which God had ordained, that is, beyond the measure of justice. 
His sin lay in willing commodum more than iustitia.
354
 
Anselm’s discussion of the two wills in De casu diaboli focused on the initial freedom 
of choice possessed by the angels, but the same arguments could be applied equally well to 
man. In his later treatise De concordia, the focus of his concern switched to man. Here, 
Anselm developed his arguments from De casu diaboli concerning the will for justice and the 
will for advantage. He described the will at its most basic level as a tool, which could be 
turned to many different specific desires or uses. Every potential object of willing could be 
categorized under one of two fundamental orientations of the will, which Anselm described 
as affectiones; for justice or uprightness, and for happiness or advantage. 
 
The tool for willing has two abilities which I call affectiones, one of which is for 
willing advantage, the other for willing uprightness. For the will as a tool wills 
nothing except advantage or uprightness. For whatever else it wills, it wills either 
on account of advantage or of uprightness and - even if it is mistaken – it thinks 
itself to be willing in relation to these. Indeed through the disposition to will 
advantage, man always wills happiness and to be happy; but through the 
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disposition to will uprightness, he wills uprightness and to be righteous, that is, 
just.
355
 
 
These affectiones of the will correspond to the two ‘wills’ that Anselm had described in De 
casu diaboli, although he had since refined his terminology to enable a more detailed and 
precise discussion of the nature and operation of the rational will. However, Anselm was not 
entirely consistent in his choice of terminology, and continued to refer to the affectiones as 
two uoluntates intermittently throughout his argument. 
In De concordia, Anselm argued that the affectio ad commodum was an inseparable 
feature of the will; all rational creatures naturally will their own benefit and happiness. By 
contrast, the affectio ad rectitudinem was separable, because not all rational creatures will 
justice, as the fall amply demonstrated.
356
 A further difference between the two is that the 
affectio ad rectitudinem could be identified as rectitudo itself, but the affectio ad commodum 
was not the same thing as commodum. ‘The will for justice is justice itself, but the will for 
happiness is not happiness, because not everyone who wills happiness has it.’357  
When man sinned, he lost the will for justice which was justice itself. The loss of 
justice was permanent, and man was unable to restore himself to it. ‘Now he was also made 
unable to will the justice he had abandoned. For one cannot will justice through free choice if 
one does not have it, though one can preserve it when one has it.’358 Only the will for 
happiness remained. This will, which had been created good, ‘became something evil, that is 
unjust, because it was not subordinate to justice without which one ought to will nothing.’359 
The will, which had freely abandoned justice, necessarily remained unjust; ‘for it is unable by 
itself to return to justice, without which it is never free, because without it natural freedom of 
choice is useless.’360 Without justice, man lost the happiness which he had enjoyed at 
creation, and was reduced to servitude to the base passions of the flesh. The continued desire 
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for happiness which could no longer be attained constituted the just punishment for the 
abandonment of justice.
361
 
Honorius repeated this argument in the second recension of Ineuitabile, in which he had 
also used the Anselmian definition of libertas arbitrii as ‘the ability to preserve rectitude of 
the will for the sake of rectitude itself’, In this ‘Anselmian’ version of the text, he also made 
use of Anselm’s distinction between the two wills possessed by man, for justice and for 
happiness. 
 
God created man just and happy, lacking nothing, with sufficient of all good 
things, and he gave him free will of justice and of happiness, so that with the will 
for justice he might rule over his subjected body, and with the will for happiness, 
he should obey God. Therefore he had justice to the honour of God, and 
happiness for his own advantage. And if he had preserved justice he would have 
honoured God, and would have reached the supreme happiness of the angels. But 
because he deserted justice, he lost happiness. But he retained the will for 
happiness. Therefore, he burns with longing for advantage, but he cannot have the 
advantage befitting rational nature, which he lost, and he is converted to the false 
advantages and bestial appetites of brute beasts.
362
 
 
Honorius argued that man was created with the will for justice and for happiness. The will for 
happiness was natural, and gave man the possibility of enjoying the supreme advantages 
which God had prepared for him. It was not intended to be followed without restraint, but 
only in obedience to the limits set down by divine precepts. The will for justice ought to keep 
the will for advantage under control, and prevent the desire for temporal goods and corporeal 
pleasures exceeding due measure. As punishment for abandoning the desire for justice, man 
lost the happiness which he would otherwise have enjoyed. He retained the desire for 
happiness, but without the guiding restraint of justice, he fell into carnal desires that could 
never bring true happiness.
363
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The idea that man’s will could be turned to either of two fundamental orientations was 
not a completely novel element in Anselm’s thought, but has origins in Augustine. In his 
treatise De libero arbitrio, Augustine differentiated between the desire for eternal goods and 
that for temporal, changeable goods. The just man desires eternal goods above temporal 
advantage, while the unjust man has an inordinate desire for temporal advantage. The desire 
for happiness is natural to all human beings, but not all men are happy, because many lack 
justice.
364
 
As an addendum to De libero arbitrio, Honorius included a number of sententiae 
from different authors offering definitions of free choice. The last of these was Anselm’s 
definition of ‘the power of preserving rectitude of the will for the sake of rectitude itself.’ 
Honorius did not comment on any of these sententiae, and when he used Anselm’s definition 
in the text itself, it was unattributed. It is significant that Honorius preferred to highlight the 
compatibility of the definition with accepted Augustinian authority, rather than the relative 
novelty of the definition itself. In the dedication of the treatise, Honorius claimed that he was 
writing in response to recent discussions on the meaning of free choice.
365
 It seems 
reasonable to suggest that Anselm’s work may have played an important part in these 
discussions. By emphasising the essential compatibility of Anselm’s thought with that of 
Augustine, Honorius stressed the orthodoxy of the new definition, enabling it to be 
incorporated into existing frameworks of discussion, as a means of clarifying and elaborating 
upon Augustinian doctrine.  
Honorius’ attempt to portray Anselm’s discussion on freedom of choice as an extension 
of traditional Augustinian teaching illustrates the importance of Augustine’s thought in the 
early twelfth century, and the dangers of writing that seemed to contradict his authority. It 
was Anselm’s apparent opposition to Augustine’s definition of free choice that led the Laon 
authors to reject his work so strongly. Honorius also tried to present Anselm’s definition in a 
way that highlighted its utility for pastoral work and the movement for reform of the Church 
in England. Honorius was greatly concerned by the acute shortage of pastoral care for the 
laity in post-Conquest England, and keen to encourage monks to undertake pastoral duties. 
Elucidarium was thus created as a teaching aid to prepare new recruits for questions they 
were likely to face in the course of their ministry.
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 It has been suggested that Honorius’ desire for anonymity may provide further 
evidence, not only of only theological and intellectual, but also political and ecclesiastical, 
connections with Anselm in his own attempts at reform. In the preface to Elucidarium, he 
wrote that ‘I desired to conceal my name, for fear that destructive envy might bid its devotees 
scorn and neglect a useful work.’367 While this comment may have been little more than a 
literary conceit, various suggestions have been offered as to the possible sources and reasons 
for this envy. Lefèvre suggests that the hostility which Honorius feared was not directed 
against him personally, but his master Anselm.
368
 Honorius was afraid lest Anselm’s enemies 
in the Church, who had opposed his attempts at reform and suffered from the disorder 
resulting from his repeated exiles, should attempt to stifle his work. Lefèvre argues that ‘the 
anonymity sought by Honorius could allow his work to be less quickly noticed by Anselm’s 
enemies and to spread good teaching more surely.’ Lefèvre also points to Honorius’ 
comments at the beginning of the second recension of Ineuitabile, where he complains about 
the ‘malicious words of the envious.’369 Lefèvre argues that the fact that these envious 
detractors are only referred to in the second, Anselmian, version of the text, and not in the 
earlier recension, lends support to the belief that the inuidia were primarily opposed to 
Anselm rather than to Honorius himself.
370
 
There is no reason to suppose that the inuidia referred to in Elucidarium and those in 
the second recension of Ineuitabile were the same group of people. The opening paragraphs 
of Ineuitabile appear to form an attack on those in the schools who treat important matters of 
doctrine as opportunities to show off their own skills in disputation, rather than seeking to 
clarify the divine truth, with detrimental effects on the faith of the simple. There is nothing in 
this passage to indicate the fear of malicious detractors which led him to seek anonymity for 
Elucidarium. 
If Honorius’ desire for anonymity did have more to do with fear of hostility against 
Anselm than against himself, the precise nature of this hostility must be examined. There are 
two basic aspects of Anselm’s activity that might have provoked opposition during his 
lifetime. Firstly, his political actions as archbishop. Anselm’s policy of reform was not 
always popular. A notable example is the Council of Westminster (1102), in which Anselm 
ordered the deposition of numerous abbots and bishops who failed to live up to his standards 
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of clerical purity, in particular his prohibition of married clergy.
371
 Anselm was unable to 
push through all his reforms; William of Malmesbury, writing in the early 1120s, decided 
against discussing Anselm’s conciliar decrees in his Gesta pontificum Anglorum, on the 
grounds that ‘they have all disappeared into oblivion by now.’372 Nevertheless, it is not 
difficult to imagine that many of those whose deposition had been called for might well have 
felt less than sympathetic towards their detractor. As well as political opposition towards 
Anselm, there may also have been an element of hostility towards his theological activities.
373
 
If Honorius was worried, not only about Anselm’s political opponents, but about 
those who criticised his theological approach, his own structure and format in Elucidarium 
could be interpreted in part as an attempt to reassure his readers and present Anselmian ideas 
in a manner that could not be construed as remotely speculative or dangerous. Early 
manuscripts of Elucidarium emphasized their orthodoxy by identifying the authorities used, 
either in the margins of the text itself, and the very earliest often referred to Anselm simply as 
magister.
374
 Anselm’s arguments were simplified and presented as straightforward 
expressions of orthodox teaching, with the contemplative and speculative elements removed. 
Flint describes the effect this had in ‘firmly repressing any encouragement it may have 
offered its readers to think.’375 Honorius’ primary purpose in arranging his material in this 
way was to provide his readers with an easily accessible summary of the salient points of a 
given topic in order to meet the needs of a monastic or secular clerical audience who needed 
clear responses to basic theological questions. In order for this to be effective, his readers 
needed to have total confidence in the absolute orthodoxy and sufficiency of the opinions 
offered. Whether or not it was done with a conscious view to potential detractors of Anselm’s 
theology, one of the effects of Honorius’ work was to present Anselmian ideas in a format 
that removed any suspicion of unorthodox methodology or originality of approach.  
 
Levels of freedom: Hugh of St Victor  
 
Like those of Honorius and the masters at Laon, Hugh of St Victor’s analysis of liberum 
arbitrium focused primarily on the freedom possessed by rational created beings rather than 
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their creator. His first discussion of the meaning of free choice in De sacramentis was in 
relation to the creation and fall of the angels. Here, he defined liberum arbitrium as ‘the free 
power of inclining their will and choice either to good or to evil.’376 Similarly, Hugh argued 
that man’s original freedom of choice consisted in ‘that freedom by which he could incline 
the desire of his will either to good or to evil.’377 
Although he did not refer to Augustine in these passages, Hugh appears to have been 
following the ‘Augustinian’ definition of free choice that Anselm had rejected. However, 
Hugh made it clear that he did not consider ‘the ability to sin or not to sin’ as the ultimate 
sine qua non of free choice. He differentiated between different levels of freedom possessed 
by man at various stages of history. At his creation, and before the fall, man had the ability 
either to sin or not to sin.
378
 After the fall, man lost the ability to uphold the good, and so was 
unable not to sin.
379
 After man’s restoration to God through Christ’s action on the cross, the 
capacity to avoid sin was restored through the assistance of divine grace, although the 
possibility of sin remained. At the final stage, after confirmation, man would no longer have 
the ability to sin.
380
 Hugh was careful to explain that this was ‘not because even then freedom 
of choice or lowliness of nature may be destroyed, but because strengthening grace (with the 
presence of which sin can in no way enter in), may no longer be taken away.’381 
Hugh did not consider the ability to sin or not to sin to be a necessary and integral 
aspect of freedom of choice in all circumstances. As long as the initial movement of the will 
was free and without compulsion, this was all that was required. Subsequent necessity 
imposed on the will as a result of its own free choice might make it unable either to sin, or to 
avoid sinning, but this ‘necessity’ did not constitute a limitation of the rational being’s 
inalienable freedom of choice. While the hierarchy of created beings possessed varying levels 
of wisdom, power and freedom, this did not mean that any necessity was imposed on the 
weaker, since ‘just as a different strength and subtlety of nature do not lead to infirmity, and 
less knowledge does not engender ignorance of wisdom, so an inferior freedom does not 
impose any necessity on the choice of the will.’382 
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Like Honorius, Hugh also adopted Anselm’s discussion of the two basic orientations 
of the will from De concordia. In his discussion of the human will in De sacramentis, Hugh 
identified two fundamental desires implanted in man by God from the beginning. These were 
the desire for the just (appetitus iusti), and the desire for the beneficial (appetitus 
commodi).
383
 Hugh explained that the appetitus iusti was created to be voluntary, so that man 
might freely deserve either reward, through its retention, or punishment, through its 
abandonment. If it was not subject to the rational will and to free choice, there could be no 
true merit. Conversely, the appetitus commodi was not voluntary but necessary. It was 
impossible for man to lose the desire for the beneficial. Through the appetitus commodi, God 
was able either to reward man or to punish him according to his merits. 
Consequent to each appetitus was its corresponding effectus, justice (iusticia) and 
benefit or advantage (commodum).
384
 Iusticia was inseparable from the appetitus iusti, since 
to seek justice was in itself to possess justice. By contrast, commodum was separable from the 
appetitus commodi, since the desire for benefit remained whether or not it was possessed. 
When man sinned, he voluntarily lost his appetitus iusti. As a result of this, he deservedly lost 
not only his iustitia, but also his commodum. All that he had left was the appetitus commodi, 
which remained as a longing that could never be satisfied. This constituted the punishment of 
man for sin.  
Hugh’s discussion of the appetitus iusti and commodi bears striking parallels to 
Anselm’s discussion of the will in De casu diaboli and De concordia. Like Anselm, Hugh 
argued that the will for justice could be identified with justice itself, but that the will for 
happiness could not. The will for happiness was natural and inseparable to all willing 
creatures, and was necessary for the creature to enjoy eternal reward or punishment according 
to his merit. This depended on whether he held fast to the will for justice, which was 
separable. The parallels between the development of the argument in Hugh and Anselm seem 
to indicate that, in spite of the slight differences in terminology, Hugh’s discussion of the 
appetitus iusti and commodi in man was closely based on Anselm’s work.385 The library 
catalogue from St Victor lists an early twelfth-century manuscript of Anselm’s works, 
including both De casu diaboli and De concordia.
386
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Hugh defined justice as measure in desiring. In ceasing to will justice, man continued 
to will his own advantage, but this desire was now without measure.
387
 ‘In this, therefore, was 
the injustice of man, that he extended his desire beyond measure...When therefore he sought 
the highest good, he sought the good but he did not seek well, because he desired to seize this 
both immoderately and unseasonably.’388 
As a result of his inability to keep measure in desiring, ‘that dire necessity is born to 
extend desire by necessity beyond the order of the first disposition.’389 Although Hugh 
emphasized the consequent necessity of sin, he argued that this inevitability could not be 
offered as an excuse. Man’s first sin was voluntary; the necessity that arose as a result of his 
first sin was therefore voluntarily contracted. ‘Since the will produced necessity, necessity 
cannot excuse the will itself.’390 
By contrast, had man not sinned, but pursued the will for justice in ordering his 
desires, he would eventually have been brought to a position where he was no longer able to 
abandon it by sinning. Hugh commented that ‘there would have been an increase of glory in 
persevering in justice not to be able to grow cool in love and desire for goods possessed.’391 
This inability to depart from the way of justice would not constitute an impingement on 
man’s freedom of choice, even though his will was now ‘necessarily’ obliged to follow a 
particular course; the necessity was voluntarily contracted, and thus fully compatible with 
freedom.  
Hugh’s discussion of the different levels of freedom possessed by man at various 
stages of salvation history reflects a comparable discussion by Anselm in the final chapter of 
De libertate arbitrii. Having presented his universal definition of libertas arbitrii as ‘the 
freedom to possess rectitude of the will for its own sake’, Anselm had spent the majority of 
the treatise attempting to explain how man still retained freedom of choice even after sin. In 
the concluding chapter, he acknowledged that ‘although this definition is common to every 
rational nature, that which belongs to God is very different from those of rational creatures, 
and these vary greatly from each other.’392 This statement led Anselm to a brief discussion of 
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the different kinds and levels of freedom possessed by God and rational created beings. The 
libertas arbitrii possessed by God was unique because it was of itself and was neither created 
nor received, unlike that of angels and men. In terms of creatures, Anselm differentiated 
between those who possessed rectitudo, whether separably or inseparably, and those who did 
not. Before the fall, angels were created with separable rectitude. This meant that they 
possessed the ability to preserve rectitude by not sinning, but were also able to sin, if they so 
willed. Anselm did not mention the status of man before the fall in this passage, but he 
argued that righteous men in this life share the separable rectitude of the angels at creation; it 
was possible for them either to sin or to avoid sin, even though this could now only be 
achieved with the assistance of divine grace, and not from man’s own natural capacity. 
Inseparable rectitude, the ability to avoid sin without the possibility of falling into sin, 
belonged to the angels who had been confirmed in goodness, and awaited righteous men after 
death. Sinful men who lack divine grace are unable to avoid sinning, but their lack of 
rectitude is not yet irrevocable and they can still be saved as long as they remain in this life. 
After death, the damned among humanity no longer have the possibility of regaining 
rectitude, but are in the same position as the fallen angels who cannot avoid sin.
 393
  
 Anselm’s discussion of freedom in terms of the possession or lack of rectitude reflects 
his definition of libertas arbitrii as ‘the freedom to possess rectitude.’ Although the terms in 
which he couched his discussion appear very different from Hugh’s discussion in terms of the 
ability to sin and not to sin, the essential principle of the argument was the same. Hugh’s 
basic definition of liberum arbitrium as ‘a spontaneous movement or voluntary desire’394 was 
in accordance with Anselm’s discussion of the inalienable freedom of self-orientation of the 
rational will in De libertate arbitrii. However, like Anselm, Hugh did not believe that this 
was all that could be said about liberum arbitrium. He followed Anselm in identifying 
different levels of freedom that the rational will could possess, the highest being the freedom 
to preserve justice without the possibility of the degradation of sin. The chapter in which 
Hugh set out his schema of the different levels of freedom was entitled ‘on the nature of free 
choice through the three states.’395 This implies that, like Anselm, he understood the higher 
freedoms as higher levels of freedom of choice.  
 Unlike Anselm, Hugh did not discuss the question of divine freedom as part of his 
analysis of freedom of choice. For Hugh, the problem of freedom and necessity in the divine 
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will became important in the context of the relationship between the faculties of will and 
power in God. In his Libellus de potestate et uoluntate Dei, he began with the premise that 
God’s potestas and uoluntas must be equal, since there can be no inequality in God. 
Everything that God wills to do, he can do, and everything that God can do, he wills to do. 
This led to the apparent conclusion that ‘everything which God can and wills to do, he does; 
just as everything which he does, he can and wills to do.’396 However, this conclusion was 
problematic, as it implied that God was constrained by necessity to act as he did, which it was 
impious to claim.
397
 Hugh imagined his opponents arguing that either God’s power had to be 
greater than his will, since he was capable of doing many things which he did not will to do; 
or his will had to be greater than his power, because his power was constrained by his will so 
that nothing should be done against his will.
398
  
Hugh attempted to resolve this problem by differentiating between power and will as 
internal characteristics of God, and in relation to external things. Within God himself, power 
and will are completely inseparable, as his power is always voluntary and his will always 
powerful, and everything he does is always done with both will and power. Only with regard 
to externals can there be any distinction between them, since he does not will to do 
everything that he could will. ‘Thus therefore divine power sometimes exists with regard to 
different things than the will, but in itself it does not exist apart from the will, because it has 
nothing contrary to the will.’399  
This led to the further problem of appearing to suggest that God could act against his 
will, and thus be limited in his omnipotence by the fact of being able to be forced to act 
unwillingly.
400
 Hugh countered this objection by making a distinction between having the 
ability to do something which he does not will and having the ability to act against his will. 
Since God’s power and will in se are inseparable, God cannot do anything which he does not 
will to do. God’s will is the epitome of justice; therefore, to say that God cannot act against 
his will is the same as to say that God cannot act unjustly.
401
  
Hugh argued that God’s inability to act against his own just will did not constitute a 
limitation to divine omnipotence, but its very essence. True power consisted in the freedom to 
uphold justice. The ability to act unjustly was not power, but impotence, as it weakened the 
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individual’s power to fulfil his divine purpose of upholding justice and rectitudo. This had 
been a major theme in Anselm’s discussion of freedom; in De libertate arbitrii, Anselm 
argued that ‘the will which cannot turn away from rectitude by sinning is more free than that 
which can desert it.’402 
Anselm and Hugh shared a strongly teleological understanding of freedom which was 
inseparable from their understanding of justice. Divine freedom was perfect freedom because 
it was unwaveringly oriented towards justice. In relation to external acts such as the 
incarnation of the Christ, the need for God to act with justice and conuenientia meant that he 
could be said to act by ‘necessity’, yet this was not the necessity of external constraints or 
impotence, but an expression of God’s ‘inability’ to act against his own will, and was 
therefore the epitome of freedom. Angels and men were created with the ability to choose 
between iustitia and commodum, but this was given solely in order that they might freely 
choose iustitia. The rational creature could not truly be said to be just unless his adoption of 
justice was the result of the unforced self-determination of the will, which demanded the 
provision of an original alternative. The final purpose of man’s free choice was the 
attainment of the perfect freedom of God, the freedom to uphold justice without hindrance, 
already achieved by the good angels.  
 
Bernard of Clairvaux 
 
Hugh was not the only early twelfth-century author to present his ideas on the meaning of 
freedom of choice, and its relation to sin, necessity and grace, by means of a scale of different 
levels of freedom. A similar model had been employed several years earlier by Bernard of 
Clairvaux. In his treatise De gratia et libero arbitrio (1128), Bernard identified three forms of 
freedom: freedom from necessity, from sin and from sorrow, or, alternatively, freedom of 
nature, of grace and of glory.
403
 The first, freedom from necessity, is common to all rational 
beings, good and bad. The second, freedom of counsel that enables freedom from sin, may be 
possessed in part in this life, through the gift of God’s grace, but will not be possessed 
completely until the world to come. Freedom from sorrow cannot be possessed in this life, 
except fleetingly, in moments of contemplative bliss.
404
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Bernard identified liberum arbitrium specifically with freedom from necessity, the 
basic capacity of the rational will to give voluntary consent to a chosen course of action 
without compulsion by an external agent. ‘Where there is consent, there is will. And where 
the will is, there is freedom. And this is what I think is meant by “free choice”.’405 This 
freedom was natural and inalienable to all rational beings, and was the sole means by which 
an individual could be deemed either just or unjust, deserving of either happiness or of 
sorrow. 
This liberum arbitrium constituted the image of God in man that could never be 
destroyed.
406
 However, freedom from necessity alone did not make man truly free, as it still 
left him enslaved to sin. Bernard argued that freedom from sin constituted a higher level of 
freedom that was not a natural characteristic of rational creation, but could only be given by 
divine grace. He described freedom from sin as freedom of counsel, the grace that enabled 
man to choose what was right and freely do it. Man’s rational capacity of judgement enabled 
him to discern right and wrong, but only grace, described here in its manifestation of free 
counsel, could enable man to act according to that judgement and avoid sin.
407
 
The final and highest freedom, freedom from sorrow, would follow as a natural 
consequence of freedom from sin, as man would then be free from everything harmful to 
him, and able to hold fast to the good. Through God’s grace, freedom of counsel may be 
possessed in part in this life, but will not be possessed fully until the world to come. 
Similarly, freedom from sorrow cannot be possessed in this life, except fleetingly, in 
moments of contemplative bliss.
408
 
 De gratia et libero arbitrio can be seen primarily as a commentary on Romans. 
Bernard attempted to demonstrate how man’s slavery to sin meant that he was no longer 
capable of achieving righteousness for himself, but was completely dependent on the 
assistance of divine grace given to man through Christ. However, the fact that fallen man 
could no longer avoid sin did not negate free choice. Liberum arbitrium did not imply 
wisdom to choose the right course of action, or the power to carry it out; it only conferred the 
means of willing. Bernard argued that the fact that fallen man could no longer avoid sin did 
not signify the destruction of liberum arbitrium, but the loss of the two higher freedoms.  
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For it does not belong to free choice, in itself, nor did it ever belong to it, to 
possess either power or wisdom, but only to will; it makes the creature neither 
powerful nor wise, but only willing. Therefore he should not be thought to have 
lost free choice, if he is neither powerful nor wise, but only if he has ceased to be 
willing. For where there is no will, neither is there freedom.
409
 
 
Bernard explicitly identified liberum arbitrium with freedom from necessity alone, with the 
possession of a rational will by which the individual consented to a particular desire or action. 
The definition of liberum arbitrium in its most basic sense as freedom from necessity alone 
was characteristic of patristic and medieval theology, and was central to the thought of both 
Augustine and Anselm. Bernard did not consider the higher levels of freedom, from sin and 
from sorrow, as aspects of liberum arbitrium, but as separate entities. The parameters of his 
argument thus differed significantly from those of Anselm, who emphasised the freedom 
from sin as an essential feature of true libertas arbitrii. However, beyond the obvious 
difference of categorization, Bernard’s discussion of freedom and of free choice had much in 
common with that of Anselm.  
Like Anselm, Bernard argued that liberum arbitrium did not necessarily imply the 
ability to choose good or evil. He illustrated this fact with the observation that God could not 
will evil, and the devil could not will good, but this did not mean that either God or the devil 
lacked liberum arbitrium. 
 
Neither God nor the devil lacks free choice, since it is not weak necessity that 
makes the former unable to be evil, but a steadfast will for good and willing 
steadfastness;  the latter is unable to be good not because of any violent 
oppression from outside but his own obstinate will for evil and his willing 
obstinacy. Free choice, consequently, is so called because whether in good or in 
evil, it makes the will equally free, since no one ought or can be called either 
good or bad unless he is willing.
410
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Liberum arbitrium did not in itself imply the ability either to will good or evil, but merely to 
will something.
411
 God had liberum arbitrium because he willed the good freely and without 
coercion, while the devil’s evil will was similarly the result of his own free choice. In the 
same way, Bernard argued that fallen man’s inability to will the good did not mean that he 
lacked liberum arbitrium. He was merely unable to use it effectively, since he had lost the 
freedom of counsel that enabled him to will the good, freeing him from sin. 
 Bernard argued that, before the fall, man possessed both freedom of counsel and 
freedom of pleasure, but to a lower degree than he would receive in heaven. This meant that 
he was able not to sin, but not yet unable to sin; and able not to be disturbed, but not yet 
unable to be disturbed. When man sinned, he completely lost both his freedoms of counsel 
and of pleasure, so that he was now unable not to sin, or not to be disturbed.
412
 His freedom 
of choice remained intact but, lacking the higher freedoms, he was no longer able to use it 
effectively. Bernard defined the ability to will what is good as an enhancement of the faculty 
of liberum arbitrium; conversely, the ability to will what is evil was a defect.
413
 God enjoyed 
supreme liberum arbitrium because he had perfect freedom to will the good without 
hindrance. Man was created in the image of God and in possession of liberum arbitrium, in 
order that he might freely choose the good and come to the perfect freedom enjoyed by God. 
Man could never lose this basic capacity of choice in willing, but he was unable to use it 
effectively without also possessing the higher freedom of counsel. Man’s choice could not be 
truly free unless it was free from sin; true freedom of choice thus necessarily meant inability 
to sin.  
Although Bernard did not identify the higher freedoms with liberum arbitrium in the 
narrow sense in which he used the term, they were nevertheless integral to his understanding 
of freedom of choice, just as they had been to Anselm. Bernard’s emphasis on goodness and 
the inability of the upright will to fall into evil as the one true and inalienable freedom of the 
will appears to show Anselmian influence.
414
 Unlike Hugh, Bernard did not use Anselm’s 
discussion of the affectiones ad justitiam and ad commodum, and the form and structure of 
his work provided less scope for the discussion of characteristically Anselmian questions than 
De sacramentis. However, Bernard provides a further example of how Anselm’s ideas on 
                                                          
411
 Bernard, DGLA, 6.16, 8.24. 
412
 Ibid., 7.21. 
413
 Ibid., 6.18. 
414
 B. MicGinn, ‘Introduction’ to Bernard of Clairvaux, On Grace and Free Choice, trans. D. O’Donovan 
(Kalamazoo, 1977),  p. 21. 
134 
 
freedom could be combined with a more traditional definition of liberum arbitrium, and 
functioned as a clarification and extension of disparate elements in Augustine’s work, 
contributing to a more coherent discussion of the nature of freedom in its various forms in the 
scholarly communities of the twelfth century.  
 
Voluntas and Affectus: Guibert of Nogent and Anselm’s oral teaching 
 
A very different application of Anselm’s teaching on the will is found in the work of Guibert 
of Nogent. Guibert stands apart from the mainstream discussions described above, and his 
scriptural commentaries had little influence on his contemporaries.
415
 Nevertheless, his work 
is of interest to modern scholars because it provides a rare glimpse into the possible content 
and style of Anselm’s oral teaching during his time at Bec. As Abbot of Bec, Anselm 
frequently visited other monasteries in the area, including St Fly, where Guibert was a 
novice. In his autobiographical Monodiae, Guibert described how, on Anselm’s visits to St 
Fly,  
  
his teaching was to divide the mind in a threefold or fourfold way, to treat the 
operations of the whole interior mystery under affectus, will, reason, and intellect. 
By a resolution, based on clear analysis, of what I and many others thought to be 
one, he showed that the two former are not identical, although it is agreed by 
ready assertions that in the presence of the third or fourth they are practically the 
same. He discussed with me certain chapters of the Gospel on this understanding, 
and most clearly explained the difference between willing and desiring.
416
 
 
Nowhere in Anselm’s own writings is this tri- or quadri-partite division of the mind or soul 
explicitly discussed. The nearest we have to a discussion of the relationship between ratio, 
uoluntas and affectus appears in De concordia, where Anselm described how ‘the soul 
possesses certain powers which it uses like tools for appropriate functions,’ such as ratio and 
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uoluntas.
417
 In the same chapter, Anselm divided the will into the instrumentum uolendi, ‘that 
power of the soul which we use to will’418; the affectio instrumenti, ‘by which that tool is 
moved to will something’419; and the usus instrumenti, the particular things that are willed at 
different times.  
 Jay Rubenstein notes the verbal parallel between Anselm’s affectio and Guibert’s 
affectus, arguing that it was this aspect of Anselm’s thought that Guibert had in mind in his 
discussion tripartite division of the mind.
420
 However, in spite of the verbal similarity 
between the terms affectus and affectio, they do not mean the same thing, and what Anselm 
described as an affectio of the will was very different from Guibert’s affectus. Affectio 
referred not to the desire for a particular thing (which Anselm termed a usus of the will), but 
to the fundamental orientation of the will which leads it to each particular thing. This is not 
the same concept that Guibert was trying to convey in his use of the term affectus in this 
passage in the Monodiae. Rather than a faculty of the will, his affectus was a separate and 
independent entity within the soul. This was the seat, not of the deliberate and consensual 
will, but of the impulses and desires that move the soul, its affects. John F. Benton and Paul J. 
Archembault both translate affectus as ‘appetite’,421 and although Rubenstein prefers to 
render it more literally as ‘Affection’, he does stress the correlation between the two terms, 
arguing that ‘affectus is...the word Guibert most often uses in places where most other 
theologians would prefer “Appetite”.’422 
 If we interpret Guibert’s affectus in terms of desire or ‘appetite’, a clear parallel 
emerges with another first-hand account of Anselm’s teaching, Alexander of Canterbury’s 
Dicta Anselmi (c. 1109-1116). Alexander was a monk of Christ church, Canterbury, who 
appears to have joined Anselm’s household around 1100. He became a close companion of 
Anselm, accompanying him throughout his second exile, and may have taken over much of 
Eadmer’s work as Anselm’s personal secretary.423 The Dicta provide a record of Anselm’s 
teaching in commune at Canterbury.
424
 Chapter 17 described how 
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the soul contains within itself three natures: reason, will and appetite. By reason 
we are similar to angels, by appetite to brute animals, by will to both. For we are 
rational, which is of angels, and prone to appetites, which is of brute animals, and 
have will, which is common to angels and brute animals. For when we will 
rightly we will according to the will, and if we seek what is illicit, we do this 
through the will. Therefore the will is in the middle between reason and appetite. 
For sometimes it tends towards reason, and sometimes towards appetite. When he 
turns himself towards reason, which rational and spiritual beings know, man is 
said to be rational or spiritual. But when he tends towards appetites, which carnal 
and irrational animals know, he is said to be carnal or animal.
425
 
 
Alexander particularly identified the appetitus with carnal appetites, which man has in 
common with brute animals. This is the same meaning that Anselm generally gave the term 
when he used it in his own writings, although he used the verb form appetere much more 
broadly, to describe all sorts of desires and longings, spiritual as well as carnal. In De 
conceptu uirginali, Anselm discussed appetitus in the context of original sin. As a result of 
Adam’s sin, man’s body was corrupted so that it became subject to carnal appetites like those 
of brute animals.
426
 These appetites constitute the punishment for sin. This idea was repeated 
in De concordia, where Anselm described ‘that corruption and appetite, which are the 
punishment for sin.’427 Nevertheless, he emphasized that these appetites were not in 
themselves sinful, and differentiated between the experience of, and willing consent to, these 
carnal desires.
428
 The morally neutral nature of carnal appetites per se is demonstrated by the 
fact that they are experienced not only by man, but by brute animals who are incapable of 
moral good or evil, since they lack the freedom of judgement to choose what to will, but can 
only obey the impulses of their carnal appetite.
429
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 The meaning of the noun affectus in Anselm’s thought is somewhat ambiguous. In De 
conceptu uirginali, he explained how the corruption of the body with carnal appetites 
(carnalibus appetitibus), in the aftermath of the fall, infected the soul in its turn with carnal 
desires (carnalibus affectibus).
430
 Here, the parallel between the physical appetitus and its 
corresponding mental affectus is obvious. Although in this passage Anselm used the term 
affectus to describe particular passions and desires, elsewhere he appears to have had a more 
general definition in mind. In his Oratio ad sanctum Paulum, he lamented the extent of his 
wretchedness and sin, as even the revelation of divine truth could not bring about true 
compunction: ‘sic ueritas ostendit, et affectus non sentit’.431 Klaus Guth interprets Anselm’s 
use of affectus in this passage as referring not to a particular passion or desire, but to the 
organ which produces and governs these desires.
432
 
 In his division of the soul into affectus, uoluntas, ratio and intellectus, Guibert seems 
to have been using affectus to describe an instrument of the soul, the locus of desire, rather 
than as a particular desire itself. This is not substantially different from Anselm’s use of the 
term in the Oratio ad sanctum Paulum. This prayer, which probably formed part of the 
collection sent to Adelaide in 1070,
433
 was composed around the same time as Guibert’s 
reported conversations with Anselm. The fact that Anselm does not appear to have used the 
term in this way in his later works may suggest an evolution in his terminology across his 
career, although there is insufficient evidence to prove this, given the relative scarcity of 
references to the term in Anselm’s writing. 
 In the Monodiae, Guibert claimed that Anselm not only explained the theoretical 
principles of his model of the soul, but also used it to ‘argue with me several chapters of the 
Gospel’. He went on to explain how, inspired by this teaching, ‘I, in turn, began to apply his 
reasonings to similar commentaries wherever I could and to examine all Scripture attentively 
to find anything agreeing, morally, with those interpretations.’434 The precise relationship 
between Guibert’s model of the soul and his scriptural exegesis has been debated by 
commentators. Klaus Guth argues that the four-fold model of the soul is analogous to the four 
senses of Scripture. According to this model, the literal, historical sense which deals with 
particular events, can be associated with the affectus that governs the movement of the heart. 
                                                          
430
 Anselm, DCV, 2. 
431
 Anselm, Oratio ad sanctum Paulum, ed. Schmitt, Opera, v. 3, pp. 33-41. 
432
 K. Guth, ‘Zum Verhältnis von Exegese und Philosophie im Zeitalter der Frühscholastik: Anmerkungen zu 
Guibert von Nogent, Vita I, 17’, RTAM 38 (1971), pp. 121-135, at p. 126. 
433
 B.Ward, Prayers and Meditations of St Anselm (Harmondsworth, 1973), p. 65. 
434
 Coepi postmodum et ego ejus sensa commentis, prout poteram, similibus aemulari, et ubique Scripturarum, 
si quid istis moraliter arrideret, sensibus multa animi acrimonia perscrutari. Guibert, Monodiae, 1.17. 
138 
 
The allegorical sense, which requires judgement in interpretation, is associated with the 
uoluntas. Historia and allegoria work together to build up the faith of the believer. Beyond 
this, tropologia, with its emphasis on the moral meaning of the text, can be compared to the 
ratio that tests the impulses of the affectus and makes a reasoned moral judgement based on 
the understanding of the need for the whole of life to be directed towards the good. Finally, 
anagogia, which provides insight into the higher mysteries of faith, is related to the 
intellectus.
435
  
Guth’s model, with its emphasis on the need for reason and will to combine in order 
to penetrate the deeper mysteries of faith certainly reflect an important element in Anselm’s 
thought that was taken up by Guibert, but this does not in itself demonstrate Guth’s 
contention that the four elements of the soul are analogous with the four senses of Scripture. 
Some of his points of comparison seem rather forced, and without adequate justification.
436
 In 
addition, it is unclear to what extent Guibert saw his model of the soul as fourfold at all, 
given that he seemed unclear whether ratio and intellectus should be interpreted as distinct 
faculties. 
 If Anselm’s model of the soul as described by Guibert cannot be understood as an 
analogy of the four levels of interpretation, it is necessary to ask what Guibert meant when he 
wrote that Anselm ‘argued with me certain chapters of the Gospel on this understanding.’ 
The phrase can perhaps best be explained in the light of Anselm’s own Preface to the three 
treatises De ueritate, De libertate arbitrii and De casu diaboli, in which he described the 
works as ‘pertaining to the study of Scripture.’437 Although the form of the the dialogues 
bears little resemblance to scriptural commentary, they provide detailed analysis of key 
passages, supplying students with the conceptual tools needed for a full understanding of the 
ideas and implications arising from the text. De libertate arbitrii, for example, takes as its 
starting point a quotation from John’s Gospel, and using it as a basis for discussion of how to 
reconcile man’s freedom of choice with his fallen status as a ‘slave of sin’.438 It does not 
seem unreasonable to suppose that it was discussions on how to interpret passages such as 
this one that Guibert was remembering when he described how Anselm ‘explained to me 
several passages from the Gospel based on this understanding,’ especially as he immediately 
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followed this comment with ‘and he most clearly explained the difference between willing 
and desiring’; the basis of Anselm’s explanation of free will and sin. 
 In his own exegetical writing, Guibert used Anselm’s model of the soul, not just to 
explain the meaning of particular passages in Scripture, but as a basic model for the overall 
structure of his interpretative narrative. This can be seen particularly in his Moralia in 
Genesin, a commentary on the book of Genesis in which he focussed primarily on the moral 
or tropological interpretation. In the Monodiae, Guibert claimed that this work was written 
‘according to those aforementioned four movements of the inner man.’439 In the Moralia, the 
characters and events of the Genesis narrative were interpreted as an extended analogy, 
representing the inner life of the soul with its various moral choices and conflicts.  
 In his interpretation of the fall, Guibert identified the affectus with carnal appetites. 
Carnalis affectus was represented by the serpent who tempted Eve, or uoluntas, away from 
the dictates of reason.
440
 Sin consists in the will’s consent to the tempting impulses of 
affectus. The will, which ought to be governed by reason, is instead obedient to nothing but 
its own desires, and the natural hierarchy within man’s soul is overturned.441 After sin, the 
whole of Christian life becomes a struggle between affectus and uoluntas, between the 
serpent and the woman and her offspring. This continuing struggle is the main theme of 
Guibert’s exegesis. 
 The concept of desire was crucial in Guibert’s thought, but affectus was not the only 
term he used to describe it. He also used the variant form affectio, as well as appetitus. These 
terms appear to a certain extent to have been interchangeable; Guibert alternated between 
them, often within a single paragraph, without making any attempt at differentiation. 
However, although the contexts in which Guibert used the terminology of affectus and 
affectio in the Moralia were many and varied, they can, broadly speaking, be divided into two 
main senses: to describe the particular and ever-changing passions experienced by man, or to 
describe the general orientation of the will. The first sense is epitomized by the serpent in the 
first few chapters of the Moralia, and is virtually indistinguishable from appetitus. The 
second sense is more interesting from the perspective of an investigation of Anselmian ideas 
in Guibert’s thought, as it has parallels with Anselm’s understanding of the two affectiones of 
the will. 
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 In Anselm’s tripartite model of the will, between the single instrumentum uolendi and 
its multiple usus was a double affectio. Guibert shared this concept of a double orientation of 
the will, arguing that ‘we know by experience that there are two wills in man, one carnal, the 
other spiritual.’442 He explored this idea most fully in his account of Abraham, Sarah and 
Hagar. According to Guibert’s model, Sarah represented the spiritual will, and Hagar the 
carnal, while Abraham himself was associated with reason. Rubenstein highlights this 
element in Guibert’s commentary as ‘another sign that Guibert was a disciple of Anselm’, 
adding that ‘he probably added this division to his psychological model during the course of 
writing the Moralia, after he had learnt it from Anselm.’443 Rubenstein goes on to claim that 
‘our suspicion that Guibert is drawing upon the vocabulary of Anselm receives some 
confirmation in a later passage, where he defines Hagar as a worldly affectio. When Abraham 
chooses between Hagar and Sarah, Reason chooses between the two basic directions, two 
basic affectiones of the will.’444 
 It is difficult to justify Rubenstein’s claim that Guibert was remembering Anselm’s 
teaching on the two affectiones of the will purely on the grounds of this definition of Hagar; 
not only is the term distanced by several chapters from Guibert’s explicit discussion of the 
two wills in man, but the spiritual will embodied by Sarah is not described as an affectio, 
which one might have expected if this were the case. Guibert’s use of terms such as affectio 
throughout his writing was inconsistent; he repeatedly used the term as a synonym for the 
carnal appetites, and this may have been his intention when using the term to describe Hagar. 
In addition, we have no record of Anselm using the term affectio in this way before De 
concordia, written twenty years after the time when he knew Guibert at St Fly. In his earlier 
works, he simply referred to two uoluntates.
445
 Although he may have begun using 
affectiones to describe the two basic dispositions of the will in oral discussion before he first 
used them in a written treatise, it is impossible to say with any confidence that Guibert would 
have had any reason to associate the term with this aspect of Anselm’s teaching. 
Nevertheless, leaving aside the terminological details, the parallels between the thrust of 
Guibert’s argument and that of Anselm do seem to suggest that Rubenstein is largely correct 
in his analysis of a probable Anselmian influence on Guibert’s thought in this respect. 
                                                          
442
 Duas esse in homine uoluntates, unam carnalem, spiritualem alteram, experto nouimus. Guibert, Moralia, 
5.16.1. 
443
 Rubenstein, Guibert, p. 52. 
444
 Ibid. (referring to Moralia 6.21.9). 
445
 Anselm, DCD, 13. 
141 
 
 In his account of Anselm’s teaching on the mind in the Monodiae, Guibert 
emphasized the distinction between affectus and uoluntas. However, he also stated that 
Anselm taught that, when combined with ratio or intellectus, they were ‘practically the same’ 
(eadem mox esse). The relation between will and reason was important for Guibert, and he 
emphasized the need for the two to be united if the human soul was to fulfil its potential. The 
first time this concept was discussed in the Moralia in Genesim was the union between Adam 
and Eve in the garden of Eden. Guibert described how, before sin, ratio or intellectus and 
uoluntas were joined together in perfect harmony, just as Adam and Eve were joined together 
as one flesh.
446
 This union between reason and will enabled man to hold fast to one single 
desire, and strive effectively for his one true goal and the purpose of his existence, that of 
drawing ever nearer to God. Throughout the Moralia, the repeated motif of the patriarchs as 
the embodiment of reason, and their wives as will, reinforces this idea of the union between 
the two faculties of the soul. 
 Guibert further developed his argument about the need for the will to be allied with 
reason in his discussion of Sarah. As has already been seen, Sarah not only represented the 
single faculty of will in man, but also, in relation to Hagar, as one possible orientation of the 
will, the ‘spiritual’ rather than the ‘carnal’. However, Guibert went further in describing 
Sarah, not only as uoluntas, but as libertas uoluntatis, the freedom of the will.
447
 In order for 
the will to be truly free, it must be illuminated by and allied with ratio, the power of 
judgement that enables it to identify what is right and to realise its true destiny. This reflects 
Anselm’s teaching, in De libertate arbitrii, that true freedom is only found where the will is 
in full accord with the demands of justice and rectitudo. 
 The relation between ratio and intellectus in Guibert’s model of the soul is somewhat 
ambiguous. His account in the Monodiae was vague on the question of whether what he was 
describing contained three or four primary elements: ‘his teaching was to divide the mind in a 
threefold or fourfold way.’448 Although he then went on to list four components, affectus, 
uoluntas, ratio and intellectus, it is unclear to what extent he envisaged ratio and intellectus 
to be fully separable. In the Monodiae passage, Guibert did not treat the two concepts 
separately, only commenting briefly on the effect that ‘ratio or intellectus’ had on the relation 
between affectus and uoluntas.  For much of the Moralia, his interpretation was essentially 
tripartite, based on the relationship between affectus, uoluntas and ratio. Although he made 
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frequent references to intellectus, this was not as a fourth element, but as an alternative to 
ratio. In the very first verse of his commentary, Guibert commented that ‘ratio indeed is 
nothing other than intellectus, through which we are made to be like God and the angels.’449 
The same characters were described as representing both ratio and intellectus, sometimes 
within the same sentence.
450
 
 Guibert’s interpretative model throughout most of the Moralia can thus be seen as 
essentially tripartite. The change comes about in Book 10, with the introduction of the 
character of Joseph as a personification of intellectus or intellectualitas. For the first time, 
intellectus is described as a separate faculty, ranking higher than ratio in Guibert’s scheme, 
‘for intellectus pertains to the divine, while ratio properly pertains to the human.’451 The 
emergence of intellectus as a separate faculty of the soul appears to bring Guibert’s 
commentary in line with the four-fold model described in the Monodiae. However, the fact 
that this development only occurred at the end of Guibert’s narrative, in the final book, 
suggests that Guibert did not have it in mind as an essential element of his interpretative 
model throughout, but conceived the idea at a late stage in the writing process. Rubenstein 
points this out, arguing that Guibert’s intellectus was unlikely to be based on an Anselmian 
model. Instead, he suggests that ‘the creation of Intellect as a wholly new psychological 
function was most probably his own inspiration, an outgrowth of the writing process, and the 
most satisfactory way to end the moral narrative that his commentary had become...the 
narrative of the spiritual progress of a single mind.’452 
 In contrast, the tripartite model of appetitus, uoluntas and ratio reported by Alexander 
in the Dicta Anselmi, which did not share this function of charting the development of the 
individual soul over time, had no need of introducing a fourth component to describe the 
spiritual insight and understanding that could be achieved beyond ratio and uoluntas in the 
mature and upright soul. Although Anselm often used intellectus as a comparable term with 
ratio, he also had a higher concept of it as a form of spiritual enlightenment that went beyond 
the capabilities of ratio alone, as in his famous formula fides quaerens intellectum.
453
 
Nevertheless, the inclusion of intellectus as a faculty of the soul in the same manner as ratio, 
uoluntas and affectus does not seem to have featured in Anselm’s model, as far as can be 
ascertained from his written texts. Although Guibert included it in his description of 
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Anselm’s teaching in the Monodiae, it did not have a clearly-defined function, but was 
loosely referred to alongside ratio. That it was present at all in this description must be 
largely attributable to the fact that Guibert’s account in the Monodiae was written towards the 
end of Guibert’s career, after the completion of the Moralia. As Guibert’s model by the end 
of the text included intellectus as a fourth element, it also had to be included in his account of 
Anselm’s teaching.  
 By presenting his thought on the relation between will, appetite and reason in a 
tropological commentary on the book of Genesis, Guibert set himself apart from the forms of 
discussion that were taking place elsewhere among his contemporaries. Scholastic authors in 
the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries were beginning to take a more systematic 
approach to concepts such as freedom and the will, and to analyse the various aspects through 
a carefully structured sequence of questions and ideas. Anselm’s work was of fundamental 
importance in this process, as he was the first author to attempt to establish a single universal 
definition of freedom of choice that drew together the various elements that had already been 
described in a piecemeal fashion by earlier authorities such as Augustine, and enabled a 
comprehensive overview of the whole question. Anselm also provided an example of how 
systematic analysis of philosophical and theological constructs, such as the definition of 
freedom, could be applied to the exegesis of challenging passages from Scripture to enable a 
fuller understanding and elaboration of doctrine. Subsequent authors found his subject-matter 
relevant to wider twelfth-century debates on the relation between freedom and sin, will and 
grace; and his work provided a useful conceptual framework for future discussion. 
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Chapter Five – Original Sin and the Birth of the Sinless Christ 
De conceptu uirginali 
 
Mary and the Immaculate Conception 
 
The papal bull of 1854 which set out the dogma of the immaculate conception of Mary 
included the statement that Mary possessed ‘that fullness of holy innocence and sanctity than 
which, under God, one cannot imagine anything greater, and which, outside of God, no mind 
can succeed in comprehending fully.’454 The passage follows Anselm’s statement regarding 
Mary in De conceptu uriginali, composed after Cur Deus homo, where he argued that ‘it was 
fitting for the Virgin to shine with that purity than which a greater cannot be understood 
below God.’455 
 In spite of this reference to his writing in the encyclical Ineffabilis Deus, Anselm did 
not support the idea that Mary’s conception was immaculate and entirely free from the stain 
of original sin. In Cur Deus homo, Anselm argued that ‘after it is agreed that that man is God 
and the reconciler of sinners, there is no doubt that he is totally without sin. But this cannot 
be so unless he was conceived without sin, from the mass of sin.’456 As God, Christ could not 
be afflicted with sin in any way. As man, he must have been created from the massa 
peccatrix that was fallen humanity. Otherwise, he would not be eligible to pay the penalty for 
sin on man’s behalf. Christ’s human mother must therefore have been conceived in sin and 
born with original sin. The Virgin was conceived in original sin, but was cleansed of her sin 
before Christ’s birth, so that he could be born sinless from her in the state of sinlessness 
which was now hers. Mary was purified through grace because of her faith in the future death 
and redemption of her Son.
457
 
 In De conceptu uirginali, Anselm referred the reader back to his discussion in Cur 
Deus homo to explain how Mary’s faith enabled her to be purified from sin before the 
conception of Christ.
458
 He also developed an alternative argument, which focused on the 
mechanics of Christ’s conception from a virgin. Anselm argued that original sin is 
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transmitted through the will in sexual reproduction. Christ did not inherit original sin because 
he was not propagated through Adam’s will, even though he was propagated from Adam’s 
nature as a human being.  
 
He could not transmit the aforementioned evils to any other person, although 
propagated from him, in whose generation neither the propagating nature given to 
him nor his will worked anything or could work anything. Thus it is neither 
reasonable nor right that these evils of Adam should descend to the man 
conceived from the Virgin.
459
 
 
Since Christ was born from a virgin, without the involvement of a tainted will through sexual 
intercourse, he did not contract original sin. The will of God alone was responsible for the 
virginal conception. As Anselm explained, ‘neither created nature, nor the will of a creature, 
nor a power given to any that produced or sowed the seed, but God’s own will alone set it 
aside from the Virgin to procreate a man by a new power, clean of sin.’460 Christ’s sinlessness 
was due to the asexual nature of his conception from the Virgin. Even if he had not been God 
but a man procreated in this way, he would still have been free from sin and possessing the 
original justice lost by Adam.
461
  
 Anselm thus identified two separate arguments that could be used to explain the 
sinless birth of the God-man out of the sinful mass of humanity. The argument described in 
De conceptu provided a rational explanation for how propagation outside the natural working 
of the human will could only result in just offspring, while his argument of Cur Deus homo 
demonstrated that ‘even if sin pervaded the entire essence of the Virgin, she could still be 
made clean by faith to purify her for this mode of conception.’462 
 Anselm’s arguments throughout Cur Deus homo and De conceptu clearly demonstrate 
his belief that Mary was conceived in original sin and afterwards purified by divine grace 
because of her faith. Anselm’s veneration of the Virgin was in no way diminished by his 
conviction that she was conceived in original sin. In the passage quoted above, he described 
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her as being of greater goodness, not only than anything else in creation, but than anything 
that could be conceived, with the sole exception of God himself.
463
  
 Although Anselm did not support the doctrine of the immaculate conception, he was 
widely associated with the development of the idea until into the twentieth century. This is 
largely attributable to the work of his student Eadmer. Eadmer’s treatise De conceptione 
Beatae Mariae Virginis, the earliest example of a text in support of the doctrine of the 
immaculate conception, circulated in manuscript form under Anselm’s name throughout the 
Middle Ages, and it was included as part of the Anselmian corpus in later printed editions.
464
 
 In De conceptione, composed c. 1125, Eadmer expressed the belief that ‘if there was 
anything of original sin in her [Mary’s] procreation...it belonged to the parents and not to the 
progeny.’465 He described how Mary could have been born free from original sin, even 
though she was not herself born of a virgin, using the analogy of a horse chestnut, which 
develops perfectly formed and free from scratches and blemishes beneath a thorny exterior.  
 
If God makes the chestnut to be conceived, nourished and formed under thorns, 
but remote from pricks, could he not grant to the human body which he was 
preparing for himself to be a temple in which he would dwell bodily and from 
which he would become fully man in the unity of his person, that although she 
was conceived among the thorns of sin, she might be rendered completely 
immune from their sting? Clearly he could, and he willed it; if, therefore, he 
willed it, he did it.
466
 
 
Eadmer believed that God could have produced an immaculate conception. It was more 
fitting to the dignity and honour of the Blessed Virgin that she should not be stained with sin 
in any way. It would be unreasonable to suppose that God would not will to act in the most 
fitting manner possible; therefore Mary’s conception must have been immaculate. Although 
Eadmer’s conclusion was very different from that of Anselm on the subject, his argument 
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from fittingness was reminiscent of Anselm’s reasoning process throughout Cur Deus homo 
and elsewhere.  
Eadmer recognised the novelty of his claim that Mary was not subject to original sin.  
 
If anyone shall say that she was not altogether free from the sin of our first parent, 
since she was conceived through the union of a man and a woman under the law, 
that is the catholic opinion. I do not wish by any means to dissent from the truth 
of the catholic and universal Church; nevertheless when I consider, so far as I can 
with my clouded mind, the magnificence of the workings of the divine power, I 
seem to see that if there was anything of original sin in her procreation, it 
belonged to the parents and not to the progeny.
467
 
 
Eadmer did not attempt to provide a sophisticated theological discussion of the precise means 
through which the Virgin was conceived, and his treatise did not address questions such as 
the transmission of original sin or the meaning of purification for sin that were a feature of 
more ‘scholarly’ approaches to the problem. Instead, his treatise was based on the desire to 
justify to the highest degree possible the devotional practices of his community. He 
considered the analogy of the chestnut as perfectly sufficient for the needs of his monastic 
readers, providing them with a simple model on which to base their understanding of the 
conception, and an image that could be used as focus for devotion. 
 The devotional purpose of De conceptione is revealed in the opening paragraphs of 
the treatise, where Eadmer referred to the feast of the conception, the celebration of which he 
claimed to be widespread.
468
 He referred to the fact that the feast was celebrated by simple 
Christians (simplices), who were sincere in their devotion to the Virgin and desire to 
celebrate her conception, even if they were unable to produce philosophical arguments in 
support of the feast, in the face of its theological opponents.
469
 This passage reveals the 
controversy surrounding the feast of the conception in the early twelfth century, and the 
ecclesial and polemical context in which Eadmer was writing. 
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 The feast of the conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary had been widely celebrated in 
the late Anglo-Saxon Church. It had been introduced at Winchester around 1030, and soon 
spread to other centres such as Canterbury, Exeter and Ramsey.
470
 However, it faced 
opposition from post-Conquest bishops such as Lanfranc, who saw the feast as a local 
aberration without theological justification, along with the cults of a number of Anglo-Saxon 
saints. The feast was omitted from the liturgical calendar produced at Canterbury under 
Lanfranc.
471
 
 The principal figure in the move to restore the feast of the conception in England was 
Anselm, Abbot of Bury St Edmunds and nephew of Anselm of Canterbury. From 1109 to 
1115, this Anselm had been Abbot of St Sabas in Rome, a Greek-speaking community that 
had fled from their original foundation near Jerusalem following the Saracen invasion of 
Palestine. The feast of the conception of the Virgin was popular in the Eastern Church, and 
continued to be celebrated by the monks of St Sabas in Rome. In 1122 Anselm was elected 
Abbot of Bury St Edmunds, and arrived in England eager to reintroduce the feast there too. 
Having spent time in Canterbury between 1100 and 1109, under the aegis of his uncle 
Anselm, he would have had the opportunity to learn from the older monks at Canterbury 
about their memories of the feast before its abandonment under Lanfranc. Awareness of 
recent devotion in England must have been a major source of encouragement to Anselm in 
his efforts to revive the practice. 
 Eadmer’s treatise on the conception was written in the context of this move to restore 
the feast of the conception in England. Eadmer must have known Anselm in Canterbury, and 
it seems likely that he composed the treatise with the specific aim of supporting Anselm. The 
reintroduction of the feast in England was controversial. A letter to Anselm from Osbert of 
Clare (c. 1127-8) expresses his own support for the revival, naming as fellow supporters 
Gilbert, Bishop of London and Hugh, Abbot of Reading, as well as Henry I himself; but it 
also demonstrates the bitter opposition encountered from the likes of Roger, Bishop of 
Salisbury and Bernard, Bishop of St David’s, who argued that the festival lacked the 
authority of the Roman Church and should be abolished forthwith.
472
 Osbert’s support for the 
feast of the conception was founded on his firm belief in the doctrine of the immaculate 
conception, although he did not express this belief explicitly in his sermon for the feast, 
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lamenting in a letter to Warin, Dean of Worcester, that ‘I dare not say what I believe in my 
heart about this holy generation,’ for fear of his theological opponents.473 
 Support for the doctrine of the immaculate conception spread rapidly in England in 
the early twelfth century, and was primarily associated with celebration of the feast of the 
conception, legitimised by the Council of London in 1129.
474
 The feast of the conception also 
came to be celebrated on the continent, although its introduction there was similarly 
controversial. A letter from Bernard of Clairvaux to the canons of Lyons castigated them for 
their celebration of the feast, ‘which the custom of the Church does not recognize, reason 
does not approve and ancient tradition does not commend. Are we more learned than the 
Fathers, or more devout?’475  
Bernard objected to the feast of the conception on the grounds, not only of its novelty 
in the Church calendar, but also of the implied belief in the doctrine of the immaculate 
conception, which he opposed. Bernard argued that it was temporally impossible for Mary to 
be sanctified before her conception; therefore she must have been sanctified after her 
conception. Her conception was not immaculate, but in sin, and her purification came later. 
Mary was born a virgin, but was not born from a virgin; she was conceived through the 
natural law of human propagation, not through the Holy Spirit.
476
 Like Jeremiah, Mary was 
sanctified in the womb before her birth, but was not conceived already sanctified. Only Jesus 
was conceived through the Holy Spirit, and only Jesus was sanctified before his 
conception.
477
 
In his letter to the canons of Lyons, Bernard admitted that the desire to afford 
maximum devotion to the Virgin might lead the simple into the erroneous celebration of the 
feast of her conception without understanding the immense doctrinal implications. For 
learned men like the canons, however, such an error was inexcusable.
478
  
Bernard was passionate in his devotion to Mary. His opposition to the immaculate 
conception was not indicative of a diminished veneration of her ultimate purity and grace, 
after sanctification, but was instead a doctrinal concern based on his understanding of original 
sin and its Christological implications. This concern was widespread among theologians; 
Peter Lombard rejected the doctrine of the immaculate conception in his Sententiae, as did 
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Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure in the thirteenth century. It was not until Duns Scotus’ 
reanalysis of Anselm’s discussion of original sin and the virginal conception in the late 
thirteenth century that the doctrine began to gain serious ground among theologians.
479
 
Popular veneration of the Blessed Virgin Mary, and the desire to celebrate the feasts 
of key events in her life, including her conception, developed largely independently of 
debates concerning the finer points of doctrine. Early supporters of the feast of the 
conception, such as Eadmer and Anselm of Bury, had little interest in the subtleties of 
systematic theology. Southern emphasizes Eadmer’s concern as a historian to chart the 
historical events in Mary’s life, rather than approaching Mariological questions from an 
essentially ‘timeless’ philosophical attitude, as Anselm had done.480 Anselm of Bury was 
influenced by Eastern practices, as observed by the monks of his own community of St 
Sabas. Eastern theology was not dominated by Augustinian teaching on original sin, and so 
were unaffected by the difficulties of explaining her freedom from the massa peccatrix that 
caused so much difficulty among Western theologians. 
Through his recognition that Mary was conceived in original sin, and was afterwards 
purified in order to bear the Son of God, Anselm’s Mariology was in line with the dominant 
position among theologians for the rest of the twelfth century. The doctrine of the immaculate 
conception as propounded by Eadmer was, from the perspective of scholastic theology, no 
more than an irrelevant doctrinal aberration, of which his own master Anselm would have 
approved no more than Bernard or Peter Lombard. Nevertheless, it could be argued that 
Anselm’s teaching in Cur Deus homo and De conceptu uirginali did have a significant role to 
play in the development of the doctrine of the immaculate conception. Southern points out 
that Eadmer’s argument of potuit, uelit, ergo fecit was ultimately derived from Anselmian 
thought.
481
 Furthermore, it has been suggested that it was Anselm’s revised definition of 
original sin as original injustice which paved the way for subsequent thinkers. Hilda Graef 
argues that  
 
whereas the general opinion of theologians at that time was that concupiscence 
plays a decisive part in the transmission of [original sin], tainting all persons in 
the normal way, Anselm saw in it nothing else but the absence of justice. If Mary 
was the purest of all creatures, and if original sin was but the absence of original 
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justice, then no more was needed than the anticipation of the effects of Christ’s 
passion to make the Immaculate Conception theologically possible.
482
  
 
According to Graef, Eadmer’s notion of a ‘passive conception’, illustrated by his chestnut 
analogy, was only made possible because ‘his teacher Anselm had paved the way by 
regarding original sin as no more than the absence of original justice.’483 This definition of 
original sin as a non-thing, being nothing more than the absence of original justice, rather 
than the positive stain of concupiscence, removed the major objection to the doctrine of the 
immaculate conception. If original sin were no more than an absence, that absence could be 
easily made up by a special injection of grace, restoring Mary to the original level of justice 
possessed by Adam and Eve before the Fall. All that remained to be resolved was the 
temporal question of precisely when this grace was given; before or at the very moment of 
conception, or later. However, this question was just as relevant to a hamartiology that 
focused on concupiscence as to one of injustice, as Bernard’s letter to the canons of Lyons 
illustrates; an extraordinary gift of divine grace could surely remove a stain as easily as it 
could restore the loss of original justice. Furthermore, Anselm’s discussion of original sin and 
its transmission was not restricted purely to the loss of the original justice possessed by Adam 
before the fall, but also incorporated aspects of Augustinian thought on concupiscence and 
corruption as taught by his contemporaries. These will be discussed below. 
 
Original sin, original injustice: Anselm and Odo of Tournai 
 
In the opening chapters of De conceptu, Anselm defined original sin as original injustice, 
transmitted to all human beings from their first parents. When Adam and Eve sinned, they 
abandoned the justice with which they had been created, becoming personally unjust. This 
personal injustice affected the whole of human nature, which was at that time contained 
within Adam and Eve, and no-one else. Future generations inherited Adam’s sinful injustice 
as part of their human nature. As the sinful nature is contracted from their origin in Adam, it 
is called original injustice or original sin.
484
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 Anselm explained that, had Adam and Eve maintained their original justice, their 
descendants would have inherited original justice. However, by abandoning justice, they 
became weakened and corrupted by sin. 
 
Since they sinned personally when, originally strong and incorrupt, they had the 
power to remain just always without difficulty, their whole being was weakened 
and corrupted...And because the whole of human nature was in them and nothing 
existed outside them, the whole was weakened and corrupted.
485
 
 
Although he no longer had original justice, fallen man retained ‘the obligation of possessing 
the justice which it had received, whole and without any injustice, and the obligation to make 
satisfaction because he abandoned it.’486 Here, Anselm returned to one of the central themes 
of Cur Deus homo: of man’s debt to God, and the need, not only to repay what he had stolen 
by restoring himself to his original justice and obedience to God, but also to make satisfaction 
for the dishonour of his disobedience. At the same time, Adam’s nature was weakened and 
corrupted by his abandonment of justice, so that all of human nature, propagated through 
him, was also weakened and corrupted. Because of this weakening corruption, man was no 
longer able to restore himself to his original state of justice. Anselm argued that  
 
if [human nature] had not sinned, just as it had been made by God, so it would 
have been propagated; and so after sin, just as it had made itself by sinning, so is 
it propagated. Since, therefore, through itself it can neither make satisfaction for 
sin nor regain its lost justice...It seems to be necessary that [human nature] is born 
in infants with the obligation of making satisfaction for the first sin, which it 
could always have avoided, and with the obligation of possessing original justice, 
which it has always had the power to keep.
487
 
 
                                                          
485
 Quoniam autem personaliter peccauerunt, cum originaliter fortes et incorrupti haberent potestatem semper 
seruandi sine difficultate iustitiam: totum quod erant infirmatum et corruptum est...Et quia tota humana natura 
in illis erat et extra ipsos de illa nihil erat, tota infirmata et corrupta est. Anselm, DCV, 2. 
486
 Remansit igitur in ea debitum iustitiae integrae sine omni iniustitia quam accepit, et debitum satisfaciendi, 
quia eam deseruit. Ibid. 
487
 Si non peccasset, qualis facta est a deo talis propagaretur: ita post peccatum qualem se peccando fecit talis 
propagaretur. Quoniam igitur per se nec satisfacere pro peccato nec iustitiam derelictam recuperare 
ualet...uidetur est necesse eam in infantibus nasci cum debito satisfaciendi pro primo peccato, quod semper 
cauere potuit, et cum debito habendi originalem iustitiam, quam semper seruare ualuit. Ibid. 
153 
 
The obligation to possess original justice, and to make satisfaction for the first sin, belonged 
to human nature, which was entirely contained within Adam at the time of his sin.
488
 An 
infant born with original sin was not guilty of personal sin, as it was not yet capable of 
distinguishing between good and evil, of acting with either justice or injustice. The newborn 
infant is sinful in nature, not in person. Human nature, contained in Adam, had the potential 
to avoid sin and retain its original justice; when it failed to do so, human nature was guilty of 
its own willing disobedience. Thus, although original sin did not involve any actual 
wrongdoing on the part of the individual person, Anselm defined it as absolute sin.
489
 
 Anselm’s definition of original sin as injustice was taken up by Odo of Tournai in his 
treatise De peccato originali (c. 1100-1105). This was the only treatise in the early twelfth 
century to be written specifically on the nature and implications of original sin, and it owes a 
considerable debt to Anselm’s work in De conceptu uirginali and elsewhere. In the first book, 
Odo attempted to define ‘sin’. He began with a discussion of the nature of evil, which he 
defined as injustice.
490
 This injustice was found in the rational spirit alone; no action of the 
body could be described as sinful. Reason, will and the spirit itself are not evil, for these are 
creations of God, and God is the creator of good, not of evil. Instead, ‘the injustice of the will 
is the evil we seek.’491 Odo argued that evil was nothing, and had no essence. Evil could not 
have real existence, because everything that exists is made by God, and God is the creator of 
good, not evil. ‘If it exists, God made it, for God made everything that exists. But it is wicked 
to say that God made evil. Therefore evil is nothing.’492 Evil should instead be defined as 
nothing more than a privation of good.
493
 
 Focussing his discussion on sin, which he had already defined as injustice, Odo 
explained that ‘injustice is the privation of justice, since indeed the privatory particle only 
removes justice and does not posit another essence.’494 The privatory particle ‘in-’ denied the 
existence of justice without replacing it with a new essence. Privation differed from negation 
only because it did not apply in all cases where the thing concerned did not exist, but only in 
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cases where it should exist, but did not. Thus, ‘an unjust person does not exist unless one who 
ought to be just, is not.’495 
 Odo next raised the potential objection that ‘if evil is nothing, we are punished for 
nothing, when we are punished for evil.’496 Odo responded by arguing that  
 
when we are punished for injustice we are punished for having abandoned justice. 
But justice is something; therefore we are punished for something. So when 
injustice is said to be nothing, nevertheless something is understood by that, for 
which we are punished because we have deserted it. We are punished therefore 
for the justice which we have deserted. And so both a privation is nothing, and, 
when we are punished for it, we are punished for that which is something.
497
 
 
Man’s punishment for injustice could be more accurately described as his punishment for 
having abandoned the justice he ought to have preserved; therefore, he is not punished for 
nothing and his punishment is just. 
 Odo’s discussion in Book One of De peccato originali bears striking similarities with 
Anselm’s writing on the nature of sin and evil in De casu diaboli and De conceptu. In De 
casu diaboli, Anselm identified the devil’s sin as his failure to serve justice with 
perseverance. By willing something that at the time he ought not to have willed (that is, to be 
like God), he deserted justice and thus sinned.
498
  
 Anselm argued that the injustice of the will has no real existence in itself, but is 
nothing. ‘We say that injustice is nothing in itself, because it is nothing other than the 
privation of the good, which makes them evil and their will evil, and so we say that this 
injustice is nothing other than the privation of justice.’499 When the devil sinned, he ‘lost 
something great, and received nothing in its place, except its privation which has no essence, 
which we call injustice.’500 
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 Having established that evil is nothing, Anselm then entered into a discussion of the 
word ‘nothing’, and in what senses it could be said to signify something, just as the word 
‘evil’ was not meaningless, but apparently signified something. He concluded that the words 
malum and nihil only signified something according to grammatical form, and not in 
reference to a real entity. ‘For “nothing” signifies nothing other than “not-something”, or the 
absence of those things which are something. And “evil” is nothing other than “not-good”, or 
the absence of good where it is proper or fitting to be good.’501 
 Transferring the discussion from evil in general to injustice in particular, Anselm 
demonstrated that injustice has no existence in itself, but is defined simply as the privation of 
justice where justice ought to have been. He argued that ‘the absence of justice is called 
injustice not before justice has been given but after it has been abandoned...the absence of 
justice is not dishonourable except where it is meant to be.’502 Only rational creatures, who 
were capable of and obliged to uphold justice, could ever be described as unjust; the lack of 
justice in brute beasts, for example, was not unjust, as beasts have neither the capability nor 
the obligation to be just. 
 The idea that evil has no existence in itself, but is merely a privation of good, was not 
original to Anselm, but a commonplace in medieval thought. Augustine discussed the non-
existence of evil in his Confessiones, where he argued that ‘whatever things exist are good, 
and the evil into whose origins I was inquiring is not a substance, for if it were a substance, it 
would be good...you made all things good, and there are absolutely no substances which you 
did not make.’503 Anselm expanded the idea of the essential non-existence of evil into an 
explicit discussion of the essential non-existence of injustice, and the definition of sin as the 
absence of justice where justice should have been. By focusing on the voluntary 
abandonment of a justice that had already been given for the purpose of being upheld, 
Anselm added a conscious moral element to the question, relating it specifically to man’s 
culpability for sin. 
 In De conceptu, Anselm recapitulated his definition of sin as injustice.
504
 Referring 
the reader back to his earlier work in De casu diaboli and De ueritate, he argued that evil and 
injustice have no real existence in themselves, being merely the absence of good and of due 
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justice respectively.
505
 Odo’s definition of sin as the deprivation of original justice can be 
seen as largely drawn from Anselm’s thought. The structure and form of Odo’s argument in 
the first book of De peccato originali bear strong resemblance to De conceptu. Like Anselm, 
Odo began with the definition of sin as injustice, and the demonstration of the essential non-
existence of evil and injustice, with an argument based mainly on grammar and the meaning 
of a negation. Like Anselm, he differentiated between a simple negation with no moral 
dimension, and the privation of something which ought to be there. The question of Odo’s 
imaginary objector, asking whether the fact that evil is nothing means that man is punished 
for nothing, also appears in Anselm’s work, where he described ‘certain people’ who were 
‘accustomed to say: if sin is nothing, why does God punish man for sin, when no-one should 
be punished for nothing?’506 
 Odo also demonstrated apparent Anselmian influence later in De peccato originali, 
when he discussed the sinlessness of the Christ. Like Anselm, Odo believed that original sin 
is transmitted through the will in sexual reproduction. When Adam sinned, he lost the 
uprightness of will through which he could propagate his seed without sin.  
 
The soul of Adam joined guilt to the gift of propagation, and to the good of 
propagation which God gave him, he added sin which he did himself. Indeed, 
those things which were joined in origin cannot be separated in posterity. 
Therefore, men who are born by human propagation carry sin by nature. You are 
born by human propagation, so guilt follows of necessity.
507
 
 
Christ was not born from human propagation, and so did not contract guilt from human 
propagation.  
 
Christ did not have guilt, because he did not have a human generation. Nor is 
human nature subject to sin except where there is human generation. For, where 
there is only a divine operation in propagation, unless you blame God, there is no 
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guilt. Therefore, Christ would have been born without sin, even if he were not 
God.
508
 
 
Like Anselm, Odo argued that Christ’s miraculous conception apart from the usual process of 
human generation meant that he was free from the inheritance of original sin. Even if Christ 
were merely a human man conceived in this way, he would still have been free from sin. 
Irven Resnick and David Hughes both stress the extent of Anselm’s influence on Odo’s 
argument in De peccato.
509
 However, there was one aspect of the question which Odo treated 
in far greater depth than anything in Anselm’s writing: his discussion of the origin of the 
soul. 
  
An obscure and perplexing question: Odo, Anselm and the Origin of the Soul 
 
Having established, as Anselm had done, that sin belonged entirely to the soul, and not to the 
body, Odo then turned to the question of the origin of the soul, and how each individual 
contracts the guilt of original sin. 
The origin of the soul was much debated in patristic and early medieval literature, and 
no definite conclusions had been drawn.  Augustine described the problem as one of great 
obscurity and perplexity,
510
 on which he was unable to give a firm opinion. In De libero 
arbitrio, he outlined four main arguments concerning the origin of the soul that were 
circulating in the late fourth century.  
 
There are four views about souls: either they come into being through 
propagation, or they are newly made for each individual being born, or, already 
existing elsewhere, they are sent by God into the bodies of those who are born, or 
they sink into them voluntarily.
511
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Augustine argued that ‘one ought not to affirm rashly any of these’, as catholic commentators 
had not yet been able to produce any firm evidence one way or the other.
512
 The third and 
fourth views listed, which suggest the pre-existence of human souls in a spiritual dimension 
before they come, or are brought, to earth to dwell within a human body, had been widely 
discredited before the twelfth century. The choice faced by later patristic and medieval 
scholars, was between the idea that soul was propagated from soul, as flesh from flesh, and 
passed down from parent to child, or that each new soul was created individually by God and 
implanted into the infant’s body in its mother’s womb. 
 Odo’s discussion of the origin of the soul, in the second book of De peccato originali, 
begins with the claim that the authority of the orthodox Fathers taught that soul was not 
created from soul, as flesh from flesh, even though many people wanted to believe that this 
was so.
513
 Odo’s insistence on the creationist model as the orthodox catholic doctrine is 
striking, as there is little evidence to suggest that any one argument had been definitively 
established as correct before the twelfth century. Although in the late fourth century Jerome 
had declared that ‘the Church’s doctrine is that God forms souls every day, and sends them 
into the bodies of those who are born’, he failed to convince doubters who remained 
concerned about the apparent injustice of convicting infants of original sin.
514
 The majority of 
early medieval commentators followed Augustine in the view that it was impossible to know 
for certain one way or the other.
515
  
 In De peccato originali, Odo presented a number of scriptural citations which 
appeared to demonstrate that each new soul is created by God, so that men ‘have both human 
fathers of the flesh and God as the father of our spirits, so that the flesh alone comes from 
man, but a new spirit is given by God into new flesh.’516 However, in the first book of De 
peccato originali, Odo had already demonstrated that sin is found only in the soul, and not 
the body, so that subsequent generations could not be said to have sinned in Adam, as their 
souls were not in him when he sinned. Odo described this as a ‘very difficult question.’517 
 Odo’s attempt to solve the problem involved a detailed explanation of how the 
individual souls of subsequent generations could be said to have been present in Adam’s soul 
at the time of his first sin, so that they could have been corrupted by his sin. His argument 
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was based on the philosophical distinction between individual and species, person and 
substance. At the time of the fall, the individual souls of Adam and Eve comprised the sum 
existence of the human soul. ‘When the first man was made, the human soul was made first 
in one individual, and then divided into another, and the very nature of the human soul was 
all and wholly in two persons.’518 Odo distinguished between the individual souls that Adam 
and Eve each possessed personally, and the human soul understood as the nature or substance 
of human soul, common to each individual. Thus, Odo counted three: the human soul 
(humana anima), Adam’s soul (anima Adae) and Eve’s soul (anima Evae).519 
When Adam and Eve sinned, they sinned personally, and as individuals, so that their 
own individual souls were corrupted. However, at the time of their sin, the whole of human 
nature was contained within them, so that there was no part of the human soul that was not 
contaminated with sin. Odo argued that ‘in the soul of Adam and in the soul of Eve, who 
sinned personally, the whole nature of the human soul was infected with sin, which nature is 
both a common substance and specific to each. For it does not yet exist outside these.’520 Had 
there existed at the time another individual who had not sinned, the whole nature of the 
human soul would not be guilty of sin; but this was not the case.
521
 
 The corruption of the whole substance of the human soul in Adam and Eve meant that 
every future individual soul would share in that corruption. Odo argued that 
 
because the whole human soul in Adam was guilty of sin, it could not be 
transferred to other individuals without sin, nor could there now be a human soul 
without the blemish of sin, and each draws with it everywhere the concrete 
blemish which it has from the beginning in itself. Therefore every soul which was 
created after Adam, from its beginning draws in nature what he had incurred in 
himself.
522
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Odo concluded that ‘no human soul is created without sin in this life.’523  
 By arguing that the entire substance of the human soul was contained in Adam and 
Eve so that all future individual souls were participants in their corruption, Odo appeared to 
be promoting the traducianist idea that original sin is transmitted with the soul, from parent to 
child. He explained how the soul must be created from human nature, so that ‘when a new 
soul is created it comes to be from a human nature...Therefore God makes a new soul which 
does not have a new nature. In person it is new; in species it is not new.’524 Odo argued that 
when God created new souls, he was actually creating a new person of the existing human 
soul. Each individual soul was human because it shared in the substance of the human soul 
created first in Adam, but was at the same time individual to each person and newly created 
by God.
525
 
 To explain how new souls are created from pre-existing nature, Odo argued that the 
soul has a generative power that enables it to reproduce. He described how ‘as body is made 
from body, so also a living soul is made from a living soul through a nutritive soul.’526 This 
‘nutritive seed’527 constituted an intermediary substance between soul and soul, issuing from 
the soul of the parent and growing into the soul of the offspring. Odo used the commonly 
observed phenomenon of inherited personality, as well as physical traits, as evidence for his 
argument that spiritual, as well as corporeal, nature was transmitted from parent to child. 
 
Often we see a likeness of the parent in the offspring, both in the appearance of 
the body and in the habits of the soul. What is this, unless the seed draws both a 
little fluid from the body and the nutritive power from the soul? For unless the 
seed transmits to the offspring in both ways what it drew from the parent in both 
ways, the offspring would not show such great likeness to the parent in both 
ways.
528
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Odo concluded that, as what comes both from the soul and from the body could be found in 
the seed, ‘it is clear that the soul of the offspring comes from a root-stock, and all our souls 
were in the soul of Adam.’529 
 Odo’s discussion of the transmission of the soul through a root-stock (tradux) from 
parent to child is surprising, given that he consistently claimed that the traducianist argument 
for the origin of the soul was wrong. Odo attempted to circumvent potential accusations of 
error by differentiating between his own use of the term tradux, and that of his traducianist 
opponents. Odo believed that the traducianist model involved a purely physical or materialist 
view of the soul, the idea that ‘soul comes from soul from that which the nutritive power 
draws in the seed, saying that the seed itself is a part of the soul, and is separated from the 
whole in making the offspring.’530  Thus, Odo’s traducianists believed that, in reproduction, a 
part of the soul was separated from the rest and passed into the offspring to produce a new 
soul. 
The error of this argument was, in Odo’s view, the failure to recognize the non-
corporeal nature of the soul, which could not be divided into parts in this way.  
 
For the human soul is a simple and non-composite nature. It is not composed of 
several things, although it may consist of several. It is one, and has many 
efficacies, just as the sun is one, and has many rays. It is simple and nourishes the 
body with many things from itself. Externally indeed they are many, but they 
come from that which is intrinsically simple; they are parts of the soul, but [the 
soul] has no composition, because the whole itself does not admit quantity.
531
 
 
The simple and non-composite nature of the soul meant that it was impossible for a part of 
the parent soul to be detached and transmitted to the offspring. If, as Odo believed, the 
traducianist argument required soul to be passed directly from parent to child in this way, 
then traducianism must be wrong. Instead, Odo posited a ‘nutritive power’ which was ‘the 
seed of the soul, but not soul.’532 By using the generative seed as an intermediary substance 
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between soul and soul, Odo claimed to be able to reconcile the apparently contradictory 
demands of the simple nature of the soul with the need to propagate soul from soul.  
 While Odo clearly did not consider himself to be a supporter of traducianism, his 
argument for the transmission of the soul certainly appears to fall within the parameters of 
what would today be considered at least a form of spiritual traducianism.
533
 Terms such as 
‘physical traducianism’ and ‘spiritual traducianism’ did not yet exist in Odo’s day, and it is 
important not to judge his work according to modern definitions of the various theories. 
When Odo opposed traducianism, his opposition was to the idea that would today be termed 
‘physical traducianism’, the theory that part of the parent’s soul is transferred to the child. 
Tertullian, the main proponent of this model in the patristic period, had described how, 
during intercourse,  
 
the seed of the whole man is discharged, deriving its fluidity from the substance 
of the body, and its warmth from the soul...in that final heat of gratification, when 
the generative fluid is ejected, do we not feel that something of our soul has also 
gone out, and we feel greatly weakened and enfeebled, with dimness of vision? 
This will be the animating seed, coming at once from the dripping of the soul, just 
as the fluid corporeal seed from the expulsion of the flesh.
534
 
 
Tertullian’s suggestion that part of the soul left the parent during intercourse, and became the 
seed that would develop into the soul of the child, was clearly incompatible with Odo’s 
understanding of the soul as simple and indivisible, and he rejected it for this reason. The idea 
that his own argument concerning the generative power of the seed could also be interpreted 
as a form of traducianism did not occur to him.  
  The similarities between Odo’s account of original sin in De peccato originali and 
that of Anselm in De conceptu, particularly their shared definition of original sin as original 
injustice, and discussion in terms of the lack of real existence in sin, seem to indicate that 
Odo’s work was in part derived from a reading of Anselm. Hughes lists a number of specific 
points in Odo’s argument that he believes could only have come from reading De 
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conceptu.
535
 This implies that Odo must have written De peccato originali after 1100, when 
De conceptu was completed.
536
 Resnick does make the suggestion that Odo could have 
completed his treatise as early as 1095, raising the intriguing possibility that the similarities 
between the two texts could be attributable, not to Anselm’s influence on Odo, but to Odo’s 
influence on Anselm.
537
  
However, although the available evidence does not allow any definite conclusions to 
be made regarding the dating of De peccato originali, it seems far more likely that it was Odo 
who was influenced by reading De conceptu than that Anselm took his arguments from De 
peccato originali. Anselm had been developing his thought on justice since at least the 1080s, 
when he composed De ueritate, and it remained a major theme in his work throughout his 
career, most notably in De casu diaboli and Cur Deus homo. His discussion of original sin in 
terms of original injustice in De conceptu was thus a natural continuation of a theme which 
he had developed over the course of two decades of writing. There was no need for his 
arguments in De conceptu to rely on a late reading of Odo’s treatise. On the other hand, Odo 
was a keen student of Anselm’s work. His use of Anselm’s arguments concerning the 
redemption in Cur Deus homo in his own Disputatio contra Iudaeum have already been 
discussed.
538
 There seems to be no good reason why he should not have been similarly 
influenced by Anselm’s De conceptu in his earlier work on sin.539 Further, the manuscript 
tradition indicates that, while copies of De conceptu were widely available in northern France 
and Flanders very soon after its completion, it is less likely that Anselm had ready access to 
De peccato originali.
540
 
 Although a number of Odo’s arguments, particularly in the first two books of De 
peccato originali, bear close resemblance to arguments found in Anselm, his treatise also 
contains much that is original, notably in his discussion of the origin of the soul in Book 3. 
Odo’s attempt to provide a detailed, coherent explanation for the origin of the soul went far 
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beyond anything in Anselm’s writing. Whether or not Anselm would have approved of Odo’s 
argument is therefore open to debate.  
 Hughes claims that both Anselm and Odo shared the view that ‘the nature of the 
human soul was entirely within Adam and Eve, and was corrupted by their sins.’541 In De 
conceptu, Anselm stated that the whole of human nature was contained within Adam and Eve 
at the time of their sin. When they first sinned, ‘all that they were was weakened and 
corrupted...And because the whole of human nature was in them and nothing of it existed 
outside them, the whole was weakened and corrupted.’542 
 The fact that Adam was the sole representative of human nature at that time, 
containing the whole of human nature within himself, meant that his personal sin affected not 
only his personal nature but the whole of human nature, rendering all future persons guilty of 
sin according to their human nature. As Anselm explained in a later passage, 
 
What the person did, it did not do without the nature. For he was a person, 
because he was called Adam; a nature, because he was man. Therefore the person 
made the nature sinful, because when Adam sinned, man sinned...For this reason 
since nature subsists in persons, and there are no persons without nature, nature 
makes the persons of infants sinful. Thus the person deprives the nature that it 
procreates of the good, lacking which it makes them sinful and unjust. In this way 
the sin of Adam is transmitted personally in all those who are by nature 
propagated from him, and is in them original, or natural.
543
 
 
These passages indicate that, like Odo, Anselm differentiated between the universal human 
nature, contained wholly in Adam and propagated from him to all future descendents; and the 
individual person.  What is less clear is how he saw the soul fitting into this scheme. 
Nowhere does Anselm explicitly state that ‘the whole of human nature’ contained in Adam 
includes the soul. On the contrary, a number of passages in De conceptu seem to imply that 
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only the body is propagated through Adam’s seed, and that the foetus does not gain a soul 
until some time after conception. 
Following a passage in which he demonstrated that sin and injustice can only be 
discussed in relation to the rational will, Anselm concluded that ‘from this it would seem to 
follow either that an infant has a rational soul from the very point of conception, without 
which it could not have a rational will, or that there is no original sin at the moment of 
conception.’544 Anselm rejected as absurd the first of these possibilities, on the grounds that 
‘no human sense accepts that he has a rational soul at the very moment of conception.’545 
 This statement could be interpreted merely as a reference to the fact that infants lack 
the ability to distinguish between right and wrong, having not yet attained the age of reason. 
However, it seems more likely that Anselm was thinking in terms of the development of the 
foetus within the womb. This can be inferred from his repeated use of the phrase ‘at the 
moment of conception’, where otherwise it would surely have made more sense simply to say 
‘from birth’.  
The idea that the soul did not enter the body at the moment of conception, but at some 
later point between conception and birth, was widely discussed in the twelfth century, not 
least in the context of the exegesis of a passage of Mosaic law: ‘If anyone strikes a pregnant 
woman, and causes her to miscarry, if the child is not formed, let him be punished with a 
fine; but if the child is formed, let him render soul for soul.’546 In De sacramentis, Hugh of St 
Victor argued that the culprit was only required to render soul for soul in cases where the 
aborted child was formed, implying that the unformed child did not yet have a soul to lose.  
 
Since, therefore, only in the formed abortion is soul ordered to be rendered for 
soul, what is shown except that in that which is not yet formed, there is not yet a 
soul, so that in truth, just as in the first man we read that the body was formed 
first, then the soul was infused, so too in all subsequent men we may believe that 
the human body is formed first in the womb, then the soul is infused?
547
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The idea that the destroyer of the unformed child was not guilty of homicide because the 
unformed body lacked sensus, and therefore did not possess a soul, first appeared in Rabanus 
Maurus’s ninth-century commentary on Exodus, and was also reproduced in the Glossa 
ordinaria.
548
  
 If the soul did not enter the body until after conception, it could not be propagated 
from the parents in the manner of the flesh, but was created separately by God and infused 
into the unborn child, animating and transforming the lifeless body into a living human being. 
In the passage from De conceptu, quoted above, Anselm acknowledged that denying that the 
infant had a rational soul from the very moment of its conception appeared to lead to the 
conclusion that the infant was conceived without original sin.
549
 However, this conclusion 
could not be true either, as it contradicted a number of passages in Scripture. Anselm cited as 
evidence for conception in sin Job 14:4 (‘who but you alone can make clean one conceived 
from unclean seed?’), and Psalm 51:5 (‘I was conceived in iniquity and my mother conceived 
me in sin’).550 
 Anselm therefore had to explain ‘how, if sin is not in infants immediately at 
conception itself, they are nevertheless said to be conceived of impure seed in iniquity and in 
sin.’551 Anselm argued that statements such as this should not be taken literally from a 
temporal perspective. ‘Often divine Scripture asserts something when it is not actually so, 
because it is certain that it will be so in the future.’552 God’s warning to Adam that on the day 
he ate of the forbidden tree he would die, did not mean that he would die on that very day, but 
that on that day he incurred the necessity that one day he would die. All men sinned in Adam, 
not because men who did not yet exist sinned personally in him, but because at the moment 
of Adam’s sin the necessity was created that all future men born of Adam’s nature would be 
sinners. 
 Relating this argument to original sin, Anselm claimed that man is conceived in sin, 
not because the seed from which he was conceived was itself sinful, but because at the 
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moment of his conception he took on the necessity that when he later gained a rational soul 
he would become sinful.  
 
Man can be understood to be conceived of impure seed in iniquity and in sin, not 
because in his seed there is the uncleanness of sin, or sin, or iniquity, but because 
from that seed and that conception from which he began to be a man he took on 
the necessity that when he had a rational soul he would have the uncleanness of 
sin, which is nothing other than sin and iniquity...There is no sin in these 
[infants], because they do not have the will, without which it is not in them; 
nevertheless, it is said to be in them, because in the seed they take on the 
necessity of sinning when they are men.
553
 
 
If the soul is not present at the moment of conception, but enters the body at a later date, the 
conclusion must be drawn that only the body, and not the soul, is reproduced by means of 
human propagation. Although he never stated his position explicitly, it seems that Anselm did 
not support traducianist models for the origin of the soul, whether ‘physical’ or ‘spiritual’. 
The ‘whole of human nature’ contained in Adam and propagated from him can only refer to 
man’s physical nature.  
 In order to explain how a new soul, created pure by God and infused into the body of 
the infant, immediately took on the guilt of original sin, Anselm argued that it was corrupted 
through contact with the flesh. When Adam and Eve first sinned,  
 
their whole being was weakened and corrupted. For their bodies, because after 
such a sin they became like those of brute animals, were subjected to corruption 
and carnal appetites; and their souls, because of the corruption of the body and its 
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appetites and the lack of goods which they had lost, were infected with carnal 
desires.
554
 
 
Anselm quoted a verse from the Wisdom of Solomon to illustrate his argument that ‘the body 
which is corrupted weighs down the soul.’555 
 
Gilbert Crispin on the Soul 
 
Anselm’s apparent creationist stance regarding the origin of the soul was not shared by his 
student Gilbert Crispin. Gilbert favoured a form of traducianism, on the grounds that it 
provided the only reasonable explanation for original sin, which condemned innocent 
children who were too young to know right from wrong, on account of the sin of their first 
father. ‘For if the soul which is given to the infant is not given from the root of the first soul, 
and is not procreated from the first soul, by what justice is the innocent condemned for the sin 
of the first soul?’556 
 Gilbert cited a text from Paul’s epistle to the Romans, claiming that ‘sin entered into 
the world through one man, and death through sin, and in this way death came to all men, 
because all sinned’, as the basis for his argument concerning original sin.557 If all men sinned 
in Adam’s sin, then all men’s souls must in some way have been present in Adam’s soul, for 
‘how could they have sinned in him, in whom they in no way existed?’558 If only the body, 
and not the soul, were passed down from parent to child, what was the meaning of the 
psalmist’s statement that ‘I was conceived in iniquity, and in sin my mother conceived me’, 
when only the soul could justly be found guilty of sin?
559
 These arguments led Gilbert to the 
conclusion that ‘the soul of an infant is assumed from the root of the soul of the first man, and 
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not newly inspired, because it seems that it cannot be liable to condemnation through the sins 
committed by another, or anything it had committed itself.’560 
Gilbert acknowledged that not everyone agreed with this interpretation of the origin of 
the soul: ‘There are many who do not believe these things to be the case, who do not see how 
they could be.’561 For Gilbert, the failure to recognize the propagation of human souls from 
Adam’s first soul was attributable to a reluctance to accept concepts that transcended human 
understanding. In a passage reminiscent of Anselm’s condemnation of Roscelin of 
Compiegne’s failure to submit faithfully to teaching that he could not understand through his 
own limited powers of reason, Gilbert argued that opponents of the theory of propagation 
were over-reliant on the capacity of the human senses and unable to submit with faithful 
obedience to the possibilities presented by a higher power. ‘For they do not see how the 
existence of things could be thus, measuring the immensity of Almighty God according to the 
capacity of their own senses, and according to the estimation of human sense.’562 
Gilbert’s espousal of a traducianist explanation for the origin of the soul provided him 
with a clear and satisfactory explanation of how a just God could justly condemn the souls of 
innocent babies who were not yet capable of sin, unless they had been saved through the 
divine grace of baptism. The utility of the traducianist argument in explaining this problem 
was widely recognised. In his treatise De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo 
paruulorum, Augustine asked where, if the soul were not propagated, was the justice whereby 
the newly-created soul, which was free from the contagion of sin, should be compelled to 
suffer physical punishment and even condemnation to hell, should the child die before 
baptism.
563
  
 In De anima, Gilbert addressed similar questions to Odo in De peccato originali, and 
the conclusions he reached, in support of a form of traducianism, were similar to those of 
Odo. Unlike Odo, Gilbert did not attempt to provide an explanation for precisely how soul is 
generated from soul, whether in terms of what would today be described as ‘physical’ or 
‘spiritual’ traducianism, although given the extent of his dependence on Augustine the latter 
                                                          
560
  Anima infantis ex traduce anime primis hominis assumatur, et minime noua inspiretur, quia nullo alterius 
peccato inquinata, nec aliquo suo in facta, dampnationi obnoxia esse uidetur. Gilbert, DA, 16. 
561
 Sunt multi qui non credunt ea esse, qui ipsi non uident posse esse. Ibid., 22. 
562
 Quia non uident eorum existentiam quomodo sic possint esse, metientes secundum sui sensus capacitatem 
omnipotentie Dei immensitatem, et secundum humani sensus estimationem. Gilbert, DA, 22; cf. Anselm, De 
incarnatione uerbi (hereafter DIV), ed. Schmitt, Opera, vol. 2, pp. 1-35, 1.4. 
563
 Augustine, De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo paruulorum, ed. C. Urba, CCSL, 60 
(Turnhout, 1913), 3.18. In a letter to Jerome, Augustine expressed again his difficulty with the idea that infants 
should suffer punishment if their souls were newly created and free from all sin. Epistola 166, ed. A. 
Goldbacher, CSEL, 44 (Turnhout, 1895), pp. 545-583. 
170 
 
appears most likely.
564
 He was not interested in complex philosophical analysis of the sort 
that Odo employed in the elaboration of his argument, not just because he recognized that 
such an investigation was beyond his personal powers, but because he thought it unnecessary, 
even irreverent, to attempt to penetrate too deeply into the mysteries of faith.  
Evans praises Gilbert for the success with which he managed to reduce complex 
theological questions to understandable conclusions, arguing that he ‘achieves something 
modest but sound in its way, with no pretensions to do more than clarify a theological 
problem for his monks.’565 He achieved his aim of producing a coherent explanation of the 
transmission of original sin, which was acceptable to human reason and not in direct 
contradiction to Scripture, and which emphasized the immutability of divine justice.
566
  
Gilbert’s support for a form of traducianism, at a period in which popular opinion was 
increasingly coming down in favour of the creationist model, is interesting. Had he reached 
his conclusions independently, or was he guided to them through Anselm’s teaching? 
Resnick suggests that, given Gilbert’s dependence on Anselm as his student, it should be 
possible to accept Gilbert’s ‘apparent traducianism’ as ‘Anselm’s own’.567 A similar position 
is held by Hughes who, while acknowledging that Gilbert’s traducianism ‘could have been 
based upon a powerful conviction’ of his own, nevertheless believes that ‘more probably...it 
was based on a persuasive authority such as Anselm’s.’568 
Anselm was clearly thinking about the problem of the origin of the soul towards the 
end of his life, and presumably discussed the matter with his friends and fellow monks. In the 
Vita Anselmi, Eadmer described how, on his deathbed, Anselm had expressed regret that he 
would not now be able to ‘settle a question concerning the origin of the soul, which I am 
turning over in my mind...for I do not know whether anyone will solve it when I am dead.’569 
 Southern argues that Anselm’s concern about the problem, illustrated in this passage 
in Eadmer, may have provided the motivation for Gilbert Crispin to write his treatise De 
anima, and that Gilbert may have seen himself as Anselm’s ‘theological executor’ in this 
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respect.
570
 Evans also believes that Gilbert took his inspiration to write primarily from 
Anselm, although she argues that the uncertain dating of De anima precludes any confident 
assertion that the treatise was written after Anselm’s death, as an attempt to carry out 
Anselm’s own plan to write such a work.571 
 Gilbert’s traducianist position in his De anima treatise cannot be explained as the 
result of Anselm’s teaching. This is not necessarily surprising. Gilbert was an independent 
author who may have been influenced by conversations with Anselm, but was quite capable 
of thinking for himself and developing his own arguments. The form and content of De 
anima owes more to Gilbert’s reading of Augustine than to anyone else. The whole question 
of the propagation of the soul in relation to the transmission of original sin was developed by 
Augustine in his attempts to demonstrate the reality and inevitability of humanity’s guilt in 
the face of his Pelagian opponents. In the context in which Augustine was writing, a 
traducianist explanation of the origin of the soul did far more to promote teaching on original 
sin than the creationist alternative. Gilbert’s use of the traducianist argument to explain the 
transmission of original sin follows Augustine’s example. His insistence on the uncertain 
nature of his conclusions, and the need for humility and faith regarding questions that 
surpassed the capacity of human knowledge, also reflects Augustine. 
 It is impossible to date De anima with any precision. Southern’s suggestion that 
Gilbert may have seen himself as Anselm’s theological executor, completing a task which 
Anselm, on his deathbed, had regretted being unable to finish himself, supposes a date after 
Anselm’s death in 1109. However, as Evans points out, his theory cannot be verified. An 
alternative possibility is that Gilbert completed his treatise before Anselm’s death. A decade 
earlier, when Anselm composed De conceptu, he did not discuss the origin of the soul 
explicitly, although it is apparent from his argument that he was a supporter of the creationist 
model. A treatise advocating traducianism, coming from the pen of his friend and student 
Gilbert, could have been the factor that instigated his concern, in the final months of his life, 
to clarify a problem that he had not previously considered in need of clarification. While this 
possibility remains little more than speculation, it does fit the pattern whereby Anselm’s 
interest in a question was stimulated by the desire to clarify and correct ideas that appeared in 
the writings of his contemporaries. 
 The suggestion that Gilbert’s traducianist beliefs came from his master Anselm is 
further weakened by the fact that Honorius Augustodunensis, another of Anselm’s students, 
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supported creationism. In the dialogue of Elucidarium, Honorius had the student ask ‘whether 
souls were created from the beginning or are created daily.’572 The master responds that, 
although the invisible material from which souls are made was created by God in the 
beginning, ‘they are formed daily...and sent into the body.’573 In the following question, 
Honorius explained how souls which are created good and holy become tainted when they 
enter the polluted body, so that no human soul is free from the corruption of sin.
574
 Nowhere 
in Honorius’ dialogue was the possibility that one soul is in some way generated from 
another mentioned. 
Honorius’ purpose in Elucidarium was to provide clear and comprehensible 
explanation of doctrine that avoided difficulty and controversy. Even so, the fact that the 
student does not even mention traducianist theories as a possible explanation for the origin of 
the soul, to be rejected by the master, seems to suggest that Honorius did not consider 
traducianism to be a serious possibility, or was unaware of the idea’s currency among his 
contemporaries. If, as Hughes and others have suggested, Anselm’s thought on the origin of 
the soul involved elements of spiritual traducianism, one might expect that his student 
Honorius would have included at least a passing reference to the idea in his theological 
compendium.
575
 
By the 1130s, traducianist arguments for the origin of the soul, whether ‘physical’ or 
‘spiritual’, had been widely rejected. In De peccato originali, Odo had declared with 
confidence that the creationist model of the origin of the soul was the orthodox catholic 
doctrine, although he had difficulty explaining how, if this were the case, original sin was 
transmitted from one soul to another. Hugh of St Victor encountered similar difficulties. In 
De sacramentis, he stated that  
 
the catholic faith has chosen as more to be believed that souls are made daily 
from nothing to be joined to bodies to give them life, than that they are 
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propagated from a root-stock according to the nature of the body and the 
character of human flesh.
576
 
 
As far as Hugh was concerned, there could be no doubt that the creationist model was correct, 
and that traducianism had been universally discredited by the Catholic Church. Hugh’s 
refutation of traducianist thought was based on the non-corporeality and indivisibility of the 
soul. The soul’s simple nature meant that it could not be divided into parts, one of which 
remained in the parent while the other passed into the offspring. ‘If, therefore, soul is born 
from soul as flesh from flesh, let them say how that simple substance either remains whole in 
the begetter, if it passes into the begotten, or passes whole into the begotten, if it remains in 
the begetter.’577  
Physical traducianism of the form taught by Tertullian clearly did not make sense, and 
was rejected by Hugh for much the same reason as it had been rejected by Odo. However, 
Hugh also rejected the idea of the consubstantiality of souls, with its suggestion that the 
human soul could be divided personally to create new individuals without affecting its 
essential simplicity.  
 
Unless perhaps they should wish to say that all souls are consubstantial and that 
the simple matter is indeed multiplied personally in the propagation of children, 
but is not divided essentially; not realizing how greatly unfittingly they pursue 
this claim, if one and the same essence should be believed to be destined alike to 
blessedness and damnation, glory and punishment.
578
 
 
Here, Hugh rejected an argument that would today be described as ‘spiritual traducianism’, 
on the grounds that if all human souls were essentially the same nature, this single nature 
could not be simultaneously beatified and condemned in different individuals. If the human 
soul were one, it could only be either just or unjust, not both. There is no reason to suppose 
that Hugh was familiar with Odo’s arguments in favour of a form of spiritual traducianism, 
but this passage does indicate that he was aware of the existence of potential arguments 
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attempting to reconcile the essential simplicity and indivisibility of the soul with elements of 
traducianist thought. Hugh denied that there was any way in which soul could be said to be 
propagated from soul, and cited a number of scriptural passages to support his belief that each 
individual soul is created by God. However, he did acknowledge that ‘never has any reason 
or authority been able to prevail to such an extent as to dispel questioning doubt, with this 
exception alone, that the catholic faith has chosen as to more to be believed’ that souls are 
created daily by God and infused into the body. 
 Odo and Gilbert had used a form of traducianism because they believed it provided 
the best explanation for the justice of condemnation for original sin, a belief which was 
apparently shared by Augustine. In De sacramentis, Hugh recognized the utility of 
traducianism for the doctrine of original sin. ‘If souls were thought to be from a root-stock, 
there would not be such a great question, because justice would be more apparent in this, that 
original sin is said to pass from parents to children...if souls are not from a root-stock, how 
are children made guilty of the sin of parents?’579 Hugh argued that where human reason 
alone was incapable of comprehension, there was no point in attempting to resolve doubtful 
problems through the imposition of equally doubtful assertions such as the generation of 
souls from a root-stock. Multiplying uncertain propositions could never lead to a certain 
truth. Instead, where one was unable to come up with a certain solution to a problem, one 
should accept with faith the teaching of authority. The Catholic Church taught that only the 
flesh, and not the soul, is transmitted from parent to child. Therefore, if original sin was 
transmitted from parent to child, it must be transmitted through the flesh, even if it was 
difficult to understand how this could be so. 
 
Anselm, Boso and the School of Laon 
 
In the preface to De conceptu, Anselm addressed his student Boso, his interlocutor in Cur 
Deus homo. He described how, during the course of the discussions that became the basis for 
Cur Deus homo, Boso had raised questions about how God was able to assume human nature 
without sin to become a sinless God-man, drawn from the mass of sinful humanity. The 
question as it appeared in the second book of Cur Deus homo asked 
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how did God assume a man without sin out of the mass of sin, that is, the human 
race, which is totally infected with sin, as if unleavened bread from leavened? 
For, granted that the actual conception of this man was pure and free from the sin 
of carnal pleasure, the Virgin from whom he was taken...was born with original 
sin, since she herself sinned in Adam, ‘in whom all have sinned’.580 
  
Anselm’s initial response to Boso’s question in Cur Deus homo had been to stress the 
miraculous nature of Christ’s conception, and the impossibility of penetrating fully the 
workings of divine Wisdom. When pressed by Boso, he went on to describe how the Virgin, 
although conceived in sin, was purified through faith so that Christ received his purity from 
hers.
581
 
 Although he did not investigate the problem of original sin and the virginal 
conception in any detail, Boso’s question continued to resonate, and was a major factor in 
causing Anselm to return to the question in his next treatise. 
 
I am certain that in the book, Cur Deus homo...you have gathered that another 
reason can be seen, besides that which I set out there, for how God assumed a 
man without sin from the sinful mass of humanity; and your eager mind is greatly 
stimulated to seek out what it is. Therefore, I am afraid of seeming unjust to you, 
if I conceal from your love what occurs to me on the subject. And so I shall say 
briefly what I think on the subject...
582
 
 
In the course of the treatise, Anselm explained how the virginal conception, which was 
effected without the will of man in the natural course of propagation, enabled a sinless child 
to be conceived in the womb of a mother who had herself been born under the power of 
original sin. This argument assumes acceptance of the Augustinian belief that original sin is 
transmitted through fleshly concupiscence, as it was the absence of concupiscence in Christ’s 
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conception in the Virgin that enabled his freedom from contamination with the stain of sin.
583
 
The transmission of original sin, and the role of fleshly concupiscence within that process, 
was the subject of extensive discussion at the school of Laon in the late eleventh and early 
twelfth centuries.  
 A passage in the Sententiae Anselmi defined original sin as ‘the corruption of 
concupiscence or tendency to concupiscence’, which was transmitted in the father’s seed and 
which, when the child’s flesh became animated, led to personal sin.584 The body must have 
had original sin before the soul entered it; if not, the body, as well as the soul, would have 
been originally pure, leaving nowhere for original sin to be found.
585
   
 A later passage in the Sententie returned to the question of whether soul could be 
generated from soul as flesh from flesh. The author argued that reason denied this to be a 
possibility. The soul had no parts, so how could a part of the soul be separated from the rest 
for the purpose of propagation?
586
 Neither could the soul be transmitted in its entirety, as it 
was impossible for the same soul to be worthy of punishment and glory simultaneously in 
different individuals.
587
 The argument that soul could not be propagated from soul was then 
supported by numerous citations from scriptural and patristic authority: the apostle’s 
statement in the Epistle to the Hebrews that man is the father of the flesh, but God the father 
of the spirit; Augustine’s commentary on Psalms which taught that God creates new souls 
daily; and Jerome’s declaration that those who believed in the propagation of the soul were in 
serious error; as well as the passage from Exodus which argued that a man who provoked 
miscarriage in a woman should only render a life for a life if the foetus was formed.
588
 
 The Sententie Anselmi demonstrate that the teaching on the soul and its origin in the 
school at Laon was strongly in favour of the creationist position, a position that was 
apparently shared by Anselm of Canterbury. It is likely that Anselm was aware of the 
teaching of his Laon contemporaries. In Chapter Two, it was argued that Anselm’s 
knowledge of contemporary teaching at Laon regarding the position of the devil in the 
redemption may have come largely from his student Boso, who came to Anselm from the 
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schools with perplexing questions about what he had learnt there.
589
 It may well be the case 
that Anselm’s knowledge of the teaching on original sin available at Laon at this time may 
also have come, at least in part, from Boso. Through Cur Deus homo and De conceptu, 
Anselm attempted to offer a coherent explanation of original sin and the sinless conception of 
the Christ that resolved the sort of doctrinal problems facing his contemporaries in the 
schools. Masters such as Anselm of Laon were beginning the process of drawing together the 
various statements made by Augustine and other authorities in different contexts to try to 
create a comprehensive picture of the whole subject of original sin and its implications. 
Anselm’s treatises were intended to provide a cogent, rational analysis of a given problem, 
and a conceptual framework that could be used as a basis for further discussion. 
 Anselm’s contribution to thought on original sin and the origin of the soul in Cur 
Deus homo and De conceptu fed into ongoing discussion at Laon, although his position was 
not always fully understood. The author of the Sententiae diuine pagine apparently believed 
Anselm to have held traducianist views on the soul’s origin. In a passage discussing the 
various theories of the transmission of original sin, the author claimed that  
 
some people say that, just as the body is propagated from another, so one soul is 
also from another, because otherwise they do not know how to explain original 
sin in children, for which they are condemned. They do not know the means of 
transmission. And the bishop, in Cur Deus homo, agrees with these men. 
590
  
 
This statement is problematic on several levels. The reference to Cur Deus homo, rather than 
De conceptu, for Anselm’s discussion on original sin may be explicable in terms of the close 
association between the two texts in the twelfth century, where De conceptu could be seen as 
a continuation and supplement to Cur Deus homo, rather than a separate and independent 
treatise. More significant is the attribution to Anselm of traducianist views on the origin of 
the soul. This is probably a mistake; Bliemetzrieder suggests that Anselm’s authority should 
belong not to the group of individuals described in the preceding sentences, but to those that 
followed. The author went on to describe how ‘others say that souls are not propagated as the 
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body is; and so sin is not transmitted in the soul; and so sin is not transmitted in the soul.’591 
This position is certainly much closer to Anselm’s belief as set out in De conceptu. However, 
the author of the Sententie remained unconvinced.  
 
If it is propagated in the body, then the impurity, that is, sin, is either spiritual or 
corporeal. But if it is corporeal, then man ought no more to be condemned for it 
than if he had been polluted with mud. But it is not spiritual, because there cannot 
be spirit except in rational creatures. And so they say that original sin is 
something, but they do not know where to assign it.
592
 
 
The difficulty inherent in defining corporeal weakness as sin, and a source of guilt for which 
new-born infants could be condemned even before they were old enough to commit personal, 
willing sin for themselves, continued to exercise writers on original sin throughout the twelfth 
century. The author of the Sententie diuine pagine argued that the soul ‘is not condemned for 
this corruption but because, when the soul is infused into the body, it finds that body apt and 
suitable for sin, and delights in that aptitude, and that delight is called original sin.’593 It was 
not the corrupt flesh itself, but the soul’s pleasure in its corruption, that was culpable. 
 In Elucidarium, Honorius used a similar argument to explain how souls which are 
created good and holy become tainted with sin upon association with the polluted body.  
 
God, from whom is all goodness and all holiness, creates none but good and holy 
souls, and these desire naturally to enter the body, as we naturally want to live. 
However, when they enter that impure and polluted vessel, they embrace it with 
such great avidity that they love it more than God. Therefore it is just that when 
they prefer that sordid vessel, indeed that prison in which they are enclosed, to the 
love of God, God excludes them from his company.
594
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The argument that the soul was held guilty of original sin because of the delight and love that 
it felt for the corrupted flesh, was not universally accepted in the twelfth century. Hugh of St 
Victor objected on the grounds that ‘if we say that when the soul is mingled with the body it 
is inclined by some will to delight in guilt, we already show that it is guilty not only of 
original but also of actual sin.’595 On the other hand, if the soul’s association with polluted 
flesh was not willing but forced through necessity, it should not be accounted as the guilt of 
sin, for ‘we show by that very necessity it is absolved from guilt. For what is entirely of 
necessity is not imputable.’596 If the soul did willingly ally itself to the body in delighted 
anticipation of sin, this was an act of personal, willing guilt and should be identified as 
personal, not original sin.
597
 Hugh did not attempt to resolve this problem, arguing that the 
solution had not been revealed to human knowledge.
598
 Hugh was willing to accept that 
divine justice with respect to the guilt of original sin was unfathomable, but his contemporary 
Peter Abelard was not. Abelard denied that original sin should be discussed in terms of guilt 
at all, arguing that it was merely a punishment.
599
 Abelard’s views were vigorously opposed 
by Bernard of Clairvaux at the Council of Sens, and had little real impact in the twelfth 
century.
600
 
 Anselm’s discussion of original sin and the origin of the soul in Cur Deus homo and 
De conceptu reflected the teaching of Laon insofar as he agreed that the soul is created pure 
by God, and infused into the body at some point after conception, whereupon it becomes 
contaminated with original sin transmitted through the flesh. He also insisted that original sin 
was real sin, stressing the magnitude of its impact on man’s relationship with God. In all this, 
his work was entirely in agreement with the most influential streams of thought in the schools 
of the late eleventh and twelfth centuries. However, he diverged from popular opinion in his 
definition of original sin, not as concupiscence, but as injustice. This inevitably meant that his 
arguments on the subject of original sin developed along different lines from those of his 
contemporaries and successors in the schools. By defining original sin as the lack of original 
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justice, rather than the positive vice of concupiscence, he avoided problems such as whether 
and how the soul became a willing participant in that vice, that so troubled other authors. This 
may go some way towards explaining why De conceptu was cited by relatively few authors 
in the early twelfth century. Aspects of Anselm’s thought such as his definition of sin as 
injustice did not fit easily into the discursive framework of other authors who sought answers 
to questions based primarily on the Augustinian model of sin as concupiscence. De conceptu 
remained a popular text in the twelfth century, as is shown by the large number of surviving 
manuscripts, but full appreciation of the significance of Anselm’s argument was not yet 
widespread.
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Chapter Six 
Writing about God and the Trinity 
Monologion, Proslogion, De incarnatione Verbi and De processione Spiritus Sancti 
 
In the preceding chapter, it was argued that Anselm’s discussion of original sin in De 
conceptu uirginali had relatively little impact on contemporary debate in the schools because 
his approach to the subject was not immediately relevant to the discursive framework 
employed elsewhere. In contrast with Anselm’s analysis of the meaning of necessity in the 
redemption in Cur Deus homo, or the nature of free choice in De libertate arbitrii, Anselm’s 
definition of original sin as original injustice, and consequent failure to address problems 
such as the origin of the soul, meant that De conceptu had less obvious utility in the context 
of the specific debates that dominated discussion in schools such as Laon and St Victor. 
Written evidence of discussion of Anselm’s work often only exists where an aspect of his 
teaching was controversial, or provided an obvious contribution to contemporary debate. 
Where his ideas were uncontroversial, or did not fit easily into the discursive framework of 
the schools, there was little reason for Anselm’s contemporaries and successors to write 
explicitly about his work, even if the texts themselves were widely copied, indicating that 
they were well known, and considered of value by those who produced them. 
 There is very little evidence of discussion of Anselm’s earliest major treatises, 
Monologion and Proslogion, in the schools of the early twelfth century. The ‘ontological 
argument’ of Proslogion, which described God as ‘that than which a greater cannot be 
conceived’, was to have an enormous influence from the thirteenth century onwards, and is 
still widely discussed today.
602
 However, with the exception of the correspondence of 
Gaunilo of Marmoutiers, shortly after the text’s completion in the late 1070s, it was almost 
universally ignored by Anselm’s contemporaries and twelfth-century successors. This may be 
because the majority of Anselm’s readers in the early twelfth century were primarily 
interested in his work as a meditation and reflection on non-controversial ideas that were 
already familiar from earlier authors such as Augustine. As with the texts discussed in 
previous chapters, Monologion and Proslogion can be read as extended commentaries on 
ideas derived from Augustine, drawing together images and statements contained in a variety 
of Augustine’s works and combining them with ideas taken from Scripture and other 
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authorities to generate a more complete, systematic understanding of orthodox, ‘Augustinian’ 
thought. 
 As with the treatises discussed in previous chapters, Anselm’s writing provoked 
controversy when it was thought to contradict orthodox authority. In Monologion, this can be 
seen in particular with regard to his discussion of the terminology best suited to describing 
the unity and triplicity of the triune God. Although Anselm’s thought was firmly rooted in 
earlier authority, as he stressed repeatedly in the Prologue to the text and in subsequent 
correspondence, he made little explicit reference to the work of his predecessors in the main 
body of the text. His working methodology took the pioneering approach of actively avoiding 
all explicit appeal to authority, whether scriptural or patristic, with the intention instead of 
demonstrating through rational argumentation that the truth of the Christian faith must be so, 
and to provide a framework for intellectual understanding and contemplation of what was 
already believed. This approach to theological questions aroused suspicion from some 
members of the monastic community, who apparently mistrusted an over-reliance on reason 
at the expense of authoritative teaching. In the 1090s, Anselm himself was to oppose the 
Trinitarian teaching of Roscelin of Compiègne, whose lack of respect for the authoritative 
teaching of orthodox catholicism, and reluctance to accept any truth that he could not grasp 
through his intellectual capacity alone, Anselm blamed for leading him into severe doctrinal 
heresy. Roscelin cited Anselm’s teaching in support of his ‘heretical’ claims concerning the 
Trinity, and this potential association with the taint of heresy provoked Anselm to enter into 
confrontation with Roscelin more directly than at any other moment in his career. His 
response took the form of an open letter De incarnatione Verbi, through which Roscelin was 
condemned at the Council of Soissons and forced to recant his erroneous teaching.
603
 The 
incident illustrates Anselm’s role in the gradual elaboration of ‘orthodox’ doctrine in the late 
eleventh and twelfth centuries, with its concurrent identification and condemnation of 
‘heretical’ statements and beliefs.   
Anselm’s response to Roscelin in De incarnatione Verbi was itself subject to criticism 
in the 1120s by Peter Abelard, who suggested that Anselm’s analogy of a river to describe the 
Trinity, with a piped channel representing the incarnate Christ, had potentially heretical 
implications. Abelard’s own teaching on the Trinity met with strong opposition, and was 
condemned at the second council of Soissons in 1122. The complex personal relationships 
connecting Anselm, Roscelin and Abelard, that may have had as great an impact on 
                                                          
603
 Anselm, De incarnatione Verbi, ed. Schmitt, Opera, vol. 2, pp. 1-35. 
183 
 
Abelard’s attitude towards his predecessor as the theological content of the arguments under 
debate, illustrate the importance of personal networks within the scholarly communities of 
the early twelfth century, although these are inevitably much more difficult to define than the 
transmission of written texts. Abelard’s discussion was limited to his analysis of a single 
analogy from De incarnatione. With this exception, there is little evidence for any discussion 
and criticism of Anselm’s writing on the Trinity in the schools. This implies that his 
arguments were generally viewed as non-controversial, and not prime candidates for debate. 
Nevertheless, the large number of manuscript copies suggests that treatises such as 
Monologion and Proslogion were considered valuable, even if they were not discussed in the 
surviving theological texts of the period. 
 
Monologion: Reason and Authority 
 
In Anselm’s first major treatise, Monologion (c. 1076), he attempted to discuss what could be 
known and said about God and the Trinity. Although the text relied heavily on ideas and 
arguments derived from Scripture and the patristic authors, Anselm made little explicit 
reference to authority, concentrating instead on a rational exposition and logical analysis of 
terms. This approach apparently provoked opposition from Anselm’s former mentor 
Lanfranc, who had taught him when he first came to Bec, before transferring to Caen in 
1063.
604
 Anselm sent a copy of the text to Lanfranc for his approval. Lanfranc’s response 
does not survive, but it seems that he did not approve of Anselm’s methodology and lack of 
appeal to earlier authorities. Anselm insisted that Monologion was fully in accord with the 
teaching of the patristic authors, particularly Augustine. In his Preface to the completed work, 
he wrote that 
 
in the course of frequent re-readings of this treatise I have been unable to find 
anything which is inconsistent with the writings of the Catholic Fathers, and in 
particular with those of the Blessed Augustine. If, then, someone thinks that I 
have said here anything which is either too modern, or which departs from the 
truth, I would ask them to denounce me not as an arrogant modernizer or a 
maintainer of falsehood. Rather I ask that they first make a careful and thorough 
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reading of the books On the Trinity of the aforementioned learned Augustine and 
then judge my little treatise on the basis of them.
605
 
 
In particular, Anselm was apparently criticized for his discussion of the vocabulary of 
‘person’ and ‘substance’ in the Trinity. In the penultimate chapter of Monologion, he 
addressed the difficulty of finding a suitable term to represent the sense in which the Trinity 
was three. Talk of three persons in one substance was inappropriate, as a person is an 
independently existing thing, and the number of persons was the same as the number of 
substances; ‘since there are not several substances in the supreme essence, there are not 
several persons.’606 Nevertheless, practical necessity demanded that some term be adopted, 
however inadequately, to convey the triplicity of the Trinity. Anselm argued that ‘person’ or 
‘substance’ could be used in this context, as they were terms commonly used to indicate 
individuals that existed as the subject of accidents. ‘Substance’ could not properly be used to 
describe the supreme essence, as the supreme essence was not subject to accidents. Therefore, 
Anselm concluded, ‘on the grounds of linguistic necessity, it is possible to refer with a clear 
conscience to refer to the unitary Trinity and Trinitary unity as one essence and three persons 
or substances.’607 
 In suggesting that the Trinity could be spoken of as three substances, Anselm 
diverged from the standard Latin usage, which preferred to speak of three persons in one 
substance. However, it was not without precedent. The concept of three substances in one 
person was characteristic of thought among Greek authors, and Augustine, in his treatise De 
trinitate, had discussed the problem of terminology along similar lines to Anselm.
608
 Not all 
of Anselm’s early readers recognized the authoritative precedents for Anselm’s statement, or 
appreciated the logic which drove him to his conclusions. In a letter to Rainald, abbot of 
Poitiers, Anselm admitted that he had been criticised for his discussion of person and 
substance in the Trinity in Monologion, by people who 
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did not know that three personas cannot be said properly of God, just as three 
substantias cannot, although there is a certain reason by which inadequate words may 
be used to signify that plurality which is understood in the supreme Trinity. The Latins 
say three personas, believing in one substantia, but the Greeks, no less faithfully, 
confess three substantias in one persona.
609
 
 
It may well be the case that Lanfranc’s criticism of Monologion focused in particular on 
Anselm’s apparent unorthodoxy in suggesting that one might speak of three substantiae in 
the Trinity with no less legitimacy than of three personae. This is certainly the impression 
given by the fact that it was this point on which he was most eager to defend himself, both in 
the Prologue to the text itself and in the letters concerning it. The relation between person and 
substance in Anselm’s thought was to become significant again during the 1090s, in the 
controversy against Roscelin of Compiègne.
610
  
Anselm’s approach to linguistic problems and the relative roles of authority and 
reason in discussion of the nature of God and the Trinity divided the monastic community at 
Bec and beyond. While readers such as Lanfranc were apparently concerned that Anselm’s 
emphasis on logic and reasoning might lead him into unorthodox statements and erroneous 
belief, others were eager to read a work that would explain, clearly and rationally, the content 
of faith and the reasoning behind various doctrinal statements. In the Prologue to 
Monologion, Anselm emphasized the frequent and earnest requests of his fellow monks to 
produce a text in which ‘nothing whatsoever was to be argued on the basis of Scripture, but 
the constraints of reason concisely to prove, and the clarity of truth clearly to show, in the 
plain style, with everyday arguments and down-to-earth dialectic, the conclusions of distinct 
investigations.’611 Although a description of the author’s reluctant and humble acquiescence 
to the demands of eager disciples was a standard literary feature in a prologue of this sort, 
there was clearly a demand for a text that provided a rational and coherent explanation of 
statements and ideas that could previously be found only through extensive searching in 
disparate passages from authors such as Augustine. The popularity of the text, and 
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widespread manuscript transmission, clearly demonstrate the need which Anselm’s work 
supplied. 
 
Proslogion 
 
Anselm’s next treatise, Proslogion, also divided opinion among the monastic community at 
Bec. As with Monologion, Anselm wrote for the benefit of his fellow monks, but there is 
evidence that not everyone at Bec appreciated what he was doing. Eadmer described how the 
wax tablets containing an early draft of the work were twice taken and destroyed by an 
unknown member of the community.
612
 Giles Gasper discusses this incident in some detail, 
and sees it as evidence of intellectual opposition towards Anselm’s working methodology, as 
well as political hostility and tensions arising from Anselm’s early promotion to a position of 
authority at Bec.
613
 
Early criticism of Anselm’s argument in Proslogion was not confined to wholesale 
rejection of his philosophical approach, but also included critical engagement with the 
argument on its own terms. The latter is epitomized by the Pro insipiente, traditionally 
attributed to Gaunilo of Marmoutiers, which Anselm ordered to be appended to future copies 
of Proslogion along with his own response.
614
 The Pro insipiente argued that the description 
of God as ‘that than which nothing greater can be conceived’615 did not necessarily prove that 
God exists. Anselm had argued that the existence, at least in the mind, of ‘that than which 
nothing greater can be conceived’, was proven even by doubters and deniers, since they 
understood and had a conception of what was said. ‘Therefore even the Fool is forced to 
agree that something than which a greater cannot be thought exists in the mind, since he 
understands this when he hears it, and whatever is understood is in the mind.’616 If it existed 
in the mind, it must also exist in reality, since that which had existence in reality was always 
greater than that which existed only in the mind.  
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And surely that than which a greater cannot be thought cannot exist in the mind 
alone. For if it exists in the mind alone, it can be thought to exist in reality also, 
which is greater. If then that than which a greater cannot be thought exists in the 
mind alone, this same thing than which a greater cannot be thought is that than 
which a greater can be thought. But this surely cannot be. Therefore there is no 
doubt that something than which a greater cannot be thought exists both in the 
mind and in reality.
617
 
 
In response to Anselm’s claim that ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ must exist in 
the mind, since even unbelievers understood the phrase and were able to form a mental 
conception of it, the Fool responded that it was perfectly possible to form a mental 
conception of a thing without believing it existed. Further, God so far transcended human 
understanding as to make it impossible to form a true conception of him. The Fool argued 
that 
 
He who says that that which is greater than everything exists because otherwise it 
would not be that which is greater than everything does not pay enough attention 
to whom he is speaking. For I do not yet admit, indeed I even deny or doubt, that 
this greater thing is any truly existing thing; and I do not concede that it exists in 
a different way from that when the mind tries to imagine a completely unknown 
thing on the basis of spoken words alone, if one can speak of ‘existence’ here. 
How therefore can it be proved to me from this that that which is greater than 
everything truly exists in reality, because it is evident that it is greater than all 
others, if I still deny and doubt that this is evident and do not admit that this 
greater thing exists either in my mind or thought, even in the sense in which many 
doubtfully real and unreal things are?
618
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To illustrate his argument, the Fool imagined a mythical ‘Lost Island’, which was in every 
way superior to all other lands on earth. Such an island could easily be conceived in the 
imagination, but it would be foolishness to claim that this island must necessarily exist in 
reality, on the grounds that if it did not exist in reality as well as in the imagination, it would 
not be greater than existing lands and therefore could not exist, even in the mind, in the terms 
attributed to it.
619
  
 In his response to the Pro insipiente, Anselm argued that the Fool was wrong in 
assuming that ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ was equivalent to ‘that which is 
greater than everything.’ ‘That which is greater than everything’, such as the Lost Island, 
could be thought not to exist; but ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ could not.620 
Even if the supreme goodness was beyond the power of human comprehension, the formula 
‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ could be understood, so that ‘what is heard can 
be thought of and understood even if the thing itself, than which a greater cannot be thought, 
cannot be thought of and understood.’621 It was possible to conceive of a being which was 
unable not to exist, and this must be understood as greater than a being that was able not to 
exist. 
 
When, therefore, one thinks of that than which a greater cannot be thought, if one 
thinks of what can not exist, one does not think of that than which a greater 
cannot be thought. But the same thing cannot be both thought of and not thought 
of simultaneously. Therefore, he who thinks of that than which a greater cannot 
be thought does not think of something that can not exist but something that 
cannot not exist. Therefore what he thinks of exists necessarily, since whatever 
can not exist is not what he thinks of.
622
 
 
Anselm engaged in detail with the content of the Fool’s argument, pointing out the 
inaccuracies in his logic and reiterating and clarifying his own statements. In the final chapter 
of his response, he explained that he had chosen to do this because ‘it is quite clear that you 
[the Fool] have criticized those parts that seemed to you to be weak, not from any malice but 
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from goodwill.’623 The Fool apparently recognized and appreciated Anselm’s intention, to 
prove by necessary reasons what he already believed through faith, and his difficulties 
following the logic of Anselm’s argument deserved to be taken seriously. Although Anselm 
himself did not consider further clarification necessary, he acknowledged that some readers 
were swayed by the Fool’s argument, and needed to have his mistakes clearly corrected.624 
By ordering both the Pro insipiente and his own response to be copied and transmitted 
alongside all future copies of Proslogion, Anselm sought to ensure that the difficulties of his 
argument that had led the Fool to reject it should not prove a stumbling block to future 
readers. 
 With the exception of the Pro insipiente, there is no surviving evidence of any further 
discussion of Anselm’s argument. The text of Proslogion was clearly popular, and was 
widely copied in the early twelfth century; but few, if any, readers were concerned with the 
content of the logical argument of the early chapters. This may be because Anselm’s 
argument was not seen as controversial. Rather than a difficult problem that needed to be 
analysed and resolved, it was interpreted as a detailed re-statement of a universally-accepted 
belief. Unlike the necessary reasons for the incarnation and redemption, that provided fertile 
ground for debate in the schools of the early twelfth century, the necessary reasons for the 
existence of God were not considered to be in need of elucidation. 
 Anselm’s description of God as ‘that than which a greater cannot be conceived’ had 
precedents in earlier literature. In his Philosophiae Consolationis, Boethius discussed how 
the indisputable existence of imperfect goods necessitated the existence of a perfect good, the 
fount of all goods from which all lesser goods are derived as diminutions. God was the 
supreme good, for ‘nothing better than God can be conceived of.’625 In his Confessiones, 
Augustine described the absolute incorruptibility of God, saying that ‘there could not have 
been or be any soul capable of conceiving that which is better than you, who are the supreme 
and highest good.’626 Elsewhere, Augustine also described God as ‘the absolute supreme 
good, than whom nothing is or can be thought better.’627 Anselm’s description can thus be 
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seen as an elaboration of an earlier theme, providing a thorough logical analysis of the 
necessary reasons for an idea that was already widely known. In a rare utilization of the 
phrase in the early twelfth century, Gilbert Crispin incorporated it into his discussion of how 
and why God could take on human form in the incarnation: ‘if God is that than which nothing 
greater or more self-sufficient can be conceived, by what necessity was he compelled to 
become a participant in human calamity and be a fellow sufferer of such great evils?’628 This 
casual reference to the idea, without any attempt to explain or contextualize its claims, 
demonstrates its uncontroversial nature in the early twelfth century. 
 
Roscelin of Compiègne 
 
Anselm’s response to the Pro insipiente opened with an acknowledgement that his opponent 
was ‘an orthodox Christian and no fool.’629 His conviction of the author’s orthodox faith 
enabled Anselm to address the arguments raised on their own terms, demonstrating the 
inevitable logic by which ‘that than which nothing greater can be thought’ must be 
understood to have real existence. An unshakeable faith in the truth of catholic doctrine was a 
fundamental pre-requisite of theological inquiry of the sort that Anselm attempted in 
Proslogion; in the opening prayer of the treatise, he acknowledged the utter impossibility of 
perceiving the nature of God which so transcended human understanding. Nevertheless, he 
prayed, 
 
I do desire to understand your truth a little, that truth that my heart believes and 
loves. For I do not seek to understand so that I may believe, but I believe so that I 
may understand. For I believe this also, that ‘unless I believe, I shall not 
understand.
630
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For Anselm, the purpose of theological inquiry was to meditate on and penetrate deeper into 
the mystery of a faith that was already believed, to heighten understanding of the reasons for 
particular points of doctrine and to eliminate false beliefs. The impeccable orthodoxy of the 
author of Pro insipiente enabled the discussion of the logic of aspects of Anselm’s argument 
without any doubt as to the ultimate truth of his conclusion. 
 Anselm’s response to the Pro insipiente stands in sharp contrast to his response to 
another early reader of his writing on the nature of God, Roscelin of Compiègne. Apparently 
basing his claims on his reading of Monologion, Roscelin taught an understanding of the 
Trinity that was not in full accord with the teaching of the Catholic Church, and cited Anselm 
in support of his heterodox beliefs. Anselm’s reaction, in his treatise De incarnatione Verbi, 
contains some of his most conservative rhetoric on the place of theological investigation. He 
criticized Roscelin for not adhering to the rule that ‘unless you have believed, you will not 
understand’, and condemned 
 
the presumption of those who, since they are unable to understand intellectually 
things the Christian faith professes, and with foolish pride think that there cannot 
in any way be things that they cannot understand, with unspeakable rashness dare 
to argue against such things rather than with humble wisdom admit their 
possibility.
631
 
 
Anselm went on to say that  
 
No Christian ought to argue how things that the Catholic Church sincerely 
believes and verbally professes are not so, but by always adhering to the same 
faith without hesitation, by loving it, and by living humbly according to it, a 
Christian ought to argue how they are, inasmuch as one can look for reasons.
632
 
 
Michael Clanchy interprets this passage as setting a precedent for the censorship of texts 
concerning the fundamental tenets of the Catholic faith. He claims that ‘St Anselm had 
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potest quaerere rationem quomodo sit. Ibid. 
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recommended to the pope [Urban II, to whom the final version of the treatise was dedicated] 
that “no Christian should dispute about something which the catholic Church believes with its 
heart and confesses with its mouth.” In other words, there was to be no discussion of articles 
of the creed.’633 Clanchy’s translation of Anselm’s statement here is misleading; Anselm did 
not oppose all discussion of the articles of faith, but only of things that were clearly contrary 
to them: ‘no Christian ought to argue how what the catholic Church believes...is not so, 
but...how it is.’  
 For Anselm, the articles of the creed constituted the parameters of valid theological 
inquiry. The attempt to identify and understand the reasons underlying the fundamental belief 
of the Church was a useful, faith-enhancing activity. On the contrary, stepping beyond the 
boundaries established by the creed and treating its articles as open to question and correction 
was an inexcusable form of intellectual arrogance. Anselm attributed Roscelin’s heterodox 
teaching on the Trinity to an inability to accept, humbly and faithfully, divine mysteries that 
he was unable to explain rationally. Such arrogance deserved censure as much as the faulty 
logic of his argument required correction. The authority of the Church, embodied in the Pope, 
must act to defend the faith against the incursions of scholastic innovators.  
Anselm firmly believed in the utility of logical argumentation in interpreting the 
teaching of Scripture and the content of the faith. His sola ratione technique, employed in 
treatises from Monologion to Cur Deus homo, was a pioneering attempt to understand and 
clarify catholic doctrine by exploiting all available tools of reason and scholarship. 
Nevertheless, all theological inquiry must remain subject to the authority of the Church as the 
guardian of the true faith, by not casting doubt on the beliefs expressed in the creed. Where 
there was a direct conflict between the conclusions of individual reason and authoritative 
belief, the individual must be prepared to accept the fallibility of his own intellect and submit 
to the authority of the Church. Anselm’s emphasis on the importance of obedience to the 
authority of the Church may in part reflect his monastic background, suggesting a possible 
difference between ‘monastic’ and ‘scholastic’ approaches to theological activity. 
How much Anselm knew about the details of Roscelin’s teaching is unclear. In the first 
recension of De incarnatione Verbi (c. 1090-92), Anselm commented that he had known 
Roscelin personally, as a friend.
634
 Where and when they had met is unknown, but it seems 
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unlikely that Anselm knew Roscelin well, as he was apparently unaware of the nature of his 
teaching until he was alerted to its heretical content by a letter from John, a former Bec monk 
at Beauvais.
635
 Anselm’s initial response to John indicates a degree of caution, as he was 
unsure what meaning to attach to Roscelin’s statement.636 However, by the time he came to 
write his fuller response, in De incarnatione Verbi, Anselm was no longer in any doubt as to 
the heretical nature of Roscelin’s claims, or the danger that they posed. The text took the 
form of an open letter to the Church council at Soissons, where Roscelin was tried for heresy. 
Anselm did not attend the council himself, but entrusted the letter to Fulco, Bishop of 
Beauvais, to be read aloud to the entire assembly if necessary.
637
 In this letter, Anselm wrote 
that 
 
the cleric Roscelin says that in God the three persons are three things existing in 
separation from one another like three angels, and yet in such a way that there is 
one will and power; or else the Father and the Holy Spirit were incarnate. And [he 
says that] one could truly speak of three gods, if custom allowed it. He claims that 
Archbishop Lanfranc of venerable memory was of this opinion and that I am of 
it.
638
 
 
With regard to Lanfranc, there is little in the available evidence of his teaching to support 
Roscelin’s claim, although Margaret Gibson suggests that he may have been exploring the 
theological implications of Lanfranc’s comments, based on the De decem categoriis, on the 
ineffable name of God, in which he identified the name of God with ousia, ‘the ultimate term 
that is beyond utterance or comprehension.’639 However, with regard to his own teaching, 
Anselm was aware that statements he had made regarding the meaning of terms such as 
grammaticus and albus could be interpreted as supporting Roscelin’s statement. In his 
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treatise De grammatico, Anselm had demonstrated that these terms denoted quality, in 
reference to the substance homo.
640
 Although the statement is not found in any of his 
surviving written works, Anselm apparently also discussed the meaning of such terms as an 
analogy for the Trinity, suggesting that the persons of the Trinity were to God what qualities 
such as albus, iustus and grammaticus were to an individual man. In the first, unfinished, 
draft of De incarnatione Verbi, Anselm described how Roscelin ‘claimed to have heard me 
say that God can be said to be Father and Son and Spirit proceeding from Father and Son just 
as albus and iustus and grammaticus and similar things are said regarding an individual 
man.’641 Anselm did not deny the truth of this statement, but it is significant that, in the final 
published version of De incarnatione, he removed all mention of it, apparently in 
consideration of the potentially damaging conclusions that could be drawn from it.
642
 
 Constant Mews identifies another passage in Anselm’s writing that could have 
provided a basis for Roscelin’s belief that Anselm taught that the three persons of the Trinity 
could be described as three res: his discussion, in Monologion, of the three substantiae in the 
Trinity.
643
 In the only surviving text known to have been written by Roscelin, a letter to Peter 
Abelard denying accusations that he was guilty of teaching tri-theism, Roscelin insisted that 
he believed in the unity of the divine nature. Nevertheless, he stressed the importance of 
differentiating adequately between the three persons of the Trinity. As Anselm had done in 
Monologion, Roscelin cited Augustine’s discussion of the differences in terminology 
employed by the Latins and Greeks in describing the nature of the Trinity. 
 
We do not therefore signify through ‘person’ anything else than through 
‘substance’, and although we are accustomed from a certain habit of speaking to 
triple ‘person’ and not ‘substance’, the Greeks are accustomed to triple 
‘substance’. And indeed it must not be said that in the faith in the Trinity they err 
in tripling ‘substance’, because they legitimately speak differently from us, yet 
they believe that which we believe, because, just as we say, they signify 
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absolutely the same thing in God, whether by ‘person’ or ‘substance’ or 
‘essence’. For, as much as there is diversity in speech, there is unity in faith.644 
 
Roscelin argued that, ‘in the substance of the Holy Trinity any names do not signify one thing 
and another, whether in terms of parts or qualities, but they signify only substance itself, 
neither divided into parts nor changed through qualities.’ His argument here was based on 
Priscian’s definition of a noun as a nomen signifying substance with quality. In God there 
could be no distinction of quality, as this would imply mutability and variation within the 
divine simplicity. Therefore, the nomina given to the three members of the Trinity had to 
refer to substance alone. Mews argues that the Greek definition of the Trinity appealed to 
Roscelin because ‘it fitted with what he had learnt from Priscian about the meaning of a 
noun...While a name signified a quality in this created world, there was no such potential for 
partiality or mutability in God.’645 
 For the majority of the letter, Roscelin was primarily concerned with the identification 
of nomina with substantiae; the definition of a person as a thing (res) only appeared towards 
the end of his discussion, where he argued that Augustine ‘did not completely deny that there 
were three eternals...for they [the divine persons] were severally eternal, just like several 
eternal things.’646 Nevertheless, he continued to stress the unity inherent in the single essence 
of the Trinity.
647
 The claim that Roscelin advocated a form of tri-theism in distinguishing 
between three substantiae or res is unfounded. Roscelin insisted on the absolute simplicity 
and unity of the divine essence, but was at the same time determined to make adequate 
distinction between the members of the Trinity. His primary concern in the letter to Abelard 
as well as in the other texts attributed to him was not so much with the nature of things as of 
words, in particular the ontological status of nouns. However, his teaching could easily be 
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interpreted as an assault on orthodox teaching on the nature of the Trinity. Given the parallels 
that could be drawn with aspects of Anselm’s own writing on the meaning of substantia and 
persona in the Trinity, Anselm was right to be worried. 
 
Abelard, Roscelin and Anselm on the Trinity 
 
In De incarnatione Verbi, Anselm attempted to explain the essential unity of the Trinity and 
how this could be reconciled with the incarnation of the Son alone, without the Father and the 
Holy Spirit. To illustrate his argument, he employed a traditional analogy comparing the 
three persons of the Trinity to the source, stream and lake of the river Nile. Source, stream 
and lake were all distinct entities that could not be confused with each other, and yet all three 
were equally called ‘the Nile’. 
 
Therefore the source, the stream, the lake are three, but there is one Nile, one 
river, one nature, and one water, and we cannot say that anything is three. For 
there are not three Niles or rivers or waters or natures, and neither are there three 
sources or streams or lakes. Therefore, we say one thing of three things, and three 
things of one thing, and yet not the three things of one another.
648
 
 
The identification of the Father with the source, the Son with the stream and the Holy Spirit 
with the delta not only demonstrated how there could be three persons in one God, but also 
the generation of the Son from the Father, as the stream from the source; and the procession 
of the Holy Spirit from both the Father and the Son, as the lake from both the source and the 
stream.
649
 The basic analogy was derived from Augustine,
650
 but Anselm extended it to 
encompass the Incarnation of the Son, by the simple addition of a channel. 
 
For if the stream should run through a channel from the source to the lake, is not 
the stream alone, although no other Nile than the source and the lake, in the 
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channel, as I would say, just as the Son alone became flesh, although no other 
God than the Father or the Holy Spirit?
651
 
 
The channel enabled Anselm to counter Roscelin’s claim that, if the three persons of the 
Trinity were one in substance, then the Father and the Spirit must have become incarnate 
along with the Son, from whom they were substantially inseparable. However, the innovation 
became the subject of later criticism from Peter Abelard. In Theologia christiana, composed 
during the 1120s, Abelard listed a number of opinions posited by various masters to describe 
the unity and triplicity of the Trinity, each of which he dismissed as erroneous. At the end of 
the list, Abelard described how 
 
there was also in our most recent times a certain man, that is Anselm, 
metropolitan of Canterbury, who, preserving the unity of substance, seems to 
have introduced a more valid analogy than those which we have discussed. 
Unless I am mistaken, he took the basis of his analogy from the blessed 
Augustine, writing To Pope Lawrence, introducing from this both the source and 
its stream, whose substance is the same, as an example of divine generation, 
where the substance of the generator and the generated is the same. And so the 
aforementioned archbishop posits that the three are of the same substance, as it 
were, that is, the source, the stream and the pool: the source indeed from which is 
the stream as if the Father from whom is the Son, and the pool indeed which 
comes forth from the source and the stream as if the Spirit who proceeds from the 
Father and the Son. He also puts the stream in a pipe as the Son in human flesh, 
as if we should say that the Word incarnate is an enpiped stream.
652
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Clanchy believes that this passage in Abelard’s Theologia constitutes a ‘mockery’ of 
Anselm’s analogy and, by extension, of Anselm himself.653 He argues that Abelard 
deliberately played upon the potential double meaning of the fistula which Anselm had used 
to describe the incarnation. Although the term fistula had a variety of meanings in the Middle 
Ages, both sacred and profane, Clanchy emphasizes its association with bodily orifices, and 
hence with running sores and urine. ‘Expressed in this crude form, the analogy was patently 
absurd and covertly obscene.’654 Whether this interpretation would have been uppermost in 
the minds of Abelard’s audience is doubtful, as there is no reason why they should not have 
imagined the fistula as the perfectly innocent water course that Anselm intended. Similar 
imagery was used by other authors, including Bernard of Clairvaux, without any suggestion 
of crudity.
655
 Nevertheless, given Abelard’s penchant for word play and irreverent jokes, 
exhibited throughout his career, it is easy to imagine that the opportunity offered by Anselm’s 
potentially incongruous juxtaposition of plumbing and divinity may have proved too difficult 
to resist. Whether this constitutes deliberate and vindictive ‘mockery’ of Anselm is another 
matter. 
 Abelard’s most serious criticism of Anselm’s analogy was that it implied a temporal 
succession of modes of being, as the substance of water was first the source, then the stream, 
and finally the pool. The water of the source was not at the same time the water of the stream 
or of the pool, as the substance of the Father is at the same time the substance of the Son and 
the Holy Spirit. ‘On the contrary’, Abelard concluded, ‘perhaps this analogy very strongly 
supports that heresy which confuses the properties of the persons over time, so that it says the 
same person is the Father when he wills, the Son when he wills, or the Holy Spirit.’656 The 
heresy referred to was Sabellianism, which understated the distinction of the three persons in 
the Trinity by defining them as no more than a succession of modes. Anselm’s analogy was 
vulnerable to this accusation, as the water of the Nile (the unity of the Godhead) became 
successively the source, the stream and the pool (the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit). 
 This defect in the analogy had been recognized by Anselm himself. In his original 
exposition in De incarnatione, he pointed out that the spatial and temporal procession of the 
Nile was an imperfect figure of the divine Trinity that was unrestricted by the constraints of 
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space and time.
657
 He did not immediately elaborate on this point, apparently expecting his 
readers to recognize that analogies such as this one should not be taken too literally or 
stretched beyond their initial, and very specific, points of comparison. Nevertheless, he 
returned to the analogy and its limitations in greater detail in his later treatise De processione 
Spiritus Sancti (1102), which focussed on the procession of the Holy Spirit from both the 
Father and the Son. The Greeks claimed that the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Father alone, 
through the Son, just as the pool proceeds not from the stream but from the spring, through 
the stream. Anselm argued that this would be true if there were a temporal or spatial 
procession of the Father to the Son, so that the Spirit was from the Father before it was from 
the Son, as the water in the pool proceeds initially from the spring, passing afterwards 
through the stream but not proceeding from the stream. However,  
 
since the Son born from the Father does not go outside the Father but, remaining 
in him, is not distinct from the Father in place or time or essence; and since that 
from which the Holy Spirit proceeds is one and the same for the Father and the 
Son, we neither can understand nor ought to say that the Holy Spirit proceeds 
from the Father and not from the Son. Therefore, we it seems that we cannot say 
rationally that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, but from the Father 
through the Son, since even if he be through the Son, he cannot not be from the 
Son.
658
 
 
Although some masters of dialectic such as Roscelin and Abelard were notorious for 
highlighting the inadequacies of physical analogies for metaphysical concepts, pushing them 
beyond their capacity in order to draw potentially dangerous or absurd conclusions, the 
majority of twelfth-century authors continued to recognize their utility. The nature of the 
Trinity was so far beyond human understanding that no form of argument or illustrative 
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model would ever suffice as a complete explanation of its mysteries. Traditional analogies 
such as those used by Augustine continued to be employed alongside other forms of 
argumentation, as Anselm had done in his treatises De incarnatione and De processione.
659
 
As long as they were read in the spirit Anselm had intended, as illustrations of particular 
aspects of the Trinity, rather than exact scientific models, there was nothing controversial 
about them, and little reason to discuss his reworking of orthodox ideas and images in 
scholastic texts. Unlike his original contributions to contemporary debates on key subjects 
such as the necessity of the incarnation, in Cur Deus homo, there was little in Anselm’s 
writing on the Trinity to stimulate active debate in the schools of the early twelfth century. 
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Conclusions 
 
Anselm’s thought was of considerable importance in the development of twelfth-century 
thought, and was certainly of more widespread and diverse impact than has previously been 
established. Far from being a minor figure within the formative years of scholasticism, 
Anselm remained, in key areas of doctrinal evolution, central. The resurgence of his thought 
in the later twelfth and early thirteenth centuries was part of a continuity of interest, different 
in shape and contour across the theological landscape but ever-present. 
It is the major contention of this thesis that Anselm’s thinking on a number of 
theological subjects provided crucial material for the development of theology in north-
western Europe during the twelfth century. At the Cathedral schools, the nascent University 
of Paris, and in monastic locations, Anselmian themes were openly debated, and Anselmian 
questions explored. Anselm’s thought, it has been suggested, lay at the heart of major 
doctrinal development on the theology of the redemption, and contributed significantly in 
other areas too, on the questions surrounding free will and sin. In a more limited, but no less 
important way, Anselm’s Trinitarian thought was engaged with, although not to the extent as 
would be the case in the thirteenth century, when his thought would underpin two seemingly 
contradictory approaches to the understanding of the Trinity. In the case of his Trinitarian 
thought, Anselm’s twelfth century legacy was less to challenge than to explain.  
If one of the characteristic directions of twelfth century theological thinking was the 
work of redemption, as Hugh of St Victor expressed it, then this was in large part built upon 
Anselmian foundations. The question of how the economy of salvation operated, the place 
and role of reason in establishing the necessity and fittingness of atonement through Christ 
drew throughout the period on Anselmian vocabulary and intellectual practice. Similarly the 
challenge to older modes of thought in the question of the rights of the devil has within it 
something of the same critical spirit that would characterize early scholastic thought. Anselm 
was invoked in more polemical circumstances, both in theological engagement over the 
Trinity with Roscelin, but also in the Christian-Jewish polemical literature of the early twelfth 
century. Here once more, his thought can be seen to be inspirational; he was not always 
followed, his line of reasoning was not always accepted, but the notion of a question-centred 
approach to doctrinal inquiry was a large part of his theological method, and an important 
contribution to the later medieval intellectual landscape.  
Within the ensuing discussion the different communities within which his thought 
moved has been striking. To that extent a study of his influence shows something of the 
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personal and community structures upon which twelfth century theology was grounded and in 
which it was nurtured and developed. Communities of learning that were inter-connected 
encouraged debate and meditation upon contemporary thought alongside the Bible, the 
Fathers, classical authorities and early medieval writings. Twelfth-century authors might be 
chary of acknowledging the role of the moderni in theological debate, but to trace the 
influence of Anselm’s thought within these circles shows the extent to which these 
communities were fluid, permeable and inventive. Finally, this discussion reveals something 
more too of the multiplicity of currents of theological thought in a period of considerable 
intellectual fecundity. Anselm himself wrote in a controlled and remarkably consistent 
manner, which few after him were able to mimic. It is, however, the variety of theological 
visions to which his thought contributed that might be emphasized. The development of 
theology in the early twelfth century was a product of multiple influences and multiple 
centres, from which its creative energy derived.  
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Appendix 
Manuscripts of Anselm’s Works in England, Normandy and Flanders 
 
An exhaustive survey of all known manuscripts of Anselm’s works in the early twelfth 
century lies far beyond the scope of this thesis. The following tables are by no means 
comprehensive, but aim to provide a general overview of the distribution of Anselm 
manuscripts in the key areas of England, Normandy and Flanders. Some of the manuscripts 
listed are still extant and identified in modern collections; these are indicated by underlining 
where they appear in the tables. Others are known only from references in medieval book 
lists and library catalogues. As we often have no way of dating manuscripts from later 
medieval catalogues which are no longer extant or have not been identified, I have included 
information from thirteenth- and fourteenth-century catalogues, as it is possible that some of 
these manuscripts may be of an early date.  
 The difficulties of establishing precise dates for individual manuscripts mean that it is 
often impossible to state with any certainty when a text became available at a given location, 
or when individual readers may have gained their first access. These difficulties were 
highlighted by Thomas Bestul in his examination of the manuscript tradition of Cur Deus 
homo in the twelfth century.
660
 Nevertheless, as Bestul’s work has shown, there is much to be 
gained from a study of the manuscript evidence for the transmission of texts, and a detailed 
analysis of the availability of the corpus as a whole, combining what can be deduced of 
exemplars and manuscript families with a prosopographical study of the relationships 
between monastic houses and individual scribes and scholars, would be an extremely 
worthwhile study for future research on the reception of Anselm’s thought. 
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Key to Tables 
 
Items which have been underlined represent extant manuscripts. Items which have not been 
underlined represent manuscripts that are only known through medieval booklists and library 
catalogues. 
 
Abbreviations 
 
M: Monologion 
P: Proslogion 
DG: De grammatico 
DV: De ueritate 
DLA: De libertate arbitrii 
DCD: De casu diaboli 
DIV: De incarnatione Verbi 
CDH: Cur Deus homo 
DCV: De conceptu uirginali 
DPSS: De processione Spiritus Sancti 
DC: De concordia 
MRH: Meditatio redemptionis humanae 
Med.: Meditationes 
Or.: Orationes 
Ep.: Epistolae 
DSAF: Epistola de sacrificio azimi et fermentati 
DSE: Epistola de sacramentis ecclesiae 
DS: De similitudinibus 
DB: De beatitudine 
DA: Dicta Anselmi 
 
Mtf. (Table 2 only): indicates a reference in Montfaucon’s 1739 Bibliotheca Bibliothecarum. 
Unless otherwise identified, these manuscripts are undated. 
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Table 1 – Anselm Manuscripts in England 
 M P DG DV DLA DCD DIV CDH DCV DPSS DC MRH Med. Or. Ep. DSAF DSE DS DB DA 
Bradsole             By 
C13ii 
       
Bridlington             By 
C12ii 
       
Bristol             C13i C13i       
Buildwas             C12ii        
Burton on Trent        By c. 
1175 
 By c. 
1175 
          
Bury St 
Edmunds 
C12i C12i C12i C12i C12i; 
C12i 
C12i C12i  C12i C12i C12i; 
C12i 
 C12i  C12i; 
C12i 
  C12i C12i  
Christ Church, 
Canterbury 
C12i C12i C12i C12i C12i C12i C12i C12i C12i C12i C12i C12i C12i C12i C12i C12i C12i    
St Augustine’s, 
Canterbury 
By 
C14 
By 
C14 
By 
C14 
By 
C14 
By 
C14 
By 
C14 
By 
C14 
By 
C14 
By 
C14 
By 
C14 
By 
C14 
By 
C14 
By 
C14 
By 
C14 
By 
C14 
By 
C14 
 By 
C14 
By 
C14 
 
Chester C12/13       C12/ 
13 
            
Dover  By 
1389 
          By 
1389 
       
Durham C12i; 
C12ii 
C12i; 
C12ii 
 C12i C12i C12i C12i C12i C12i    C12ii C12i; 
C12ii 
     C12ii 
Exeter   C12i C12i C12i C12i C12i C12i C12i   C12i  C12i  C12i     
Glastonbury    By 
C13i 
   C12i 
By 
C13i 
  By 
C13i 
    By 
C13i 
    
Hinton             By 
C14i 
       
Lanthony C12 C12   C12i  C12i C12 C12 C12i     C12i   C12i   
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 M P DG DV DLA DCD DIV CDH DCV DPSS DC MRH Med. Or. Ep. DSAF DSE DS DB DA 
Maidstone               C13      
Malmesbury C12i C12i C12i C12i C12i C12i C12i C12i C12i C12i C12i C12i   C12i      
Meaux       c. 
1197-
1210 
     c. 
1197-
1210 
       
Newcastle  C13i  C13i C13i    C13i C13i          C13i 
Northampton C12i C12i     C12i              
Norwich C13ii C13ii  C13ii C13ii C13ii C13ii C13ii C13ii C13ii C13ii C13ii C13ii C12ii/
C13 
 C13ii     
Pershore C12   C12 C12 C12 C12  C12            
Peterborough By 
C14ii 
By 
C14ii 
By 
C14ii 
By 
C14ii 
By 
C14ii 
By 
C14ii 
C12ii;  
By 
C14ii 
By 
C14ii 
By 
C14ii 
By 
C14ii 
By 
C14ii 
By 
C14ii 
C12ii; 
By 
C14ii 
By 
C14ii 
 By 
C14ii 
    
Ramsey By 
C14ii 
By 
C14ii 
By 
C14ii 
By 
C14ii 
By 
C14ii 
By 
C14ii 
By 
C14ii 
By 
C14ii 
By 
C14ii 
By 
C14ii 
By 
C14ii 
 By 
C14ii 
By 
C14ii 
 By 
C14ii 
    
Reading By 
1192 
By 
1192 
 By 
1192 
By 
1192 
By 
1192 
By 
1192 
By 
1192; 
C13i 
By 
1192 
By 
1192 
By 
1192 
By 
1192 
C13ii C13ii  By 
1192 
    
Rievaulx By 
C12ii 
By 
C12ii 
By 
C12ii 
By 
C12ii 
By 
C12ii 
By 
C12ii 
By 
C12ii 
By 
C12ii 
By 
C12ii 
 By 
C12ii 
By 
C12ii 
   By 
C12ii 
By 
C12ii 
   
Rochester        By 
1122-
23 
            
Southwick        C12i C12i   C12i         
St Albans       C12i              
Tewkesbury C12/13 C12/13 C12/13 C12/13 C12/13 C12/13 C12/13 C12/13  C12/13 C12/13    C12/13 C12/13     
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 M P DG DV DLA DCD DIV CDH DCV DPSS DC MRH Med. Or. Ep. DSAF DSE DS DB DA 
Thame     C12i           C12     
Waltham        By 
C12ii 
By 
C12ii 
       C13    
Witham             C13        
Worcester          C12i      C12i     
Worksop          By 
1187 
  By 
1187 
By 
1187 
 By 
1187 
    
                     
York By 
1372 
By 
1372 
By 
1372 
By 
1372 
By 
1372 
By 
1372 
By 
1372 
By 
1372 
By 
1372 
By 
1372 
By 
1372 
 By 
1372 
By 
1372 
 By 
1372 
 By 
1372 
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Table 2 – Anselm Manuscripts in Northern France, Normandy and Flanders 
 
 M P DG DV DLA DCD DIV CDH DCV DPSS DC MRH Med. Or. Ep. DSAF DSE DS DB DA 
Anchin C12 C12  C12 C12 C12 C12 C12 C12 C12      C12     
Arras, Saint-
Vaast 
C11ii/ 
C12i 
  C12i    C12i; C13  C13  C12  C12       
Bouhier        C12             
Caen, Saint-
Etienne 
       C12i             
Cambrai 
Cathedral 
C13 C13  C13 C13 C13  C13 C12; 
C13 
C13 C13  C13   C13   C12  
Cambrai, 
Saint-Aubert 
C14i C14i  C14i C14i C14i C14i C14i C14i C14i C14i  C14i   C14i C14i    
Chalons-sur-
Marne 
             C13       
Chartres 
Chapitre 
        C13     C13    C13   
Chartres 
Saint-Père 
   C12 C12 C12 C11ii/ 
C12i ; 
C12 
C12 C12 C12  C12    C12 C12  C11ii/ 
C12i 
 
Citeaux  C12 C12 C12 C12 C12 C12 C12 C12 C12 C12 C12 C12   C12 C12    
Clairvaux C12; 
C13 
C12; 
C13 
 C12; 
C12ii; 
C13 
C12; 
C13 
C12; 
C13 
C12; 
C12ii; 
C13 
C12ii; 
C13; C13; 
C13 
C12; 
C13 
C12; 
C13 
C13 C12 C12ii C12; 
C12ii 
C12; 
C13 
C13  C13   
Derelie         C13            
Evreux 
Cathedral 
   C12 C12 C12 C12  C12            
Fecamp     C12 C12               
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 M P DG DV DLA DCD DIV CDH DCV DPSS DC MRH Med. Or. Ep. DSAF DSE DS DB DA 
Fleury    C13/ 
14 
C13/ 
14 
C13/ 
14 
C13/ 
14 
C13/ 
14 
            
Jumièges C12 C12 C12 C12 C12; 
C12; 
C13 
C12 C12 C12 C12 C12 C12          
Laon, Notre 
Dame 
C13 C13 C13    C13 C13             
Le Bec C12 C12; 
Mtf. 
C12 C12; 
Mtf. 
C12; 
Mtf. 
C12 C12 C12; 
Mtf.; Mtf. 
C12; 
Mtf. 
C12; 
Mtf. 
Mtf. Mtf. Mtf. Mtf. C12; 
Mtf.; 
Mtf. 
Mtf. Mtf. Mtf. Mtf.  
Lyre              C12    Mtf.   
Magnin         C13            
Marciennes C12 C12  C12   C12 C12             
Marmoutier  C11ii  C12    C12     C13ii        
Mont Saint-
Michel 
Mtf. Mtf.  Mtf. Mtf. Mtf.  Mtf. Mtf. Mtf.           
Paris, Notre 
Dame 
   By 1297                 
Paris, Saint-
Victor 
C12i C12i; 
C12i 
 C12i  C12i   C12i C12i C12i     C12i     
Pithou C13 C13  C13  C13 C13 C13 C13            
Saint-Amande C13/ 
14 
                 C12  
Saint-Bertin           C12          
Saint-Evroul C13/ 
14 
 C12 Mtf. Mtf.; 
Mtf. 
Mtf.  Mtf.       Mtf.; 
Mtf. 
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 M P DG DV DLA DCD DIV CDH DCV DPSS DC MRH Med. Or. Ep. DSAF DSE DS DB DA 
Tours, Saint-
Gatien 
 C13  C13  C13  C13 C13 C13    C13 C13 C13  C13 C13  
Tours, Saint-
Martin 
       C12             
Troyes, Saint-
Etienne 
  C12 C12 C12 C12 C12 C12 C12       C12 C12    
Verdun, Saint-
Vaast 
       C12             
Vezelay  C12ii                   
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